The Decisive | Season 6 | Ep.9 - From Free Trade to Managed Trade: The Next Phase of USMCA

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Kristen Hallam:

You're listening to the Decisive Podcast. Insights and analysis to empower confident decision making. Hello and welcome to The Decisive Podcast. I'm Kristen Hallam, your host for this episode. Today we're looking at one of the most consequential policy questions facing the continent. What comes next for the US-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement? The stakes are enormous. In the 12 months to August 2025, trilateral trade across the U.S., Mexico and Canada reached about US$1.8 trillion, underscoring just how central this agreement remains to North American growth, investment and industrial strategy.

To discuss this hot topic, we are joined by two members of our amazing Country Risk Analysis team: John Raines, Head of North America Country Risk, and Jose Enrique Sevilla-Macip, Principal Analyst, Latin America Country Risk. John, Jose Enrique, welcome back to The Decisive.

You prepared a strategic report on the USMCA talks late last year. You found that supply chains across the U.S., Mexico and Canada have remained broadly stable since the USMCA entered into force, even through the pandemic and the 2025 tariff shifts at the highest level. Does the evidence still point to continuity rather than disruption in North American trade? A lot has happened this year on top of all three countries getting new political leaders recently.

 

Jose Enrique Sevilla-Macip:

Thank you for having me, Kristen. Certainly, supply chains in North America had remained almost unchanged since the beginning of USMCA in 2020. And in fact, what we've seen, at least in the bilateral relation between Mexico and the US, is that Mexican exports towards the US have continued to increase even despite the latest rounds of tariffs under the second Trump administration. So far in the first quarter of 2026, we have seen a 5% increase in Mexican exports towards the US. The trade balance between Mexico and the US has continued to favor Mexico. In fact, since the entry into force of USMCA in 2020-2026, the trade deficit from the US side has increased 86% in regards to Mexico. That's why this is such a big issue in the US stance ahead of the USMCA review. But in general terms we continue to see that regionalization continues. Mexico is quite interested in this pattern because it's aiming to benefit from the reshoring phenomenon.

Over the past decade, Mexico has reaped significant benefits from reshoring away from China. Not as much as Mexico originally expected, but it is expecting to boost foreign investment flows over the next five, ten years based specifically on the trend of regionalization. Obviously, when we are talking about North American trade, at least for the past 25 years, talking North America always means also talking about China. But I would like to hear what John has to say about the importance of China in the North American trade negotiations.

 

John Raines:

Yeah, thanks, Enrique. It is an important issue, and I think it's one that many times we're hearing about in these negotiations is there's this legitimate fear that Chinese firms are just using Mexico as a pathway to get into the US market virtually tariff-free. So I think there is a thing that we need to consider: Is this going to be either a stumbling block for negotiations? Is this going to be a core issue? Or is this something that might be less central now that we've seen that the United States and China have repaired in some ways their trade friction with the last Trump-Xi summit that happened just a few weeks ago. And I think what you're going to find is that this detente that we've seen from the United States and China can only go so far. I do think it means potentially lower tariffs on China from the United States and also cross-trade between the United States and China, like key products including planes, agriculture, semiconductors. But at the end of the day, I think that fear in Washington, on Capitol Hill and also in the White House is going to mean that they're going to take a pretty strict line when it comes to Chinese investment. So I think we are going to see investment screening conditionality, and also origin tracing for Chinese firms in Mexico and also in Canada.

But I think that there are other issues at play as well, because this is not just China we're talking about. The US has done this before with other trade agreements that it's had, including Vietnam and also Cambodia. And so it's not surprising that this would be part and parcel of any agreement that probably is going to get negotiated. The one last thing that could come to the fore is this agreement between China and Canada regarding electric vehicles. 49,000 coming in into the Canadian market, and of course, US manufacturers being a bit upset that they're going to lose market share here. So again, that’s also a feature, I think that's going to be played out quite extensively in negotiations between the United States and the Canadians.

 

Kristen Hallam:

All right, thank you both. Some interesting perspectives there, for sure. So, in that strategic report that I referenced earlier, you also outlined four potential scenarios. Which of those scenarios now looks the most plausible?

