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BLOG — Apr. 2, 2026
Conflict in the Middle East has already caused significant damage to supply chains across the energy, transportation, food and manufacturing sectors as a result of reduced trade flows through the Strait of Hormuz as well as physical infrastructure damage.
Thus far, the main economic transmission mechanism for the conflict has been via prices, particularly for energy and commodities dependent industries. Increasingly the impact for supply chains it will be felt via available inventories as the stocks built into global logistics networks begin to deplete.
Travel by sea with four-to-six-week delivery times such that the last of the “pre-war” volumes will have reached their destinations by late March at which point availability will start to drop. Rebuilding the supply lines will take a similar amount of time even if the Strait unequivocally reopens, though even then infrastructure damage will take years to fully repair.
In aggregate across natural gases, crude oil and derived products, nitrogenous fertilizers and sulfur and a handful of manufacturing materials including aluminum, plastics and noble gases imports from the Middle East are equivalent to 0.55% of global GDP, with South Asia the most exposed followed by sub-Saharan Africa at and Asia-Pacific.
This clearly understates the potential impact on economies more broadly where critical materials can bring down entire supply networks. An example is Taiwan, where imports from the Middle East are equivalent to 2.39% of GDP but the potential loss of supplies of helium could cripple electronics production equivalent to 25.2% of national output.
Crude oil has rightly received the main focus in government concerns regarding the conflict given Middle East exports of crude oil accounted for 36.7% of the world total with a value of US$429 billion of annual trade in 2025. Similarly, shipments of processed fuels accounted for a further US$110 billion with the region accounting for 14.9% of global trade in diesel/fuel oil and 19.0% of gasoline/naphtha.
For crude oil specifically, the Middle East accounted for 57.3% of imports to Asia-Pacific and 31.4% of imports to South Asia.
On the fuel side, where there are also implications for agriculture, mining and industry as well as personal transportation, Sub-Saharan Africa is heavily exposed in diesel/fuel oil as well as gasoline/naphtha.
The alternatives for sourcing crude are limited for any given refinery given that specific grades are often required – for example for heavier grades the main alternatives to Iran are Russia and Venezuela. Additionally, alternative fuel sources for gasoline and diesel may be limited by countries limiting exports of their own production to protect domestic markets.
This extends the vulnerability beyond just the direct importers from the Middle East. For instance, Australia and New Zealand show minimal direct dependence on Middle Eastern crude but are highly exposed to regional refiners like South Korea for finished products.
The attacks on Qatar’s Ras Laffan facility has drawn attention to the liquefied natural (methane) gas (LNG) sector given the region accounted for 20.9% of global LNG exports in 2025. Still, a large part of global trade in natural gas is focused on pipeline supplies, so that Middle East LNG is actually equivalent to 12.7% of natural gas supplies in total.
In the near term, a shortage of natural gas for power generation can be aided by increasing load factors for other technologies where available, including coal-fired power, reports indicate.
An extended shortage could be a particular issue for the EU. While Middle East LNG only accounted for 3.3% of total natural gas imports, that rises to as much as 11.0% in Italy where less pipeline gas is available. It is also a challenge given the end-winter reserves are heavily depleted and sourcing was already disrupted by Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Aside from methane, the Middle East also accounted for 34.2% of global exports of butane and propane, which are vital as a cooking gas. The technological options available for power generation are not the same for cooking, particularly given their predominance in lower income countries where retooling household cooking equipment is not viable economically in the near term. That’s particularly an issue for South Asia where 89.7% of butane/propane imports came from the Middle East. Availability is also an issue in Asia-Pacific.
This article was published by S&P Global Market Intelligence and not by S&P Global Ratings, which is a separately managed division of S&P Global.
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