Colombia: peace at last?

A final peace agreement between the Colombian government and FARC is now probable in the next six months, following a deal on transitional justice. Although some challenges and detractors remain, the historic handshake between President Juan Manuel Santos and FARC leader Timochenko marked an agreement on the most difficult aspect of the negotiations, and the country looks set to open its doors to enhanced investment buoyed by this promise.

On 23 September, President Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia: FARC) top leader Rodrigo Londoño, aka Timochenko, met in Havana, Cuba, to announce that an agreement had been reached on the vital issue of transitional justice-the fourth point of negotiation on a six-point agenda outlined in October 2012 between the government and FARC. The deal on transitional justice removes a major hurdle that had forced a stalemate in the peace process since late 2014. A formal bilateral ceasefire is now highly likely in the run-up to the final agreement scheduled for March 2016.

Although partial agreements had already been reached on land reform, illicit drugs, and political participation, the issue of transitional justice had become the main roadblock in the peace process. The agreement strikes a compromise between FARC's previous refusal to consider any prison time for its fighters and the government's obligations under national and international law. A truth commission is to be established, as well as a special tribunal to try cases related to the conflict. Members of FARC, political classes, armed forces, and other protagonists in the conflict who admit to serious crimes will face five to eight years in "restricted liberty." Those who refuse to cooperate will face up to 20 years in normal detention. The negotiating parties have agreed on a deadline of 23 March 2016 to sign a final agreement, with FARC demobilization to follow within 60 days.

However, while peace prospects have greatly increased, challenges remain, including getting support for the deal from FARC fighters on the ground and Santos's ability to secure the population's support in a national referendum. FARC has been fighting an insurgency war against the Colombian state since 1964, making it the oldest armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere.

Confidence-building paid off

De-escalation of the conflict, including FARC's declaration of a third unilateral ceasefire on 20 July, was critical to clinching the deal. Prior to that, the peace process appeared to be close to collapse, owing to a string of attacks from both sides that claimed the lives of dozens of soldiers and guerrilla fighters. FARC's new unilateral ceasefire prompted President Santos to suspend air raids against guerrilla camps.

Since then, military engagements have been reduced to a minimum. According to the Conflict Analysis Resource Centre (Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos: CERAC), the armed confrontation in Colombia from the end of August through September had reached record-low levels not seen since 1975. CERAC data showed that only one military engagement had taken place since late July until late September, while not a single attack on infrastructure by FARC has been recorded in that time. FARC has also increased cooperation with the security forces on removing antipersonnel mines.

Terrorism and war risk likely to decline significantly in next six months

The agreement on transitional justice is likely to give further momentum to the military de-escalation in August and September. With a time frame now clearly established, both sides have an additional incentive to deepen their commitment to the peace process. For FARC, a key priority would be to put in place the conditions and logistics needed to build a political party that will allow them to take part in civilian politics. To this end, the participation in the 25 October 2015 local and regional elections of the Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica: UP)-a political vehicle created by FARC in the 1980s that was then virtually destroyed by right-wing paramilitaries-has been a starting point. UP fielded candidates in dozens of departments; most of them were able to campaign without facing intimidation. FARC is likely to use UP as its springboard for the creation of its political vehicle.

The regained momentum will serve to extend the fragile peace following the cessation of terrorism activity against infrastructure by FARC across the country, particularly in their main strongholds: the departments of Cauca, Nariño, Caquetá, Putumayo, Guaviare, Arauca, Northeast Antioquia, and Norte de Santander. This will provide a significant respite to Colombia's oil companies, which historically have been at the receiving end of FARC's terrorism attacks.

Outlook and implications

The agreement on transitional justice is a major step toward ending Colombia's five decades of armed conflict. However, significant challenges remain on whether the deal will be accepted by FARC fighters on the ground, and whether Santos can secure the support of the Colombian population for the final deal.

It is unlikely that all FARC fronts would acquiesce to imprisonment for major crimes, which would result in splinter groups. For instance, FARC units involved in drug trafficking and those responsible for raising revenue for the conflict will have a strong financial incentive to continue their criminal activities for personal gain. For their part, the FARC's 29th and 48th front, located in the Nariño and Putumayo departments, respectively, are heavily involved in cocaine trafficking as well as oil theft and illegal refining. Other FARC units likely to turn to criminality include the 7th front, based in the department of Guaviare; the 27th front, in the department of Meta; and the 57th front, in the department of Choco. Were these groups to stay active, the risk of insurgent-style attacks on infrastructure and state security forces would likely fall, but risks linked to organized crime, including extortion and kidnapping, would probably increase.

Another threat to the peace process is the potential targeting of UP political activists by right-wing paramilitary groups and rogue members of the security forces. It will be critical for the Santos government to guarantee protection to UP activists following the October elections, which were one of the most peaceful in three decades; otherwise, it would provide FARC enough justification to renege on its commitment to end the conflict once and for all by March 2016.

On the government side, the major challenge is how to secure the support of public opinion, as the final agreement needs to be ratified by a national referendum sometime in the second half of 2016. The lack of formal jail sentences for members of FARC is likely to be unpopular. Santos has already acknowledged that the deal on transitional justice will leave many disappointed.

Support for the peace negotiations has fluctuated since they began in 2012. In June 2015, during a period of intense FARC attacks against state security forces as well as energy and hydrocarbon infrastructure, support for the peace process fell to 45%, its lowest since the process started, according to a Gallup poll. However, a poll published on 8 October by the Centro Nacional de Consultoría showed 73% of the population supported the process. The government is likely to engage in a rigorous public-relations campaign to maintain support, while FARC will have to avoid further military engagements.

Despite the improved security outlook, terrorism risks could persist in areas where the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional: ELN), Colombia's second-largest guerrilla organization, operates. The ELN, a 2,500-person-strong outfit, still has yet to enter into formal peace talks with the government. It has been responsible for most of the attacks against infrastructure since late July, and those attacks are likely to continue until an agreement similar to that brokered with FARC is reached. This means oil and electricity assets in ELN's strongholds-Arauca, Antioquia, Norte de Santander, Choco, and Nariño-will continue to be targeted. However, a final agreement with FARC is likely to speed up formal talks with ELN, as the latter faces the risk of being totally marginalized.

Carlos Caicedois senior principal analyst, Americas, IHS Country Risk. Arthur Dhont is senior analyst, Americas, IHS Country Risk.