 

John Raines:

Honestly, we've changed a little bit over time. I think originally the idea was is that we didn't necessarily think there would be a deal by mid-2026, but we thought that as we got further down the line, later 2026, early 2027, the prospect of some completed agreement that gave some type of security for firms that are investing in these markets would likely emerge over time. I think our view is starting to shift a little bit, and what it is much more towards annual renewal with changes. And what this would allow the US to do is say, okay, we're not going to withdraw from USMCA, but what we're going to do is kick it down the road a little bit and then incorporate changes one year after another. It doesn't mean that you wouldn't have a deal at some point, but in the interim, it would provide the United States with pretty significant flexibility as far as its participation in the agreement. It would also provide the United States additional leverage to incentivize both Mexico and Canada to align strategically with US goals. So, I think that's also going to be key. And then finally you can utilize this pathway as a way to constantly keep everyone attuned to US demands.

And I think that is going to be also something that the US Is likely going to insist upon. The problem with this, obviously, is that you're going to continue uncertainty year after year, so you're not necessarily going to get the economic benefits that would be associated with getting an agreement that lasts for 16 years and really driving up the credibility of USMCA. And that's our second scenario. Second scenario is they do agree to some agreement, because in some ways, if you think just prior to Donald Trump’s first term, that's pretty much you would expect in something like this. The whole reason why you're doing this in the first place is to provide investors that type of credibility and security, that their investments are valid. And this type of cross trade is going to provide economic benefits to both sides. The problem is that right now, politically, that's not very sellable in the United States. And I'm not really totally sure that it's sellable in Mexico either.

So that's the recipe. I think in some ways it becomes a little bit more less attractive than something that allows you to push off year after year. The other item that is possible, and we've already seen this in some degree with these bilateral side agreements. In fact, USMCA originally had over two dozen side agreements is we could see a situation, and the US has been threatening this over the last few months, is that it does two different bilaterals, one with Mexico and also one with Canada. And you're seeing that a bit as far as the negotiations that we've currently seen over the last few days where we're saying, hey, we'll come to a deal with Mexico and then we're just going to go to Canada and say either take it or leave it. That's possible. The problem with that is that obviously increases uncertainty pretty significantly in the short term, especially in an environment where you're looking at midterm elections and the possibility of increased inflation and the political impacts of that, it makes it a little bit less likely.

The last scenario that we list and the least probable is really just outright rejection. And to see that, you'd really have to see some type of disruption between the U.S. and Canada to see the United States want to withdraw from the agreement entirely. So, we think that's unlikely due to the economic ramifications. It's something we're watching for, but it's pretty much a tail risk at this point.

 

Jose Enrique Sevilla-Macip:

Yeah. Just to add a bit on there, John was mentioning the possibility of a breakout is the least likely scenario, but something that we want to keep in mind in our analysis, particularly because of the spillover, the potential spillover from other domains in the relationship. Here I'm thinking specifically about the Mexican case. Over the last year, US pressure on Mexico to step up the fight against drug cartels has significantly increased. And over the last month, the US government indicted sitting Mexican officials. That's something without precedent, and that's something that has led to the relations souring, at least on the security side. From the Mexican perspective, Mexico has always favored different domains in the relationship to be worked within silos so that security doesn't spill over into trade, doesn't spill over into migration. But over the last year, we've seen the increasing risk that these silos increasingly contaminate each other. And if we continue down the line, and if security relations between Mexico and the US start breaking down over cooperation against cartels, then the risk of a breakdown of trade talks would increase down the line. So that remains the least likely scenario, but it's important. That's an indicator to keep in mind: How security cooperation evolves between Mexico and the U.S. right.

 

Kristen Hallam:

Thank you for that. So, turning now to the negotiations, what has actually been happening this year, and if you could characterize the nature of these activities in a word or two, what would that word be?

 

Jose Enrique Sevilla-Macip:

The negotiations are underway, but so far only between the US and Mexico. John was mentioning that one of our scenarios is to break them down into two bilaterals. The fact that the US and Mexico are the only ones on the table right now doesn't necessarily mean that we are going down that road, because in the USMCA original negotiations in 2018, 2019, we also saw a similar dynamic. At some point we had US and Canada talking alone. At some other point, US and Mexico talking alone, and in the end, that deal remained trilateral. But so far, the formal negotiations have only been between the US and Mexico. We have the first round on the 27th and 28th of May. We are expecting for a second round in mid-June in the US and a third round by mid-July back in Mexico.

