S&P Global Offerings
Featured Topics
Featured Products
Events
S&P Global Offerings
Featured Topics
Featured Products
Events
S&P Global Offerings
Featured Topics
Featured Products
Events
S&P Global Offerings
Featured Topics
Featured Products
Events
Solutions
Capabilities
Delivery Platforms
Our Methodology
Methodology & Participation
Reference Tools
Featured Events
S&P Global
S&P Global Offerings
S&P Global
Research & Insights
Solutions
Capabilities
Delivery Platforms
Our Methodology
Methodology & Participation
Reference Tools
Featured Events
S&P Global
S&P Global Offerings
S&P Global
Research & Insights
Crude Oil
March 10, 2025
By Aresu Eqbali
HIGHLIGHTS
Foreign ministry spokesman confirms willingness
'Maximum pressure' already felt
Critical juncture approaches
Iran is open to negotiations concerning the military uses of its nuclear program but is not willing to discuss dismantling its civilian nuclear program, the country's United Nations mission said on March 9.
"If the objective of negotiations is to address concerns vis-à-vis any potential militarization of Iran's nuclear program, such discussions may be subject to consideration," Iran's UN mission said on X. "However, should the aim be the dismantlement of Iran's peaceful nuclear program to claim that what Obama failed to achieve has now been accomplished, such negotiations will never take place."
The statement came soon after US President Donald Trump wrote a letter addressed to Iran's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, saying he aims to negotiate a nuclear deal while keeping military options open.
At a press conference on March 10, Iran foreign ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei told reporters that Iran had not yet received the letter but confirmed that Iran was open to negotiations if the US was not "threatening" in its approach.
"We have never closed doors to negotiations," Baghaei said. "But at the same time, we don't consider it negotiation if the talks are proposed through intimidating and threatening. Negotiations with pressure and a bullish approach have no point."
Trump has implemented a "maximum pressure" campaign to target Iran's oil exports and revenues, coinciding with a period of significant economic decline in the country. Most recently, the US decided it would not renew the power sanctions waivers that Iraq relied on for years to import electricity from neighboring Iran.
After Trump tightened sanctions on Iranian oil exports during his first term, Iran's oil exports dropped from 2.3 million b/d in 2018 to 1.1 million b/d in 2019 and 585,900 b/d in 2020. During former US President Joe Biden's term, Iran's overseas shipments recovered to more than 1.7 million b/d in 2024.
Iran's crude output dropped to 1.95 million b/d in August 2020 during Trump's first term, according to the Platts OPEC+ survey by Commodity Insights. In January, Iran produced 3.2 million b/d.
The Iranian rial's continuous devaluation against the US dollar, the exacerbation of poverty, and the mounting inflation rate have contributed to the growth of social discontent in Iran -- as evidenced by protests that have led to bloodshed and proved to be a potential threat to the ruling establishment.
The sanctions have exacted a substantial toll on Iran, forcing the OPEC member to produce and sell less crude than it otherwise might and losing petrodollars in the course of the trades, leading to budget deficits. The sanctions have also cut Iran's access to its oil money and left its energy sector without foreign investment to enhance outdated facilities.
Suffering from a debilitated private sector, the state and semi-state economy defers shortages to the shrinking middle class. Despite massive hydrocarbon resources, Iran's public utilities are underdeveloped, and the country manages shortages of gas, water, power and fuel by cutting industrial and household subscribers.
Tehran's diminishing bargaining power is also evident in its reduced capacity to influence regional dynamics through military proxies, a role that was previously instrumental in stabilizing the war-stricken region.
Since October 2023, the regional landscape has undergone a significant transformation, as Tehran's allies in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen have been weakened or defeated.
The military engagement between Iran and Israel has not resulted in meaningful deterrence. Iran's missile and drone capabilities, which have been a subject of considerable speculation in recent years, were put into practice in 2024 without proving to be as hindering to Israel as anticipated.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has initiated a campaign of pressure on Iran regarding its stockpiling of high-grade enriched uranium – described as near-weapon grade. The move has garnered the support of Britain, France, and Germany, signatories to the 2015 nuclear agreement, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The Troika has the authority to impose penalties through the snapback mechanism. This mechanism, which is set to expire on Oct. 18, 2025, could result in the re-imposition of multilateral sanctions on Iran that were previously lifted when the JCPOA took effect.
While the international community perceives Tehran as needing substantial change to avert an economic crisis, direct negotiations with Washington are not solely a matter of diplomacy.
President Masoud Pezeshkian, who assumed office in late July, secured a narrow electoral victory through a campaign centered on re-engagement with the West, a strategy that is widely regarded as pivotal to addressing the nation's economic challenges.
Following their loss in the presidential elections, hardliners who wield significant power and enjoy the support of Khamenei have engaged in interference and sabotage, hindering the administration's economic efforts. This interference has manifested in the dismissal of the economy minister, Abdolnaser Hemmati, on March 2 by the conservative-dominated parliament.
A day later, Mohammad-Javad Zarif, the JCPOA architect, submitted his resignation under the mounting pressure of the hardliners. The two incidents were regarded in the country as political revenge. Zarif's appointment as vice president for strategic affairs was a sign of the new Iranian government's intention to revive anticipated nuclear negotiations.
Khamenei gave a hint of support for talks with the US in January; however, in February, he reversed his stance, ruling out any benefit from interacting with the US and asserting that such talks were dishonorable.
Since the all-powerful cleric dismissed direct talks with the US again, influential hardliners loyal to the leader have restarted a campaign against direct talks with the US. This ideological stance, rooted in a profound mistrust, underlies Iran's approach toward the US.
However, Tehran is approaching a critical juncture where it must decide whether to acquiesce to a deal that would alleviate the crippling sanctions imposed by the US administration.
Khamenei's recent stance indicates a preference for indirect negotiations, a strategy that Tehran and Washington have been employing for an extended period. The prevailing sentiment among observers is that the likelihood of achieving substantive outcomes through interceding talks is minimal, and time is of the essence.
Historically, various countries, from Oman to France, have mediated between Iran and the US. However, considering the recent developments, a curious volunteer has emerged: Moscow, a strategic ally of Iran, has formally declared that Russia is the optimal candidate for this task.
The proposition of Russia as a mediator has caused skepticism among non-hardliner politicians in Iran, who have invoked cases where Russia was previously accused of sabotaging the JCPOA. It is feared that Moscow might help impose the US demands on Iran in an attempt to forge its own deal with Washington to end the war in Ukraine.
"There will be probably a meeting with the Europeans soon before this Iranian year ends [March 20]," Baghaei said on March 10.