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Blog — May 26, 2025
By Jeremy Domballe, Byron McKinney, Ines Nastali, Max Lin, and Anna Koldova
An increasing focus in 2025 on Iranian oil cargoes exported to the Far East by shadow fleet vessels has received extensive attention by US authorities and has resulted in a “maximum pressure” approach to reduce these exports to zero¹. The recent sanctioning of Chinese "teapots," (small, independent refiners) such as Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical Co. Ltd.², for purchasing Iranian oil is a significant escalation by the US in seeking to choke Iranian oil at the refining stage and not just at sea. Further action on Iran and the shadow fleet servicing its oil shipments are likely to continue.
The shadow fleet, therefore, remains an important topic for consideration in 2025, especially for those undertaking vessel compliance. Not knowing the group owner of a vessel or fleet of vessels poses a degree of risk. Equally, the ability to determine the origin of oil and to understand restrictions on Russian oil entering an EU port, either directly or via a ship-to-ship (STS) operation, are requirements placed on maritime-associated firms. The need to identify the shadow fleet and be aware of its actions are hugely important when a Russian nexus to a vessel or firm is no longer obvious.
Market Intelligence and Commodity Insights have attributed three tiers to the shadow fleet analysis. These three tiers are determined to ease identifying ships in the fleet recently designated; how deeply they are embedded into sanctions evasion activity; the ships hidden from view by ownership; and those lifting Russian, Iranian and Venezuelan cargoes.
Tier 1 constitutes the highest risk involved in Russian, Iranian and Venezuelan trade and Tier 3 the lowest with its emphasis on the movement of Russian, Iranian and Venezuelan oil via STS and port calls. A fourth tier covers the tanker fleet, which does not engage in the shipment or trade of shadow fleet oil.
Research by Market Intelligence and Commodity Insights has identified 3,154 individual ships involved in the transportation of Russian oil since Dec. 5, 2022. This number constitutes 48% of the global in-service oil and products tanker fleet that is equal to or more than 27,000 dwt.
Additionally, a shadow fleet, made up of tankers in Tier 1 and Tier 2, accounts for 17% of the global in-service oil and products tanker fleet. This fleet numbers 940 unique ships, up 45% since previous estimates were calculated by Market Intelligence in May 2024. The significant rise in this number can be explained by the introduction of new sanctions measures and designations by the US Treasury Department in 2024, the sale of tankers by Greek owners to Russian entities and new owners establishing themselves within the Russian shadow fleet often based in India and the UAE.
One of the key attributes to the shadow fleet has been the age of a vessel. It is frequently noted that the shadow fleet comprises mainly older tankers and analysis highlights a large number of ships older than 18 years.
Tier 1 and Tier 2 shadow fleets, age
The average age of a shadow fleet ship is 20 years; 567 vessels in the shadow fleet, 60% of the total, are 20 years or older.
The medium range 2 (MR2) tanker type (50,000 dwt) makes up the largest class of vessel within the shadow fleet with Aframax-class vessels (100,000 dwt) also contributing significant numbers to the overall composition.
Tier 1 and Tier 2 shadow fleets, flag
Flag nationality has often been a moving target in regard to its relationship to the shadow fleet, with many vessels frequently flag-hopping. Panama is the single, largest home for the shadow fleet today, accounting for 22% of its vessels. The prominence of false flags within the shadow fleet, making up 12% of its current nationality status, is a relatively new phenomenon as shipowners look for ways to obscure their origins. Other flags in the shadow fleet are well known, such as Iran, Russia and Gabon.
When comparing the number of vessels of interest identified in the 2024 study with those in the 2025 study, we see a 125% growth, either resulting from the dynamic shift of vessels moving from one tier to another or newly identified vessels. This accounts for 12.9% of the globally registered tanker fleet.
Russia's shadow fleet, numberof ships
As the conflict reaches its third year, sanctions have continued to escalate in different ways. Governments, supranational blocks and organizations have been involved in rolling out sanctions against Russia, with the most active being the UK, the US and the EU. From assets, individuals, entities, export controls and more, various measures have been put into place, which have increased the scope required to operate a robust diligence process.
So far this year:
Market Intelligence have been closely tracking sanctions issued against the Russian government, Russian companies and individuals since the invasion of Ukraine began, highlighting the continuous month-on-month issuance since February 2022.
Click here to download the full complimentary whitepaper for an in-depth analysis of the current shadow fleet size and composition.
[1] See US Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent remarks at FinCEN Iran Maximum Pressure and Counter Terrorism (IMPACT) Exchange Series, April 2, 2025," https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0069.
[2] US Department of State, "Sanctioning entities purchasing and transporting Iranian oil to further impose maximum pressure on Iran, March 20, 2025," https://www.state.gov/sanctioning-entities-purchasing-and-transporting-iranian-oil-to-further-impose-maximum-pressure-on-iran/.
[3] See US Department of Treasury, "Treasury intensifies sanctions against Russia by targeting Russia’s oil production and exports, Jan. 10, 2025," https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2777.
[4] See Council of the European Union, "16th package of sanctions on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: EU lists additional 48 individuals and 35 entities, Feb. 24, 2025," https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/02/24/16th-package-of-sanctions-on-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-lists-additional-48-individuals-and-35-entities/.
[5] See Council of the European Union," https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia-explained/#sanctions.
[6] See GOV.UK, "UK announces largest sanctions package against Russia since 2022, Feb.24, 2025," https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-announces-largest-sanctions-package-against-russia-since-2022.
[7] See GOV.UK, "Russian invasion of Ukraine: UK government response," https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/russian-invasion-of-ukraine-uk-government-response