This is again only at the bilateral level. Key highlights: USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer highlights that the US maintains as a key priority to reduce trade deficit with Mexico, which as I mentioned, has increased this year by 5%. And another important topic that they already discussed was economic security, which is something that we have already been highlighting. One of the key strategic objectives of this negotiation and some of the changes that we are expecting is an increase in mechanisms to screen foreign direct investment flows into North America and particularly into Mexico in sectors that are deemed strategic. I would think of chips, semiconductors, automotive, those kind of sectors. And those were the issues that were discussed during this first round. Obviously there were no definitive agreements so far, but we are expecting those topics to continue being highlights over the next couple of rounds between the U.S. and Mexico.

 

John Raines:

Yeah. And for Canada, Enrique mentioned that there's some real issues there. So not only did USTR Greer mention last week that he was going to just basically wrap up a deal with Mexico, then hand it to the Canadians to see if they would take it or leave it, but there's really the atmospherics themselves have been quite negative for quite some time. Originally, both sides were going to go back to the domestic audience, get comments, and they moved from there. We saw some talks. And then in October of last year, things really began to fall apart. And ostensibly that was because Ontario, the provincial government, did an ad campaign during the World Series where they criticized President Trump over his trade policy and everything fell apart. And then really for about five months we had no negotiations whatsoever.

They picked up again a bit in March. Right? But not much. And as Enrique said, really the focus has been on US-Mexico. And there's a number of reasons for that. Number one, of course, is that the first shot across the bow is by the United States raising those tariffs on Canada. But also there's a personality issue here as well, starting with Prime Minister Trudeau before, and then of course now with Carney, who's leading the middle powers pretty much in contrast to the United States, puts in a position where there's a bit more an adversarial relationship between these two. Not only to mention the fact that Trump traditionally, as far as economic policy goes, has had a better relationship with Mexico than he has with Canada.

So I think that comes into play. And then finally it's just the economies themselves, right? A bit more compatible when we're looking at United States and Mexico, as far as like looking at lower labor, higher labor, looking at the products across the border versus when you look at the United States and Canada, oftentimes they're producing the same things. So it's obvious they're not necessarily going to see eye to eye when they're trying to seek advantage on the same exact products. So I think that's what we're looking for. Things did pick up. Again, we do have reports that there have been low level talks and we just heard just really over the last day or so that USTR Representative Greer is going to meet his counterparts, Minister of Canada, US Trade LeBlanc and so that gives an opportunity to get things on the right track. But I think that's the first step before we start talking about the nitty gritty is we need to start seeing a repair in this relationship and we need to see it relatively soon.

 

Kristen Hallam:

Lots to watch for there. So just thinking about the trilateral agenda, where do you see the toughest fight coming? Is it automotive rules of origin, customs coordination, investment screening, or something else entirely?

 

Jose Enrique Sevilla-Macip:

I think the toughest fight is going to be around the rules of origin. Not only because it's one of the most important topics in this review, but also because the origin requirements are already very high. The USMCA has the highest origin threshold in the world for the automotive sector. It’s around 72% if I'm not mistaken. And the US wants to add, if not this general percentage, but also make some sector specific rules of origin. And it's not that the other parties are necessarily against tougher rules of origin, it's just that enforcement is quite complicated and it might need time for supply chains to adjust. If we think of the original USMCA, this increase in the origin requirements was not implemented from one day to another. There was a phasing time so that countries and supply chains could adapt to the new origin requirements. So, what we are expecting, Mexico is fully on board with tougher rules of origin because on Mexico's viewpoint that would increase the incentives for companies to reshore into North America and potentially into Mexico.

But what Mexico wants is a gradual implementation timeline that would allow for this restructuring of the supply chains and reshoring of investments to actually take place. So that's why even if there is an in-principle agreement that tougher rules of origin might benefit this idea of Fortress North America, there's going to be significant differences over the specifics, which components, how much time for implementation and all of that details.

