Multidimensional Global Energy Pathways​

The global energy system has been in a state of continuous transition for decades, influenced by geopolitics, market factors, and technological change. In recent years, the system has entered a period of sustained volatility: geopolitical disruption, supply chain fragility, affordability pressures and fast‑changing national policies. To navigate this complexity, the energy and climate discourse needs a path back to pragmatism - objective and inclusive discussion recognizing the very different perspectives between advanced and developing economies on their respective energy and climate priorities. As highlighted in the International Energy Forum report “Shaping a Living Roadmap for Energy Transition (2023)”, long term energy pathways must be ‘multidimensional’, recognizing the interplay and trade‑offs between energy security, affordability, and sustainability, as well as the system constraints, delivery realities and regional conditions that determine how energy systems actually evolve.

Within this context, this new study offers a realistic, nationally differentiated approach to long-term energy, emissions and climate projections. This synthesis, and the associated in‑depth analysis, provides a set of differentiated energy pathways for emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs)¹ and for advanced economies.  The analysis will facilitate a return to a discourse grounded in the complex realities of national energy systems.

¹ The EMDE group of countries as defined by the IMF includes around 150 developing and emerging economies. In this study, China is not included in the EMDE grouping.

This new report provides a fresh and fundamentally different approach to long-term projections of energy, emissions and global temperature.  

Rather than beginning with a predetermined emissions or temperature outcome, or projections based on national policy targets, it starts with demand, country‑level realities and system constraints. It then assesses how different priorities could shape plausible futures. The result is an actionable view of the energy future for policymakers, investors and corporations in assessing strategy, emissions targets, transition risk, valuation and climate resilience planning. 

The central tenet is a structural shift in the location of energy demand growth toward emerging markets and developing economies. Economic development – not policy aspiration alone – will be the primary driver of demand, energy mix and technology adoption. The transition is therefore not defined only by decarbonizing existing demand in advanced economies and China. It is increasingly defined by how the world meets large volumes of new demand while also reducing emissions, strengthening security and preserving affordability. The pathways presented in this report are designed to reflect these evolving realities. They differ from many existing scenario frameworks in four important ways. 

First, the pathways are demand-led, with particular focus on the EMDEs. They do not begin with a predetermined emissions or temperature outcome. They begin with a bottom-up country‑level view of projected demand for energy services in the major EMDEs, then assess how that demand could realistically be met under different policy priorities. 

Second, the pathways are grounded in country-level realities. The analysis builds on detailed energy system modeling of twelve major emerging markets and developing economies, which together represent a significant share of global demand growth.  

This approach captures differences in resource endowments and development priorities.  

Third, the pathways are constrained by delivery realities: finance, infrastructure, supply chains, land availability, institutional capacity and the pace of technology adoption. This keeps the analysis grounded in what can plausibly be built, financed and operated. Many studies skip over these real-world on-the-ground constraints.  Large scale commercialization of new disruptive energy or emissions technologies, such as nuclear fusion, is assumed not to occur within the forecast period, though this is acknowledged as an upside uncertainty.  

Fourth, the pathways are multi-objective. They assess energy system evolution not only through the lens of emissions reduction, but also through affordability, reliability, energy security and broader energy prosperity. 

All pathways also recognize what the 2015 UN Paris Agreement described as the “differentiated responsibilities” for emissions reduction between advanced and developing economies. This means recognizing that they differ in economic resources and capabilities.  A country with a $3,000 per capita average income is in a very different position from a country with $60,000 per capita average. The extent of this differentiation varies across pathways, as highlighted in the report.

The analysis uses a two-stage architecture – first analyzing the fast-growing EMDE energy markets and then building the global picture. Stage one begins with detailed bottom-up modeling of twelve major EMDEs selected for their scale, diversity and importance to future demand growth: Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, India, Indonesia, Viet Nam, Thailand, and Malaysia. 

