BLOG — July 21, 2025
Maritime State of Play Report − Deceptive Shipping Practices in 2025
Highlights
- This report provides context and foundational knowledge toward maritime operational subterfuge tactics, as well as deceptive shipping tactics to support compliance, defense and national security functions, enhance due diligence frameworks and broaden investigation processes.
- “Use of “zombie” ships” is one of the case studies in Maritime State of Play report 2025. Download the full report to access other case studies covering transshipment of oil, position manipulation and convoluted company structures.
The maritime industry is undergoing significant transformation, driven by the need for enhanced transparency, intelligence, compliance and risk management. S&P Global Market Intelligence leverages unmatched data capabilities, advanced methodologies and comprehensive data analytics to provide insights into maritime operations, focusing on automatic identification system (AIS) data, ship particulars, associated parties, compliance markers and risk indicators.
Key takeaways
- The number of vessels under sanctions or exposed to sanctions through company association is at an all-time high.
- The use of deceptive shipping tactics to circumvent and skirt sanctions and export control are widely used.
- Technological advancements, as well as rising pressure, has led to the use of more sophisticated practises in subterfuge operations.
- The number of deceptive shipping practices and markers of interest has also increased, further obfuscating and complicating the identification of beneficiaries and associated parties.
- The intention is often to mislead and misdirect to evade scrutiny.
Case Study | Use of “zombie” ships
There has been an increase in cases where digital identity manipulation has been occurring, giving rise to what is being described as “zombie” vessels.
This practice, which has been in use for several years, involves the emulation/adoption of physical, digital or registered identifiers associated to a vessel that is no longer in circulation.
Identity resolution
A vessel tracking system dependent upon AIS essentially collects positions based on the static and dynamic messages associated to a MMSI — think of this as a telephone number issued by the flag that a vessel is registered to. The flag will provide a radio license, detailing digital identifiers such as MMSI and call sign.
Hypothetically, only one MMSI ought to be assigned as in use by any vessel at any time, however MMSIs can be recycled/reissued by flags, AIS transponders can be “cracked” to manipulate digital identifiers giving the impression of multiple targets or historically active targets, as well as erroneous use, or message corruption may occur causing some challenges to the collection process. As such, companies that make use of AIS typically have a cleaning/identity association process to resolve some of these issues and validate targets.
When looking at a 30-day analysis period, out of the 573,123 unique MMSI targets seen, 11% are nonship MMSIs, 17% are associated to the Market Intelligence ships database and 72% are unmatched vessel MMSI targets.
Within the 72% of unmatched vessel MMSI targets, some were still transmitting identifiers, allowing us to further classify them into typologies, including cargo vessels (18%), fishing vessels (16%), pleasure crafts (16%), sailing vessels (14%) and tankers (1.4%), which would not necessarily qualify under the IMO number scheme based on their characteristics and operations.
However, taking a dive into those exact two reveals that perhaps more is at play than would initially meet the eye. For example, a number of these vessels were transmitting dimensions above 200 meters.
Suspect targets
At the time of this analysis, there were 4,334 in-service tankers on the Market Intelligence database that are above 200 meters. The average gross tonnage for these (which includes oil, chemicals, liquid gas and others), is ~89,000 gt, which speaks to significantly sized vessel structures. Although these do not necessarily need IMO registration if operating domestically, many of these targets were showing as operating on the high seas.
A closer look at other transmitted identifiers reveals that, within this 30-day snapshot alone, 40 target MMSIs were transmitting IMO numbers in their AIS IMO field. These correspond to 33 vessels recorded as no longer in service by Market Intelligence, with 21 showing the last name associated with the transmitted IMO number.
A review of the years during which the target vessels began being demolished show that 85% have been out of circulation for three years or more. One target, in particular, transmitted position placing it off the coast of Oman, although the vessel has been sent for scrapping in India
A timeline analysis of historical positions received for these targets reveals the areas of operations go beyond domestic waters, with many operating between the Caribbean, Middle East, and Far East.
One of these targets is for 2000-built very-large crude carrier Valentine (IMO number: 9205079), which was broken up in 2018 in Alang, India. The target was falsely transmitting digital identifiers as recently as May 29 that mirrored the radio details last associated to this vessel, including name, MMSI, IMO number, call sign, vessel type, length and breadth despite being broken up seven years ago. This area in which the position in shown is a known a transshipment hub for oil.
Click here to download the full complimentary report covering transshipment of oil, position manipulation and convoluted company structures.