 

John Raines:

Yeah, I'm going to pick up on that quickly because obviously when we have these types of discussions, we're constantly speaking about all the difficulties associated with these negotiations. But I did want to mention that there are some low hanging fruit that all of these sides can grab and present to the voters and say, hey listen, I've been able to defend our values but also get some economic benefits on the side. And I think the ones that I'm specifically interested in really are these technical modernization packages. Think about harmonization, trade facilitation, regulatory cooperation and data sharing things of that technical assistance. These are the items where I think that they can work together. We've seen this incorporated into other free trade agreements elsewhere around the globe. And I wouldn't be surprised that if they can't agree to actually some kind of comprehensive agreement initially, this is the path they'll likely go down and have this as something that they can check off and say, hey listen, we haven't been able to achieve everything that we wanted, but we have been able to bring back something positive and this is something that they can go ahead and send and show to private enterprise that they haven't just been sitting on their laurels, they've actually produced something, the three of them together.

 

Kristen Hallam:

Good to know there's some low hanging fruit to be picked there. So switching back to that, the bilateral lens that we were using earlier, US-Canada, US-Mexico, where do you see the toughest fights on the bilateral level?

 

John Raines:

Well, maybe I can pick up on Canada because I do think in some ways Canada traditionally has been tougher. I think it's going to be tougher this time. Again, as we mentioned, the US tariffs that have already been imposed, the industrial policy questions that are going to come to the forefront. Only two countries in the world have really retaliated against the United States: one, China, the other Canada. And so I think there's long memories here. So I think that's something that will have to be discussed as well as that Canada itself has moved down, as I mentioned earlier, looking towards China and some type of a trade arrangement. They're also with the European Union, it’s going to make things a little bit more difficult.

But if we're looking at individual issues and where I think those could come up first and foremost is going to be autos, right? So we're thinking of Ontario, thinking of rules of origin, as Enrique said, thinking about labor value content. Obviously here, the US wants to continue to see those go up, right? See those numbers continue to increase. Where it comes to Canadian manufacturers really scared about profitability concerns there because already those margins are pretty tight and they keep pushing those to a higher level. Going to be very difficult for them to compete long term. Secondarily, really looking towards agriculture. So dairy, the one that Donald Trump likes to tweet about quite often. It's about market access.

The US wants to have market access. That being said, the Canadians come back and say, hey, you already have market access. It's under these tariff rate quotas. How do you manage both sides there? Especially because these are very politically contentious issues, even if they're not that economically significant between the two countries. Steel and aluminum, obviously a very big item for the Canadians facing those higher tariffs. We've seen significant layoffs in Canada in reflection to these tariffs. That's going to have to be part of that. If the US can't move there becomes more difficult to reach some kind of successful conclusion.

And then finally, and a lot of people aren't speaking about this, is really the issue of data. So the US is certainly going to be pushing for limits on data localization and support for US tech platforms. But Canada's really going in a completely different direction here as far as taxation and really regulatory issues and then ultimately about privacy. So again, they're going to have to work pretty significantly there to come to some type of accommodation that appeases both sides.

 

Jose Enrique Sevilla-Macip:

As for the relation with Mexico, there's been several issues that several US officials have highlighted that the US wants in its trade relations with Mexico. The US wants more certainty in the energy sector. The US has staunchly oppose the legal changes approved in Mexico over the past couple of years which have given privilege, regulatory privilege, to Mexican state-owned enterprises. The US is also interested in higher standards in terms of labor. This has been a constant issue in US-Mexico trade relationships. And actually the US is floating in the original USMCA, we had this origin requirement in the sense that a certain percentage of a vehicle must be manufactured by workers earning at least $16 per hour. This idea was to pressure Mexico a bit into raising wages in manufacturing, but it didn't specify that workers in Mexico need to earn $16 an hour. This time around, the US is trying to push for a specific provision that workers within Mexican manufacturing must earn a certain amount in order for the product to be eligible for USMCA benefits.

So labor, it's going to be a big issue. There's also some irritants in terms of agriculture. Mexico has strong regulations against GMOs, genetically modified organisms, against some pesticides. This has been an issue that's been highlighted over the past five years in the relationship. It's certainly going to be at the center of bilateral discussions and general regulatory burden. The US wants more lower regulatory standards in Mexico so that it's easier to do business for US companies there. From the Mexican point of view, there's a lot of alignment in several goals, but I think the most contentious points in the relations are going to be on agriculture because those two particular issues are very ideological within the ruling Morena party in Mexico. So that's going to have a significant pushback.

We don't expect the Mexican government to backtrack energy legislation. They're going to try to solve it case by case basis, but not necessarily a complete overhaul of the legislation to favor U.S. strategic interests.