Other EMDE countries are assessed using a simplified top-down approach to give a total aggregate view for all EMDEs (excluding China). These results are then integrated with pathways for advanced economies and China to create a coherent global outlook that preserves country-level detail while allowing comparison across pathways.

Three global pathways are defined within this framework. 

The Current Realities Pathway (CRP) reflects a continuation of the complex reality of a global energy system with multiple, differing and ever-changing energy policy objectives: 

• Lack of global consensus around reducing emissions; volatile and multi-objective energy & climate policy in many countries. 
• Emphasis on energy affordability, especially in EMDEs. 
• Continuation of legacy systems; investment in low carbon solutions constrained by finance and affordability. 

The Emissions Reduction Pathway (ERP) characterizes a broad global consensus and drive on prioritizing reduction in GHG emissions, while recognizing the differentiated responsibilities of advanced economies and EMDEs in achieving this. Key characteristics include: 

• Reducing GHG emissions at the fastest credible rate as a key objective of energy policy in all countries – within realistic boundaries set by security, affordability and other factors. 
• Coordinated global action based on equitable outcomes. 
• Strong investment in energy efficiency to curtail demand growth. 

The Diverging Priorities Pathway (DPP) reflects a twin-track pathway in which the advanced economies and China prioritize reducing emissions, as per ERP, while the EMDEs continue to emphasize energy affordability and security, as per CRP: 

• Strong climate action across advanced economies and China, 
• Investments in low carbon energy in EMDEs where this supports energy security and affordability goals. 

Countries will prioritize objectives according to individual circumstances, resulting in a broad spectrum of national priorities and outcomes within the envelope of each pathway. Figure 2 provides an illustrative conceptual mapping of individual country priorities for each of the pathways using a simple energy trilemma framework.

A changing center of gravity: EMDEs as the primary demand driver

A defining feature of the pathways is the concentration of energy demand growth in emerging markets and developing economies.

By 2060, EMDE primary energy demand grows over 60% in the Current Realities Pathway, adding 155 EJ² to the global energy system - equivalent to adding another China. This is despite significant improvements in energy efficiency over the period.

The advanced economies (AEs) and China, by contrast, see broadly flat primary energy demand over the long term, as final energy consumption rises slowly and energy efficiency improves. Power demand from data centers will be significant, and artificial intelligence (AI) will add new load to electricity systems in all regions, with commensurate increase in emissions. However, at the global level these impacts remain relatively small compared with the broader scale of long-term energy demand growth across EMDEs. AI may also reduce demand by improving efficiency, optimization, asset utilization and system management, making its net effect more complex than a simple increase in power consumption. Nevertheless, there remains considerable uncertainty over the impact of AI and data centers, with potential upside on the demand projections shown in Figure 3.

This EMDE energy growth reflects population expansion, urbanization, industrialization and rising incomes. As access, reliability and affordability improve, households, businesses and industries consume more energy. Efficiency helps dampen demand, but it does not offset the scale of development-driven growth or the resulting demand for infrastructure, fuels and technology deployment within the EMDEs. Nevertheless, energy consumption per capita, and notably the use of electricity, remains far below the advanced economies throughout the forecast period.

² Exajoules (EJ) are units of energy in the International System of Units (SI) and are a widely accepted measure for comparing and combining alternative sources of energy

Substitution and expansion

The scale and persistence of this demand growth in EMDEs has important implications for how the transition is understood. A large share of new low-carbon supply will be needed simply to serve incremental demand in EMDEs. It will not immediately displace existing fossil fuel use. The result is an additive transition: the system expands in absolute terms, multiple fuels and technologies coexist for longer, and emissions reduction is slower than growth in renewable capacity alone might imply.

For the EMDEs, meeting this growing need for energy is core to industrial and economic development. It is also the central force shaping infrastructure needs, fuel demand, emissions trajectories and investment requirements. This dynamic is particularly pronounced in lower income economies. In these markets, improvements in access and reliability can unlock previously unmet demand. This leads to step changes in consumption rather than gradual transitions from one energy source to another.

