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US defense report on "existential" EMP threat criticizes industry study

The U.S. power grid is unprepared for a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse attack, warned a new report recently released by the U.S. government's Electromagnetic Defense Task Force. Moreover, the report assailed the findings of a three-year study by the Electric Power Research Institute, or EPRI, for downplaying the "existential" threat of a high-altitude EMP attack.

Amid a push by the Trump administration to study the potential threat EMPs pose for the power grid, the EPRI published a report in April defining the scope of EMP threats and offering technical insights, vulnerability assessments, and recommendations for EMP mitigation measures.

A working group launched in May by the power grid's reliability watchdog, the North American Electric Reliability Corp., is studying EPRI's findings to potentially craft mandatory industry standards for the power industry for mitigating impacts of manmade EMP events. So far, NERC has only implemented industry standards to address the impacts of geomagnetic disturbances, a type of natural EMP, caused by solar storms.

The EPRI report concluded that a high-altitude EMP attack, possibly resulting from the detonation of nuclear weapons at high altitudes, could trigger interruptions for regional power service but would not cause a nationwide blackout. EPRI, a research arm of U.S. electric utilities, also determined that recovery times from an EMP event would be similar to those resulting from large-scale power interruptions caused by other events.

The task force's report, published by the U.S. Air Force's Air University with Air Force Major David Stuckenberg as its lead author, disagreed with EPRI's assessment. It warned that the EPRI's recommendations for mitigating EMPs, such as shielding cables and electric substation control houses, are far too narrow.

"Reliance on the EPRI report could result in a lack of critical infrastructure protection," particularly extra-high-voltage transformers and long-lead-time replacement items required for the power grid to function, the task force asserted.

Without naming NERC, the task force also challenged the wisdom of the power industry using industry-funded EMP research, including "sometimes questionable research" from EPRI, as a basis for planning and strategy. The U.S. government formed the EMP taskforce in 2018 as a network of experts from across the U.S. government and from NATO allies in Europe and Canada to study EMP risks.

In a statement, EPRI's EMP project manager Randy Horton said EPRI stands behind their research and conclusions that were reached after three years of "extensive laboratory testing and analysis of potential EMP impacts on the electric transmission system." EPRI also "welcomes technical debates that are supported by science, facts, and data," Horton said.

Task force recommendations

While the EPRI report limited its study to the potential impacts of EMPs on transmission infrastructure, the task force assessed potential EMP impacts on generation and distribution assets as well. In offering some recommendations, the task force said more must be done to make the business case for investing in EMP mitigation measures.

"This is an area where a contrast between defense and industry officials becomes evident," the report stated. "The nation's survival cannot be measured with cost-benefit analysis; that is, in the face of existential threats, ensuring survival is — on its own merits — a complete business case."

The task force noted that the complete hardening of the U.S. power grid and other critical infrastructure against EMPs would cost between $5 billion and $50 billion, which makes this "ideal outcome" unlikely given resource constraints.

However, the task force said the U.S. government can require future critical infrastructure to be developed with EMP-protection capabilities and offer financial incentives to upgrade existing equipment with electromagnetic spectrum shielding.

The task force also said harden nuclear power plants against EMPs would be a justifiable investment. To that end, it urged the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to take several actions, including studying whether nuclear power plants' emergency back-up electric diesel generators and "FLEX" backup equipment would be functional following an EMP event. The task force said the NRC should also study whether the supply of diesel fuel and replacement equipment for nuclear power plants would be disrupted by a large-scale high-altitude EMP event.

Among other recommendations, the task force suggested storing communication equipment in EMP-hardened facilities or containers and installing microgrids at military installations using the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority's post-Hurricane Maria micro-grid design as an "effective" model to emulate. Such a design would allow interconnected, decentralized regions to generate electricity independently with an emphasis on solar energy, natural gas, and battery storage, the task force said.