 

Kristen Hallam:

All right, thank you for that. Now, John mentioned tariffs there. How central will tariff pressure be in the negotiations if a lot of companies are already adapting around tariffs?

One thing we hear from our head of supply chain research, Chris Rogers, is that trade finds a way. Supply chains have shown themselves to be pretty resilient to a number of shocks in the past few years, tariffs included. So again, the question how central will tariff pressure be in the negotiations?

 

Jose Enrique Sevilla-Macip:

The USTR Greer has been very clear. Tariffs are going to remain in place. USMCA is no longer a free trade agreement. It's most likely a managed trade agreement. So tariffs are going to be part of this. Even if Mexico and Canada are looking for preferential market access, but not necessarily free access to the US market. So tariffs are going to remain there. Even if we reach a renewal for 16 years of the USMCA, we are expecting that some tariffs, steel and aluminum or some other national security tariffs, are going to remain in place. So they're not going away.

 

John Raines:

Yeah, I totally agree with that. I think it's been clear now that the United States no longer views USMCA as your traditional free trade agreement. Right? This is going to be a new agreement where tariffs are part of this new trading relationship. But I think there does need to be a recognition that they can only go so far. So I don't want to overstate the idea that we're going to see tariffs like we saw during a Liberation Day, where we're going 50%, 25%. I don't think that they're going to be reaching those levels. But I do think we need to recognize that we're in a new trading environment. And likely this idea that it's going to be unfettered free trade for the foreseeable future is really no longer in the cards. That said, it should be noted that the core of this agreement remains those principles like rules of origin that we brought. Sector specific regulation, compliance, enforcement.

That's going to be key here. That's going to be key and tariffs are going to be important, but important is almost on the side. They're going to be important as far as leverage in negotiations. They're going to be important if the talks fail. Right? That's certainly going to be one of the first things that people are concerned about. And they're also going to be important during a threat, during negotiations. If we do have a situation whereby we have annual renewals, you have to imagine that the US Is going to be threatening higher tariffs throughout this process as a way to seek leverage and really gain advantages between both Canada and Mexico.

 

Kristen Hallam:

Right. I like that characterization. Instead of a free trade agreement, it's a managed trade agreement. So that is a good way to look at it. Now, since I have you both here, before we wrap up, I can't resist the opportunity to ask you both a few World Cup questions. It's starting on June 11th, right after this episode is set to air. So what can you tell us about the security provisions put in place for the event across the three countries?

 

John Raines:

They're taking it pretty seriously. I think that at least from the United States and Canadian side, there is a realization here that these are high value targets and the possibility of some type of terrorist attack is, if not probable, the threat is at least significant. This is really the highest level that they have for events. We've seen pretty significant coordination between the federal government from both countries and also provincial or state or local police agencies out there. There was a question for a while about funding, especially on the US side, but most of those issues have been resolved with about $1.1 billion in security already appropriated and starting to get sent out. A lot of that money is actually for counter drone attacks. So it gives you an idea, a little bit of the fears that these governments have about the vulnerabilities that might be associated with that. So all of that being positive, but we should be noting here, even though it's not in our baseline, the probability of an attack is still significant.

The most likely targets would be soft targets outside that immediate security perimeter or where we see the vulnerabilities. So something we're continuing to watch. Again, not our baseline because we do have significant levels of security here, but certainly couldn't be discounted that lone actors or small cells conduct some type of attack during the month of the World Cup.

 

Jose Enrique Sevilla-Macip:

And on Mexico, the terror threat is much lower than in the US or Canada. But in Mexico, there was significant concern of potential cartel activity, particularly following the spectacular headlines in February after the killing of a cartel kingpin, which saw significant retaliation, hundreds of simultaneous arson attacks, blockades, particularly around Guadalajara, which is one of the World Cup venues in Mexico. But what we have seen so far, and what we assess, is that cartels are highly unlikely to target any World Cup event for a violent attack. Cartel violence in Mexico remains a threat, but it's highly unlikely that cartels would directly target a World Cup event. Because in the end, cartels do not only profit from drug trafficking, they profit from a lot of different illegal and in some cases even legal activities. And in a major event in which Mexico is expecting a significant inflow of tourists, these kind of illegal markets thrive. So cartels wouldn't want to mess with that. They will try to profit as much as possible from this major event as well. So the cartel threat against World Cup visitors is low to moderate.