Energy demand in alternative pathways

In the Current Realities Pathway, global primary energy demand increases by over 10% (72 EJ) by 2040 and approximately one quarter (161 EJ) by 2060. In contrast, in the Emissions Reduction Pathway, overall global demand remains broadly stable out to 2060, with an 86 EJ increase in the EMDEs offset by an 83 EJ decline in the advanced economies and China, as more rapid efficiency gains and electrification offset much of the growth in underlying energy services. An intermediate outcome is observed in the Diverging Priorities Pathway, where demand grows by 72 EJ by 2060, again with all growth concentrated in the EMDEs.

Renewables grow fast but fossil fuels remain significant 

The additive dynamic of an EMDE-driven energy expansion leads to a prolonged period in which multiple energy sources operate in parallel. This is reflected in certain common trends across the pathways:

• Renewable energy becomes the dominant source of incremental supply, particularly after 2035 in emissions-focused pathways.
• Electrification shifts demand toward the power system but does not eliminate underlying fuel use; fossil fuels continue to provide baseline supply, flexibility, and industrial inputs.
• No primary energy source will be completely ‘transitioned out’ for the foreseeable future.

The persistence of this coexistence reflects structural constraints, which are most strongly represented in the Current Realities Pathway:

• Existing infrastructure has long lifetimes, often several decades.
• Capital stock turnover is gradual, particularly in industry and power generation.
• Demand growth absorbs a large share of new capacity, particularly in EMDEs.

The additive nature of the transition also has important implications for how progress is interpreted. 

First, rapid growth in renewable capacity does not necessarily translate into immediate declines in fossil fuel use. In many cases, both increase simultaneously, reflecting the scale of demand growth. Metrics focused on shares or rates of change can obscure underlying system expansion. 

Second, emissions reductions follow a similar pattern. Carbon intensity declines relatively quickly, but absolute emissions respond more slowly in countries where demand growth is strong. 

Fossil fuel persistence across all pathways

Fossil fuels in aggregate decline long term across all pathways, but they remain structurally embedded through to 2060 and beyond.  

For example, in the Current Realities Pathway:

• Fossil fuels remain a dominant part of the energy mix, with share declining from close to 80 percent today to around 60 percent by 2060.
• Absolute oil demand declines only modestly, from 101 million barrels per day in 2025 to 93 million barrels per day in 2060, including feedstocks.
• Natural gas demand grows by nearly 20% by 2040 and by over a third by 2060.
• Coal declines markedly, falling 40% by 2060, but still remains critical for secure, low‑cost power, especially in EMDEs.

In the Emissions Reduction Pathway:

• Oil demand falls to approximately 59 million barrels per day by 2060.
• Natural gas demand remains broadly flat to 2040 but declines by nearly one third by 2060 as renewables and batteries rapidly scale up.
• Coal declines sharply, halving by 2040 and falling nearly 80% by 2060, particularly in the power sector.

The intermediate Diverging Priorities Pathway sees demand trajectories for fossil fuels between these two pathways.

Despite the variations, one conclusion is consistent across pathways: while fossil fuels decline as a share of the system, a full fossil fuel phase-out is not envisaged over the next 40 years and will be unlikely before the end of the century. For the EMDEs, gas is likely to function less as a short-lived transition fuel and more as a destination fuel: a long-term component of the energy mix that supports reliability, industrialization and the displacement of more carbon‑intensive coal.

Fossil fuels persist because they perform functions that are difficult or expensive to replace. They provide dispatchable capacity in power systems, high-temperature heat and feedstocks in industry, liquid fuels for long-distance transport and strategic security for countries with domestic resources. In addition, hydrocarbons play a growing role in supporting the transition itself, through:

• Production of materials required for low carbon energy infrastructure (plastics, composites, chemicals).
• Providing energy to supply chains linked to renewable energy, electrification, and energy storage.

