Russia-Ukraine War: Three Conflict Development Pathways in the Next 12 Months

• The most likely outcome over the one-year outlook for the Russia-Ukraine conflict is continued attritional war. This scenario assumes that fighting will continue broadly at its current intensity, with the outcome remaining inconclusive despite heavy casualties on both sides.   
• The likelihood of an electoral ceasefire and post-election escalation is assessed as unlikely. This scenario examines how Ukraine’s decision to hold a presidential election in 2026, whether voluntarily or under US pressure, would shape Russia’s strategic calculations and its subsequent political and military actions. 
• Signing of a lasting peace agreement, assessed as extremely unlikely, would require concessions by Russia and Ukraine to conclude a bilateral agreement bringing fighting to a halt.  

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, now in its fifth year, continues as a year-round war of attrition that is unlikely to yield significant territorial gains or shift either side’s political calculus. S&P Global Market Intelligence assesses that, without further mobilization of reserve forces, conscription from sections of the population yet to be called into service, or direct involvement of a more resource-capable external ally, neither country is likely to achieve a decisive battlefield victory. 

At the time of publication, US-mediated Russia-Ukraine peace consultations have failed to narrow the gap between the parties’ key negotiating demands. According to international media, the US has set a deadline for Ukraine to hold presidential elections or a referendum on territorial concessions to Russia by June 2026 — a very unlikely scenario without a properly monitored ceasefire lasting for at least one month. 

Without progress in Russia-Ukraine peace consultations, the US has reportedly considered possible reductions or suspension of US aid to Ukraine, an outcome we consider to be likely.

Peace talks between Ukraine and Russia stall as Russia continues to reject compromises on territorial control or the provision of third-party security guarantees to Ukraine.

Russian forces maintain underresourced frontline operations but lack the capacity to mass sufficient combat power to achieve a strategic breakthrough or to exhaust Ukrainian forces through an attritional campaign leading to Ukrainian collapse. Russian long-range strikes inflict severe damage upon Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, but remain insufficient to degrade Ukrainian societal morale enough to compel capitulation.

Financial contributions from Ukraine’s allies under the Priority Acquisition List for Ukraine’s Defense (PURL) initiative continue to increase steadily, enabling Ukraine to sustain regular purchases of US-manufactured military equipment.

Multinational sanctions on Russia imposed since 2022 remain in place. Russia’s diversified trading partners enable it to offset sanctions, sustain replenishment and gradually expand its weapons stockpiles, supporting its current operational tempo.

New EU sanction packages maintain an incremental tightening approach rather than pursuing a comprehensive escalation. The impact remains constrained by the US’s lack of participation in EU sanction packages, EU reluctance to introduce US-style secondary sanctions, and reduced sanctions enforcement coordination between the US and other G7 countries.

Russia agrees to a two- to four-week ceasefire in Ukraine contingent on a partial easing of US sanctions. The US uses the ceasefire to press Ukraine to hold presidential elections, partially due to Russian claims questioning President Zelenskyy’s legitimacy following the legally mandated postponement of elections under martial law.  In Ukraine, new domestic corruption investigations in the defense sector increase public discontent with the government, compounded by parliament’s inability to adopt reforms required for further EU funding due to the absence of a functioning majority.

Zelenskyy’s presidential administration advances emergency legislation permitting elections. Zelenskyy secures victory in a single-round presidential election.   The pause in fighting allows the Ukrainian and Russian militaries to recuperate, rotate personnel and replenish weapons stockpiles. Following the conclusion of the Ukrainian elections, Russia resumes frontline operations and long-range strikes across Ukraine.

Refreshed Russian forces increase their operational tempo, securing territorial gains in the east and south of Ukraine. While insufficient to achieve a decisive breakthrough, Russian advances bring forces closer to major urban centers. Following the post-ceasefire resumption of fighting, the US does not fully reinstate the lifted sanctions on Russia.

The US rollback of selected sectoral sanctions and transaction restrictions facilitates a partial reopening of trade with Russia, including imports of key Russian commodities such as fossil fuels, chemicals and metals. Russia interprets Ukraine’s holding of presidential elections that disregard martial law restrictions as a signal that Zelenskyy’s administration is likely willing to further override existing legal constraints, reinforcing Russia’s demands for territorial concessions from Ukraine.

The UK–France-led Coalition of the Willing would maintain political commitments to deploy a force in Ukraine in the event of a signed peace agreement, while citing the resumption of hostilities to justify the lack of concrete implementation steps.

Sanctions imposed by other countries remain formally in place; however, weak enforcement and the failure to close existing loopholes through coordinated new packages continues to erode their impact.

In the second quarter, the US and Ukraine sign a bilateral agreement on enhanced US-Ukraine business cooperation, granting US businesses preferential treatment particularly in Ukraine’s energy, IT, defense and logistics sectors.

The US agrees in principle to the provision of security guarantees for Ukraine in the event of renewed Russian attacks but deliberately leaves their scope, timing and nature unspecified to preserve its response flexibility. Bilateral security guarantees with other Ukrainian allies that Ukraine negotiates and signs following its agreement with the US do not envision mutual defense clauses.

Under sustained US economic and political pressure, Russia and Ukraine agree to a ceasefire, lasting for at least two months, for Ukraine to hold presidential elections and a referendum on the future status of its Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Based on the referendum results, Ukraine agrees to establish a free economic zone in the Ukraine-controlled territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 

Russia and Ukraine sign a peace agreement in the fourth quarter, under which the existing line of contact becomes a de facto boundary. Russia agrees to forgo its demand for Ukraine’s full withdrawal from the four regions — Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson — conditional on the lifting of most multinational sanctions.

The UK–France-led coalition establishes a 15,000-strong mission to support post-agreement security arrangements but refrains from deploying troops on the ground in Ukraine, aside from a civilian-led mission in Kyiv focused on security and defense cooperation.

As Russia continues to occupy parts of Ukrainian territory, Ukraine’s post-conflict recovery remains constrained, limiting long-term reconstruction, foreign investment and economic normalization.