Mapping fault lines of communal violence in Turkey and Syria

The civil war in Syria, which has now spread into Iraq, is in part a proxy war between Sunni Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey; and Shia Iran. The war has created "ungoverned space" in both Syria and Iraq that is dominated not only by Islamic State militants in eastern Syria and northern Iraq, but by Shia militias, such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Muqtada al-Sadr's "Peace Brigades," and the Badr Corps, in other parts of Iraq. The map shows the distribution of Sunni and Shia communities, the areas where Alevi, Alawite, and Kurdish minorities are concentrated, and the predominantly Sunni area-much of it desert-currently controlled by the Islamic State.

Alawites and Alevis are two unorthodox Shia communities that are often considered heretical by mainstream Sunnis. Alawites form the backbone of President Bashar al-Assad's military and intelligence capability in Syria. In Turkey, Alevis are a relatively secular minority. Accordingly, the increasing emphasis on Islamism in the country risks pushing this community into a more hostile posture toward Turkey's Sunni majority.

The failure of the Turkish government to supply clear support to the Kurdish town of Kobane in Syria has strained the peace process between the Kurdish separatist secular Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK) and the Turkish government. IHS sources report that Turkey's Syrian border is heavily controlled by Turkish Armed Forces along sections adjacent to the three Kurdish "cantons," but is relatively porous along sections with a high concentration of Sunni Arabs on the other side. Such imbalances in border controls have rendered Syria's Kurdish minority more vulnerable to the advance of the Islamic State's "caliphate."

By overlaying population distributions and areas of control in the region on the map, it is clear that the minorities most exposed to the consequences of the establishment of the Islamic State's "caliphate" are the Kurds, not just in Syria and Iraq, but potentially also in eastern Turkey, as well as the Alawites in Turkey's Hatay province. The Kurdish and Alawite communities are far more likely to be committed to fighting the Islamic State than Sunni Arab countries and their proxies, whose positions on Sunni extremism are more ambivalent. Such opposition to the Islamic State would be directly opposed to Turkey's interests, not least because it would indirectly assist President Assad of Syria, but is likely to be supported by Iran.

Firas Abi Ali is Senior Manager, MENA, IHS Country Risk.
Contributing to this article is Ege Sechkin, Analyst, Europe & CIS, IHS Country Risk

Posted 8 March 2015