As a result, investment in oil and gas supply remains necessary in all pathways. The rate of production decline from existing fields means replacement supply is required even when demand is falling. The Current Realities Pathway will require close to US$14 trillion capital investment in upstream oil and gas supply through 2060, an average of US$300–400 billion per year. The Emissions Reduction Pathway envisages over US$11 trillion of investment over the same period.

Regional variation in fossil fuel use and its implications

The role of fossil fuels varies across regions depending on level of economic development and domestic resource endowment.

• In EMDEs, hydrocarbons remain prominent, reflecting rapid demand growth, affordability considerations, and domestic resource availability. Oil demand across the EMDEs increases by 40% by 2060 and demand for natural gas increases by 58% in the Current Realities Pathway.
• In advanced economies and China, fossil fuel demand declines in all pathways, supported by stronger policy frameworks and low/no long-term energy demand growth.

One consequence is that in specific contexts, targeted fossil fuel investment in EMDEs may be more consistent with the principles of the UN Paris Agreement than similar investment in advanced economies, particularly where it supports development, energy security or displacement of higher-emissions energy. Investment to reduce emissions can also be more effective in EMDEs, where existing energy systems are often more carbon intensive and where replacing coal or inefficient fuels can deliver larger global emissions benefits per dollar invested than in advanced economies.

Developing location-relevant decarbonization pathways for industrial sectors will therefore require a more sophisticated view of where emissions occur and where energy is ultimately used. This is especially important for international energy companies, whose supply chains and products often cross borders. A company may produce hydrocarbons in an advanced economy for export and use in a developing economy, meaning that both upstream emissions and downstream Scope 3 product-use emissions need to be assessed in context. LNG is a clear example: imported LNG underpins long‑term economic growth in multiple developing economies in the pathways presented in this report, and in some countries, it can also displace higher‑emissions coal-based generation.

These net global emissions benefits are generally not recognized in the policies and regulations of the producing country, underscoring the need for transition frameworks that consider global outcomes.

Electrification as a key transition vector 

Electrification is the most important decarbonization lever across all pathways. It enables low-carbon power to reduce direct fossil fuel use in transport, buildings and parts of industry, and it is central to any robust decarbonization pathway. Electrification of demand is delivered through, for example:

• Rapid uptake of electric vehicles in road transport. 
• Increasing penetration of electric heating and cooling in buildings. 
• Gradual electrification of low- and medium‑temperature industrial processes.

In all pathways electricity demand grows faster than total energy demand, reaching average 38% of final energy demand by 2060 in the Current Realities Pathway from around 22% today, and more than doubling to 47% in the Emissions Reduction Pathway.

Nevertheless, the pathways reflect the practical limits that start to become apparent long before full system electrification is achieved. Heavy industry, air and marine transport and some building uses remain difficult to electrify at acceptable cost or performance. Transportation is the most difficult sector to electrify. Currently, electricity provides 2% of the sector’s energy globally, and this only rises to 14% in the CRP and 28% in the ERP by 2060³.

Even the somewhat easier-to-electrify residential sector sees only around 50% of end use energy provided by electricity by 2060, as natural gas, LPG and traditional biomass retain significant market share.

³ These percentages represent the share of total energy provided by electricity. The higher efficiency of electric motors versus internal combustion engines means they do not reflect the relative market shares of electric vehicles and other electrified forms of transportation.

Electrification, renewables and emissions reduction

Electrification delivers meaningful emissions reductions in all pathways, but its impact is bounded by sectoral coverage and system constraints. The Emissions Reduction Pathway reveals two limitations:  

• The limits to electrifying final energy demand (discussed above).
• The limits to fully decarbonizing electricity at acceptable system cost.

