Provisional Kyrgyz Government Fails to Contain Ethnic Violence, Thousands Flee to Uzbekistan

Violence Spreads

Roza Otunbayeva's provisional government has failed to quell ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks that erupted on 10 June in the southern Osh region (see Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan: 11 June 2010: Deadly Ethnic Clashes Prompt State of Emergency in Southern Kyrgyzstan). According to the Kyrgyz Interior Ministry, the violence has now spread to the neighbouring Jalal-Abad region and has left some 117 dead and close to 2,000 injured. However, eyewitness accounts suggest the toll is much higher with bodies lying uncollected on some streets. The attacks have clear anti-Uzbek motivations: Kyrgyz households have apparently been marked with the letters "KG" to avoid arson attacks by well-armed Kyrgyz groups. These have been roaming the streets of major towns and villages across the south of the country. Meanwhile, a humanitarian crisis is brewing with at least 60,000 ethnic Uzbeks (according to the Uzbek border agency) crossing into Uzbekistan's Andijan region. To stop murder and looting the Kyrgyz government has authorised its troops and police to shoot to kill. However, the fleeing Uzbek and Tajik refugees have reported that in some instances Kyrgyz police have joined the attacks or turned a blind eye. With the exit of large numbers of refugees the situation is relatively calm now, although with many areas under the control of illegal Kyrgyz armed groups the peace is extremely precarious.

The escalation of violence prompted Otunbayeva to extend a 24-hour curfew in Osh and Jalal-Abad on 12 June. She also called for Russian military intervention under terms of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). This is a loose security structure led by Russia that also includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. However the Kremlin has refused to intervene immediately, arguing that the violence is an internal Kyrgyz affair, but it has agreed to discuss the request at today's CSTO meeting. Since the escalation of violence Russia has sent planes with humanitarian aid for refugees and a limited number of Russian soldiers to bolster security at its military base in the north of the country.

In response to the high number of casualties and refugees, UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union Catherine Ashton, and the U.S., Russian, and Chinese governments have called for peace, but there is little in the way of concrete help. The Uzbek government has remained relatively inactive, meanwhile, but it is clearly very concerned about the violent persecution of its ethnic kin as well as the humanitarian crisis looming on its borders.

The Ethnic Fault-Line

There is abundant historical precedence for Kyrgyzstan's ethnic grievances rearing their head during times of political turmoil. The current violence is reminiscent of the 1990s' bloody conflict in Osh among Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and other national groups that make up the ethnic patchwork of the Fergana Valley. Against the backdrop of the break-up of the Soviet Union, some 1,000 people were killed in the violence. Since those killings, disputes over land and water have dominated interethnic relations. Uzbeks are the main target of the new violence because they are particularly prominent, making up 15% of the country's population and the majority in Kyrgyzstan's second largest city, Osh. Kyrgyz have always been suspicious of the minority's intentions, especially after ethnic Uzbek calls in the 1990s to break away from Kyrgyzstan and join Uzbekistan.

The grievances turned violent again in the power vacuum left by April 2010's revolution, which swept away president Kurmanbek Bakiyev's corrupt and authoritarian rule. The situation has been exacerbated by the hardships of many Kyrgyz and Uzbek guest workers forced to return from Russia during the economic downturn. Interestingly, the first ethnic clashes following the April revolution took place in northern Kyrgyzstan, when Meskhetian Turks residing in the outskirts of Bishkek became target for violent attacks by their Kyrgyz neighbours over land claims. In many ways the riots and clashes in Osh were expected as it not only is home to a large Uzbek minority, but also is Bakiyev's stronghold. Before fleeing the country the ousted president used his native Jalal-Abad as a base for organising a counter-revolution against the provisional government. He was banking on three factors for his success. Firstly, he anticipated support from his clan, which had benefited materially from lucrative business links to the presidential office. Secondly, more conservative and religious southerners are suspicious of a northern, female-led revolution, a sentiment shared by not only Uzbeks but also some Kyrgyz. Thirdly, traditionally powerful Uzbek criminal networks have dominated in the Fergana Valley (which is shared by Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). Bakiyev's regime allegedly had close ties to dominant organised crime groups, led by Uzbek mafia bosses. The latter would certainly oppose any political change of power.

All three factors have contributed to the resurgence of old ethnic hatred in recent days. Unsurprisingly, the provisional government has accused Bakiyev, currently in exile in Belarus, of instigating ethnic conflict together with criminal groups close to his clan. Bakiyev rejects this vehemently.

Outlook and Implications

The ethnic clashes threaten to hijack Kyrgyzstan's democratic revolution. Otunbayeva's obvious failure to curb the violence is likely to push voters towards a stronger leader, at the expense of democratic freedoms. The mass exodus of Uzbeks could be the beginning of a serious conflict as refugees may launch reprisals. The Kyrgyz central government must somehow restore security in the Fergana Valley and open dialogue between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities to allow the return of refugees. If the process is delayed and the refugee camps become permanent, there is also a valid concern that Islamic fundamentalists may find a fertile ground. This could assist the revival of religious extremist organisations such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, active in the Fergana Valley in the 1990s.

Should the conflict continue, the NATO-led coalition will have to reconsider its northern logistical supply route for its anti-Taliban military campaign in Afghanistan that currently runs through troubled Kyrgyzstan. The strategically important Manas air base currently leased by the U.S. military may become unsafe for transferring military personnel and refuelling combat aircrafts. The current crisis may also provide an opportunity for the CSTO, which has been long aspiring to become a serious security organisation akin to NATO. However, Russia, burnt by the Georgian intervention in August 2008, would like to have the UN's blessing before proceeding with a CSTO mission in Kyrgyzstan. Given the importance of stability in Kyrgyzstan the United States may be forthcoming with support for the CSTO mission, proving a good opportunity for the organisation to prove its capabilities and stabilise the alarming security situation. Even if such a mission is forthcoming, security risks in southern Kyrgyzstan—and in the north if the government is further destabilised—look set to persist for some months at least. This has prompted IHS Global Insight to increase the Security Risk Rating from 3.5 to 3.75.