Ethiopian security crackdown in Oromia region will likely spread violent protests, targeting road cargo and commercial property

Ethiopia has been under a state of emergency since 16 February, following the prime minister's resignation the previous day (see Ethiopia: 21 February 2018: Ethiopia's ruling coalition likely to remain stable after appointing consensus replacement for outgoing PM by end-March). On 10 March, in Moyale, Borena zone (Oromia), at least nine civilians were killed and 12 wounded by Ethiopian soldiers operating under the "Command Post" that oversees the state of emergency. State media subsequently claimed the soldiers acted based on a "mistaken intelligence report" that the military was pursuing Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) militants who had crossed into Ethiopia from Kenya, and that an investigation had been launched (see Ethiopia: 13 March 2018: Civilian deaths likely to spread violent protests in Ethiopia's Oromia region, limited military incursions into Kenya probable). Non-state Ethiopian media reported that some of those killed had been shot in the back at close range.

"Qeerroo": Oromo youth activists and protesters

These youth activists calling for the fuel blockade are referred to as 'Qeerroo', meaning 'unmarried youth' in the Afaan Oromo language. The Qeerroo function as a network of activist groups with shared anti-government grievances and calls for greater autonomy, wealth-sharing, and power in the national government for the Oromia region. These Qeerroo groups self-organised anti-government protests in late 2015, and originally had very little co-ordination with each other, growing instead by inspiration, particularly via social media. By mid-2016, most of these groups had begun taking direction from an underground central leadership composed of Oromo activists based in the diaspora, mid-level members of the Oromia region's ruling Oromo People's Democratic Organisation (OPDO) party, and members of the 'legal opposition' Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC).

Security crackdown in Oromia

Since the 2 March approval of the state of emergency by Ethiopia's parliament (which the constitution required to follow the emergency's declaration in February), the Oromia region has seen a spike in anti-government protests and general strikes, particularly in localities along the No 4 highway from Addis Ababa to Gimbi, and roads from Addis Ababa towards Dire Dawa. On 10 March, Oromo activists claimed at least 32 people had been killed by security forces since the beginning of the emergency, and that hundreds had been arrested. IHS Markit cannot confirm the scale of these arrests, and government statements refer to them only as being fewer in number than during the October 2016–August 2017 emergency, during which tens of thousands of suspected demonstrators were detained in response to widespread protests in the Oromia and Amhara regions (see Ethiopia: 4 November 2016: Ethiopian cabinet reshuffle unlikely to placate regions, but Oromo divisions likely to dilute protests, restoring government control). Last week, several Oromo activists and academics were re-arrested, and an Oromo activist leader based abroad claimed that three Oromia police commanders were detained by federal forces. On 12 March, judges postponed the verdict in the case of 38 inmates who allegedly organised a September 2016 prison fire in Addis Ababa.

Cumulatively, these re-arrests, verdict delays, and reports of hundreds of detentions are a departure from the government's prior policy of prisoner releases, which had continued during the early days of the emergency. This is in line with statements made on 7 March by Minister of Defence Siraj Fegessa, chairman of the "Command Post", who claimed that the protests were an attempted "colour revolution" orchestrated to by online "anarchists" who want to violently seize power.

New prime minister

The ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front's (EPRDF) executive committee began its meetings on 11 March (postponed from 1–3 March), and from these meetings an agreement on which of the four member parties' chairpersons should be proposed as the new prime minister will likely emerge. Nominees must then officially be approved by a vote of the 180-member EPRDF Council, after which parliament must endorse and approve the final candidate. IHS Markit sources indicate that the candidate for prime minister has already likely been chosen, but not officially announced. Minister for Science and Technology Abiy Ahmed, of the ODPO, is currently the most likely incoming prime minister.

Outlook and implications

The selection of an Oromo prime minister would likely reduce (but not end) the ongoing anti-government protests in Oromia in the one-month outlook. An early end to the state of emergency and orders to federal forces in Oromia to return to barracks would likely bring about a further decline in protests. However, this is an unlikely outcome if Abiy Ahmed is appointed prime minister, as it would bring him immediately into conflict with the security services and leading members of the EPRDF's dominant Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) party, and instead he is more likely to allow it to expire (by not asking parliament to renew it) after six months. Beyond the six-month outlook, the persistence of the anti-government protesters' grievances will continue to drive protest risks in Oromia.

The new security crackdowns will likely increase the spread and frequency of anti-government protests in Oromia. Further indicators of protests spreading would include security forces inflicting further fatalities at demonstrations or public gatherings, particularly around Orthodox Easter on 8 April, and the Oromo Irreecha Arfaasaa festival and local elections in May. The spread of anti-government demonstrations in the Oromia and Amhara regions would likely involve road blockades that disrupt cargo transportation (particularly fuel trucks), general strikes ('stay-away' protests) disrupting business activities for up to three days at a time, and protesters committing arson and vandalism against foreign-owned road cargo and commercial sites, and vehicles and property of the state, regional governments, and ethnic Tigrayans. Mobile internet shutdowns will likely be instituted by the government in protest hotspots. Such violent protests would increase the likelihood of new mass detentions of suspected demonstrators along the lines of the 2016–17 emergency. This would likely decrease violent protest risks in the short term, but would also probably undermine the new prime minister's ability to placate Oromo and Amhara public discontent in order to ensure that protests do not resume once the emergency ends.