In most countries, decarbonization of electricity is principally achieved through deployment of intermittent solar and wind generation. In the Emissions Reduction Pathway, a credible 2°C pathway, installed solar and wind generation capacity rises eight-fold globally by 2060 to reach 28,000 GW, with an eighteen-fold increase occurring in the EMDEs. This is accompanied by an even faster relative expansion of grid battery power capacity, rising from 250 GW to over 6,200 GW in 2060. Global nuclear generation also more than doubles by 2060.

From a regional perspective, the move from fossil-fuel to renewables generation occurs relatively more slowly in the EMDEs, particularly in the Current Realities Pathway, where additional renewable power is principally deployed to meet additional demand. The advanced economies and China see a much faster transition, with fossil fuels in the power system almost entirely replaced by renewable and nuclear energy by 2060 in the Emissions Reduction Pathway. 

From a cost perspective, in countries with low renewables penetration, solar and wind can be competitive with thermal generation even after accounting for full grid expansion and integration costs⁴. But the expectation of continuously declining renewable system costs and ever faster deployment becomes more challenged as penetration rises. Once intermittent solar and wind generation exceeds around 50–60%, integration costs rise rapidly, requiring transmission, storage, demand response, curtailment management and thermal backup capacity⁵. The Emissions Reduction Pathway will require cumulative capital investment of $50trillion globally through 2060 in power generation, storage, transmission and distribution – with solar and wind generation increasing from 18% of the total currently to 73% in 2060.

The practical challenge is therefore whether power systems can expand, decarbonize and remain reliable at the required pace, at affordable cost and within the limits of available finance.

⁴ Detailed analysis of system expansion requirements and renewable integration costs in the two pathways has been undertaken for twelve large EMDEs out to 2060.

⁵ This is consistent with the earlier findings in Yu Nagatomi et al. “Evaluating the System Integration Costs and Deployment Potential of Variable Renewable Energy”, in Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ) Outlook 2026 Challenges and Opportunities for Decarbonizing the Energy Sector in Emerging Economies, and with Obane et al. “Japan’s energy scenario up to 2050 : Topic 1 Strategies for Reducing Power System Costs” for IEEJ’s 60th Anniversary Event: Japan’s Energy Scenarios towards 2050

Energy Prosperity as an organizing framework 

A primary aim of the report is to provide practical insights into the implications of different energy system choices for policymakers and investors. With this aim, the report introduces the concept of energy prosperity, assessed through a new Energy Prosperity Indicator (EPI). The EPI provides quantitative assessment at a country level of key energy metrics. It is forward looking and, in this first issue of the report, evaluated for twelve major EMDEs out to 2060 to highlight the trade-offs, if any, between the components of energy prosperity and reducing emissions.  

The EPI is not intended to compare or rank countries. It is a non-judgmental tool to help policymakers understand how different pathways affect outcomes within their own national context and help them assess trade-offs and make decisions. Evaluating the EPI may help explain why two countries with similar emissions ambitions may choose very different transition strategies.

EPI outcomes for select countries

The EPI is assessed for twelve major EMDEs out to 2060 for both the Current Realities Pathway and the Emissions Reduction Pathway. Figure 14 provides a high-level snapshot of key outcomes.

The EPI assessment provides several key insights:

1. The trade-offs between emissions reduction and energy prosperity are highly country specific – there is no ‘one size fits all’ outcome or policy template. Nevertheless, a few general trends are apparent.
2. With few exceptions, pursuing emissions reduction goals increases long term system-wide national energy costs and reduces relative affordability. Across the major EMDEs, energy costs are expected to rise over the long term in both pathways, but per capita incomes rise faster, meaning that energy becomes more affordable – but more so in the Current Realities Pathway.
3. Conversely, for most EMDEs, national energy security, measured through energy import dependence, is enhanced through greater electrification and growth of domestic renewable energy. EMDEs endowed with large fossil fuel resources are more able to enhance energy security through development of these resources (Figure 15).
4. Local air quality improvement is an additional benefit from pursuing CO2 emissions reduction. This is a significant driver in countries experiencing major air pollution challenges such as India.
5. The Emissions Reduction Pathway requires much higher investment in power system expansion. This results in greater local job creation, especially in those countries able to maximize domestic supply chains. Corresponding loss of jobs in coal, oil and gas may prove politically contentious in some countries.
6. In many cases, trade-offs exist between the components of the EPI: for example, the challenge of providing affordable low-cost electricity while ensuring power system resiliency. 

