Venezuelan President's Removal

On Jan. 3, US forces apprehended Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores in a military operation that included airstrikes on at least 10 targets within Venezuela. Later that day, the Venezuelan Supreme Court announced that Delcy Rodríguez would assume the functions of the presidency in Maduro’s absence.

The Venezuelan Supreme Court's designation of the president’s absence as “temporary” avoids the constitutional requirement for new elections to be called within 30 days, allowing Rodríguez to cover these functions for a maximum of 180 days. Maduro’s inner circle and senior military commanders remain in their positions. 

The initial reaction of the global financial markets to the news has been muted so far. S&P Global Market Intelligence’s economic forecasts are unlikely to change materially in the absence of knock-on effects on geopolitical events elsewhere, with oil prices a near-term focus.

S&P Global Market Intelligence assesses that the US will support Rodríguez remaining in her position if she follows through on her expressed willingness on Jan. 5 to “work jointly” with the US. Requirements from the US include reducing support for foreign actors deemed hostile to US interests, redistribution of oil contracts to favor US firms and US exports over Asian counterparts, and curtailing alleged cooperation with drug cartels.  

Compliance with these commitments would likely result in increased administration support for US energy investment, US sanctions relief and a cessation of the current partial oil blockade. 

The removal of Maduro indicates the potential for a marked change in Venezuela’s position in global energy supply chains. The country’s heavy, high-sulfur crude oil exports have fallen over the past 20 years thanks to a mixture of sanctions and under-investment, dropping to near-zero in 2021 from 97.3 million tons in 2007 before subsequently recovering to 18.7 million tons in 2024, according to official trade statistics.  

While official statistics show the US and Spain are the major buyers of Venezuelan crude, The use of ship-to-ship transfers and the shadow fleet obfuscates other destinations. Shipments to the rest of the world may lag while Venezuela’s oil capacity is rebuilt and as the US takes priority. 

Renewed US military action in Venezuela is highly likely if the US perceives that Venezuela is unwilling to comply with its requirements. The US embargo on sanctioned oil and its maritime deployment remain in place.  

Commercial and industrial assets are unlikely to be targeted militarily, but would face collateral damage risks depending on their location, as well as substantial risks of operational disruption. Air and maritime traffic in areas nearby would almost certainly need rerouting if military action were to occur. All operations in Venezuela will face elevated risks of electricity, fuel and basic goods shortages. 

The risk of fractures within the Venezuelan military, senior leadership and paramilitary structures will remain high, even if Rodríguez opts to work fully with the US. Rodríguez will need to maintain internal unity among Venezuela’s political and military institutions, with a focus on Maduro’s inner circle. She will likely face conflicting demands from the US and internal actors, particularly if cooperation with the US involves a reversal of oil and economic policy.  

US military action demonstrates the Trump administration’s commitment to its National Security Strategy published in November, which emphasized US preeminence within the Western Hemisphere. 

Russia, China and Colombia have criticized the apprehension of Maduro and have called for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. These countries will likely provide only diplomatic support for Venezuela, as logistical constraints and concerns over US reprisals on other bilateral matters limit significant military assistance. 

• The release of political prisoners by the Venezuelan government would indicate a higher likelihood of cooperation with US demands stated above. 
• If the Venezuelan government issues strong statements of support and cooperation with non-US-aligned allies including China and Russia, increases arrests of opposition leaders, or increases military deployment, this would indicate a lower likelihood of cooperation with the US and more likely renewed US military intervention. 
• Evidence of infighting or contradictory statements between Venezuelan government or military officials would indicate a higher likelihood of an internal government collapse, leading to a more rapid change of government or a higher risk of a military coup.