 

Kristen Hallam:

All right. Thinking about what you mentioned earlier, John, about the World Series and the ads that were run at that time, I don't know that we'll be seeing anything quite like that. But just thinking about the kind of protest risks that maybe we're expecting around World Cup matches. Do we see like a high risk of protests during the event?

 

Jose Enrique Sevilla-Macip:

I would like to pick that one first because I was saying that cartel threat might be low, that terror threat might be low in Mexico. But when we're talking about protests, then there's a significant topic on the Mexican side. And over the past couple of weeks, we have seen increasing threats from the teachers’ union to stage demonstrations to sabotage workshop matches. Right now in Mexico City, the teachers’ union's got a massive protest camp in the main square in Mexico City. They're planning to demonstrate over the next couple of weeks. And they've threatened to not let the inaugural match take place. Now, security provisions are huge also in Mexico. The Mexican government is going to set up a perimeter so that no individual without tickets can get more than 1 1/2km close to the stadium.

So it's unlikely that these protests are going to disrupt the actual matches. But we're certainly going to see some protests in particularly Mexico City against the World Cup as a way from these protest groups to pressure the government to into accepting their demands, which is basically increased budget, increased wages, increased benefits for this particular teachers union.

 

John Raines:

Yeah, and I agree, same thing for the US we're expecting to see protests really throughout the month both in the United States and in Canada. But we're not expecting major disruptions here, just limited operational effects. The biggest protest that we see, June 14, that's going to be a No Kings protest. But again most of those, even though we're expecting millions of people to come out, most of those are not going to impact the stadiums themselves, especially those that are located outside downtown areas. But we're going to see protests really throughout the month. So we're going to see immigration related protests. Obviously those could be far bigger if we see immigration related operations by the government during this time. Antiwar Iran is in the World cup so we could see some antiwar protests, pro-Palestinian protest, environmental, racial justice, labor issues, housing for Canada.

 

And then there is the possibility we will see some sporadic protest at these events related to the Cup itself. So those specifically dedicated to protesting corporate sponsors, those in hydrocarbons or other industries where they might have had issues in the past either with labor issues or environmental issues, those could come to the fore. But again the vast majority here being nonviolent, but you could have some limited impact when it comes to ticket holders getting to the stadiums, blocking traffic, potentially even blocking buses, team buses from going to the stadiums. And there is the possibility of some altercations especially in areas either against counter protesters or really against police if these protesters try to enter into these security perimeters. So again limited, but there is the possibility of a bit of and obviously if there's a significant police response that leads to injuries or casualties, obviously that risk is going to increase.

 

Kristen Hallam:

Right. So last but not least, will you be watching the World cup matches and if so, who are you rooting for?

 

Jose Enrique Sevilla-Macip:

As for me, fortunately I'm in the Western Hemisphere so I'm going to be able to watch as much as possible. Obviously I'm rooting for Mexico always, but thinking in other key candidates for the title. I'm going to remain in LatAm, certainly good prospects for Argentina, for Brazil, always. So those are the ones that I'll be rooting for.

 

John Raines:

For me I'm going to watch as much as I possibly can in between breaks and in between my current workload. So if I get a second, I'm going to turn on the screen and see what's going on. Hopefully I don't miss too many goals, but as far as actual teams, got a root for the Americans. They're the home team for me so got to root for them. And then my wife is Italian, I was going to root for them but I can't root for them because they didn't actually make the World Cup this year. So my second team will probably be England because I lived in London for quite a while so I adopted them as well.

 

Kristen Hallam:

All right, and for my part, of course rooting for Team USA to go as far as possible, but I also lived in London for a long time and so England is still very much in my heart. So it'll be great to watch them and see how well they do and I'm just excited for world-class soccer or football, as you prefer. So yeah, it'll be a great few weeks coming up.

So with that, all that's left for me to do is to thank you both, John and Jose Enrique, for sharing your insights with us, and thanks to our listeners for tuning in. If you'd like to dive deeper into the topics we've discussed, please click on the links in the description of this episode to access our latest thought leadership. Until next time.

Thank you for listening to the Decisive Podcast from S & P Global. Please subscribe and join us for next week's episode. Until then, stay curious and stay informed.