The diversity of EPI outcomes explains why there is no realistic basis for assuming all countries will converge on a single optimal pathway, and why global outcomes remain spread across a range of trajectories rather than converging toward a single endpoint.

The challenge of net zero emissions: bending the curve  

The pathways produce markedly different trajectories for energy-related emissions, reflecting the speed of electrification, renewable deployment, efficiency gains and fossil fuel phase-down. Some advanced economies and China could get close to zero energy-related emissions by 2060. But the EMDEs will, with few exceptions, not achieve this goal until the end of the century at best. This has direct implications for transition risk and valuation, particularly where asset pricing, portfolio alignment or corporate strategy assumes rapid convergence toward global net zero by mid-century.

In the Current Realities Pathway, total energy-related greenhouse gas emissions decline slowly over the period, from 41 GtCO2e in 2025 to 36 GtCO2e in 2040 and 32 GtCO2e in 2060. This despite a 40% reduction in the emissions intensity of the global energy system. In the Emissions Reduction Pathway, energy emissions decline more rapidly as electrification, efficiency and power-sector decarbonization accelerate – decreasing by 37% by 2040 to 26 GtCO2e and by 68% by 2060 to 13 GtCO2e. However, even in this pathway, unabated fossil fuels remain embedded in hard-to-abate sectors and in power system balancing.

Early gains, then diminishing returns

The challenge of deep decarbonization is where the gap between ambition and deliverability becomes most visible. Early emissions gains come from efficiency, fuel switching and renewable deployment. These measures are relatively cost-effective and scalable, leading to significant reductions in emissions intensity over the next two decades across all pathways. In all countries, emissions reductions become progressively harder to achieve over time. Improvements in key drivers such as energy intensity, electrification rates, and renewable deployment begin to slow as systems approach technical and economic limits and as attention shifts to harder to abate sectors such as:

• Heavy industry (steel, cement, chemicals).
• Long-distance transport (aviation, shipping, heavy freight). 
• Non-energy emissions linked to industrial processes. 

In these sectors: 

• Electrification is limited or not feasible. 
• Alternative solutions, such as hydrogen or carbon capture, are less mature.
• Costs are higher and deployment is more complex.

As a result, the pace of emissions reduction slows over time, even in pathways where decarbonization is prioritized.  

Non-energy and total greenhouse gas emissions

Non-energy emissions account for slightly over one fifth of total GHG emissions today. In the Current Realities Pathway, they remain largely unchanged out to 2060. In the Emissions Reduction Pathway, policy actions are envisaged to also drive down non-energy emissions, with these being reduced by more than half by 2060. This will require a series of interventions across agricultural, industrial and waste management practices, as well as reversal of land-use change – principally deforestation⁶. This pathway also assumes use of direct air capture (DAC) to remove 2% (0.4 GtCO₂e) of residual emissions by 2060. In the intermediate Diverging Priorities Pathway, these interventions are applied in the advanced economies and China only.

As a result, total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions follow similar pathway trajectories to energy-related emissions, with a modest decline from 53 GtCO₂e to 44 GtCO₂e in the CRP and to around 18 GtCO₂e in the ERP by 2060. This points to a slower and more uneven decline in total greenhouse gas emissions than implied by net zero narratives (Figure 19). 

The report emphasizes the differentiation between the advanced and developing economies. Nevertheless, each country faces a unique set of opportunities and challenges, resulting in notable differences in individual country emissions. Figure 20 shows how energy-related emissions vary across countries in the two groups, highlighting there is no single linear pathway or timeline to net zero.

