Black Sea Shipping Blockade Squeezes Wheat Importers in Middle East and Africa

• The shipping blockade in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov will likely persist for at least three more months.
• Russia is likely to attempt further strikes on Ukraine-linked vessels close to the 12-nautical-mile territorial waters limits of Romania and Bulgaria over the coming months.
• Wheat import-dependent countries in the Middle East and Africa, such as Libya, Tunisia and Kenya, are likely to require supplies from alternative providers at higher cost, increasing pressure on government budgets and expanding the cost of subsidy programs.

How long will the Black Sea shipping blockade last?

The blockade of commercial shipping to and from Russian and Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov will likely continue for at least three more months.

Russia is likely to maintain its steady pace of strikes on Ukrainian ports and moored vessels. Their impact will be exacerbated by shortages in Ukraine’s air defense weapon systems, which are very unlikely to be significantly replenished in the coming months.

Russian shipments via the Black Sea will also likely remain blocked as, despite fewer Ukrainian attacks on Russia-linked vessels in September-October 2026, there has been no resumption of Russian shipments.

Which vessels are most at risk from Russian strikes?

Russia is likely to attempt further strikes on Ukraine-linked vessels close to the 12-nautical-mile territorial water limits of Romania and Bulgaria over the coming months. We maintain our assessment that strike risks are highest for cargo vessels including agricultural shipments, and oil tankers.

How will the Black Sea shipping blockade affect wheat-importing countries?

Both Ukraine and Russia are attempting to reroute agricultural shipments, particularly wheat, from their traditional Black Sea routes to alternative rail and port corridors, but this process is being constrained by limited rail and storage capacity. The resulting supply bottlenecks are delaying wheat exports from Russia and Ukraine, leading to higher prices for agricultural commodities and prompting buyers to seek alternative suppliers.

Importing states will face higher costs, placing their currencies under downward pressure to reflect weaker trade balances. In parallel, fiscal metrics will worsen, given the higher cost of subsidy programs, especially if shortages persist into 2027.

Which countries are most exposed to the disruption in Black Sea wheat supplies?

Country exposure. The countries most dependent on Black Sea wheat are Libya and Egypt. Russia and Ukraine supplied more than 80% of Libya's wheat imports in 2025 and more than 80% of Egypt's in the first nine months of 2026. Kenya buys two-thirds of its wheat imports from Russia. Tunisia gets about 42% of its wheat from the two countries, and Algeria 33%, its highest share in five years.

Inflation and cost of living. Higher wheat prices and shipping costs will push up inflation across importing countries. Libya is especially vulnerable because it relies on private traders who have little bargaining power. Its inflation reached 16.6% in September 2026, and higher wheat prices will make it harder to bring that down in 2027. Tunisia's inflation is forecast to rise to 6.0% in 2027, which would delay interest rate cuts and slow economic activity. Algeria's food inflation has already risen in 2026. In Kenya, higher living costs are likely to drive protests and could hurt President William Ruto's bid for reelection in August 2027.

Currencies and foreign-exchange reserves. Higher import bills will weaken trade balances and put pressure on currencies. In Libya, higher prices for its energy exports are likely to partly offset the pressure on reserves and the dinar. Tunisia has less room to absorb the shock. Its import cover has been falling and stands just above three months. Higher wheat prices and shipping costs would threaten to accelerate the downward trend in reserves, given a wider current-account deficit, and would put downward pressure on the Tunisian dinar.

Government budgets and subsidies. Subsidy costs will rise, especially if shortages continue into 2027. Egypt has some short-term protection: wheat reserves that cover several months, nearly 5 million metric tons of locally grown wheat bought in 2026 and new supplies from France, Romania and Bulgaria. But a long disruption would raise the cost of its bread subsidy program, which reaches more than 70 million of its roughly 110 million people. Higher wheat prices could slow Algeria's plan to cut its budget deficit from 11.7% of GDP in 2025 to 3.9% in 2026. Kenya has also signaled that it will spend less on subsidies; in October 2026 it raised fuel prices after its fuel subsidy fund ran out.

What developments could change the Black Sea risk outlook?

• If Black Sea export disruption extends beyond the first quarter of 2027, this would likely constrain farmers’ liquidity, prompting them to reduce crop planting areas. This in turn would lower the 2027-28 harvest and further depress exports in 2027-28, implying supply risks for the second consecutive season in the agricultural market.
• The reopening of European Union “solidarity corridors” for Ukrainian agricultural exports would reduce Ukraine’s urgency to negotiate a Black Sea shipping corridor, likely prolonging the existing blockade.

—With contributions from Samer Talhouk