Geopolitical Risk Brief: November 2025

Our country risk experts provide insight into key geopolitical events that could impact the economic environment in November. 

The outcome of the Xi-Trump summit signals intent to bring greater certainty to US-mainland China trade relations and aims for a comprehensive deal within the next 12 months. The “consensus” reached in South Korea on Oct. 30 averted pending tariff hikes and nontariff trade barriers announced by both governments in October.

For the US, this included rescinding a proposed additional 100% US tariff on mainland Chinese goods, and a one-year delay in the implementation of the Bureau of Industry and Security’s (BIS) “affiliates rule,” which would have expanded sanctions to firms with 50% ownership by sanctioned entities.

Mainland China has agreed to delay implementation of a global export license program for mainland China-controlled rare earth elements (REEs) and related technologies for the same period.

By Nov. 11, both countries had confirmed at least partial implementation of additional key terms agreed to in the Oct. 30 summit. These include US commitments to suspend fees for mainland Chinese vessels making US port calls and reductions in fentanyl-related tariffs. In turn, mainland China resumed purchases of US soybeans and announced new export controls on fentanyl-related chemical precursors to the US, Canada and Mexico. 

The Houthi pause in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden reduces the likelihood of attacks on shipping in the immediate term, but risk of attacks on vessels in the one-year outlook remains severe.

International media reported on Nov. 11 that the Houthis had indicated that they were pausing attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This decision was conditional on Israel also halting its military operations in Gaza. No other formal declaration of an end to Houthi military operations against shipping or Israel has been made since the Gaza ceasefire came into force on Oct. 10.

The last recorded Houthi attack on shipping, on Sept. 29, was a ballistic missile attack on a Netherlands-flagged cargo vessel, approximately 128 nautical miles southeast of Aden in international waters.

The absence of Houthi attacks on shipping and on Israel directly while the initial stages of the Gaza ceasefire are in place — primarily involving hostage and prisoner exchanges — suggests that this period is facilitating a tactical regrouping.

Credible international media reports indicate that the Houthis have been rearming, increasing weapons shipments via Iran and the Horn of Africa, and rebuilding port infrastructure and facilities damaged by Israeli and US airstrikes since the ceasefire announcement. 

Ongoing US military activity in the Southern Caribbean indicates more anti-drug trafficking strikes, but it is unlikely to attempt to force government change without internal challenges from within the Venezuelan military.

Additions to US forces stationed off the coast of South America through mid-November — notably the largest aircraft carrier in the world — buttressed previous deployment since August. That included 10 US naval vessels, four MH-6 helicopters and 2,200 embarked marines to international waters off Venezuela, and 10 F-35 fighter jets to Puerto Rico.

Targeted strikes on drug-related assets within Venezuela, as well as international waters, remain likely in the one- to two-month outlook. There is so far no indication that the US is considering the use of significant numbers of ground troops to support a government change.

Any US attempt to force a government change militarily without such an operation being led from within the Venezuelan military is unlikely, given Venezuela’s size and topography. Venezuela’s military leadership has so far remained strongly supportive of Nicolás Maduro’s government, but the latter has been heavily reliant on the military to remain in power since the disputed 2024 presidential election.