⁶ Achieving the required land-use carbon sink would require approximately 150–200 million hectares of highly productive forest, equivalent to the size of Mexico, under optimistic sequestration assumptions.

⁷ LULUCF = Land use, land use change, and forestry

The emissions results point to an important but caveated⁷ temperature conclusion: limiting warming to 2°C by the end of the century is achievable though increasingly challenging; a 1.5°C outcome is not achievable under currently plausible assumptions.

The ERP offers a ‘no overshoot’ pathway which limits warming to 2°C. It recognizes that EMDE energy emissions will rise over the next decade before, at best, declining only gradually thereafter. It also supposes heavy adoption of nature-based and other non-energy interventions. This pathway is more consistent with development realities than a global net zero 2050 / 1.5°C trajectory and provides a more credible basis for emissions target-setting and transition risk assessment.

An alternative pathway, represented by the CRP, that reflects a continuation of current multidimensional national policy objectives, limited global cooperation on climate change, and the continuing long-term role of legacy energy systems, anticipates a temperature increase of around 2.8°C by the end of the century. Such a pathway may be useful as a basis for adaptation and investment planning. 

⁷ Global temperature outcomes are estimated using the Hector reduced-complexity climate model, calibrated to be consistent with the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), and are reported as the median warming outcome above pre-industrial levels. Results are subject to the inherent uncertainties of reduced-complexity climate modeling.

The Emissions Reduction Pathway represents an ambitious roadmap for reducing emissions through to 2060. In this pathway global warming exceeds 1.8°C by mid century, so, to reduce warming to 1.5°C by the end of the century, large scale ‘negative emissions’ (CO₂ removal) would be required. A simple analysis indicates this would require average annual removal of over 25 GtCO₂ over the period 2060 – 2100: approximately 60% of current annual global energy-related emissions. Utilizing novel technologies such as direct air capture (DAC) and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) to achieve half of this removal could cost upwards of US$6 trillion per year, around 5% of current global GDP, and would involve insurmountable supply chain and CO₂ storage challenges. If the other half was achieved through afforestation and reforestation, the required sink would be comparable to establishing a net new forested area the size of the Amazon rainforest by the end of the century. Accelerating large scale emissions removal activities to pre-2060 would reduce the annual requirements somewhat, and other measures could also be applied. But even so, while CO₂ removal offers some potential to limit end-of-century warming to below 2°C, getting the world back to 1.5°C by 2100 is not feasible - in the absence of unforeseen technology breakthroughs or extreme multi-decade global economic recession.

Taken together, the results point to a future energy system that is larger, slower to decarbonize, more capital-intensive, more uncertain and more differentiated than many existing narratives suggest.  

• Demand growth in EMDEs means that many national energy systems must both expand and decarbonize: low-carbon energy must first meet rising demand before it can materially displace fossil fuel use. 
• Fuel mix and emissions trajectories will vary with levels of economic development, geography and resource endowment. 
• The pace of transition is not determined by ambition alone: it is bounded by the speed at which infrastructure can be permitted and built, capital can be mobilized, technologies can scale, supply chains can expand and consumers can adopt new solutions. 
• Electrification and renewables – while central to decarbonization – face infrastructure, cost and system integration limitations. As a result, fossil fuels phase down rather than phase out. 
• Global net zero is unlikely this century, even if achieved by the advanced economies and China. 
• Without unforeseen technology breakthroughs or extreme global economic disruptions, temperature outcomes will exceed the ambitious targets set at the time of the UN Paris Agreement in 2015.  
• Robust planning requires achievable pathways. Risk of capital misallocation increases if non‑feasible net zero goals are used as the basis for target-setting and investment planning. 
• All pathways bring growing climate risks, requiring greater investment in adaptation, and greater costs from extreme weather events.