Islamic State threat in GCC states

The Islamic State, through three of its 'provinces', claimed a series of attacks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region during 2015. All except one (a 26 June attack on a Shia mosque in Kuwait) occurred in Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia remains the Islamic State's most important Gulf Cooperation Council target. The existence of a suppressed Salafist-jihadist insurgency in the kingdom will assist the group in gradually expanding its presence there and in the Gulf more broadly over the coming year.

In Kuwait, there is an elevated risk of one-off suicide attacks, including targeting publicly accessible security buildings, "un-Islamic" venues serving alcohol and/or frequented by Westerners, including hotels and bars, as well as shooting attacks targeting Shia officials, members of parliament, and members of the business elite.

In Bahrain, targeting the majority Shia population is consistent with the Islamic State's ideology and primary target set. However, Islamic State propaganda and activity indicates that Bahrain is more likely to be selected as a staging ground for attacks than a target, and that the group's priority is to gradually radicalise the Sunni minority, particularly members of the security forces.

In Qatar, patronage for Islamists, ranging from insurgent factions in Syria and Libya to pan-Islamic political movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, reduces the scope for Islamic State recruitment. By providing a platform and occasional base for Islamists in the Gulf and elsewhere, Qatar presents a much more complex recruitment challenge for jihadist groups than Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait. It is likely viewed as a high-risk target that could jeopardise the Islamic State's international support base.

In the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the Islamic State's intent to stage attacks is unlikely to be matched by capability. To offset repression of all forms of dissent and Islamist mobilisation, the UAE has invested heavily in its security services, actively engaged the United States and other partners, and is also attempting to take a leading role in developing counter-narratives to that of the Islamic State.

In Oman, historic internal Ibadi-Sunni conflict is no longer a live issue, which the Islamic State might seek to exploit, as it has the escalating Sunni-Shia regional conflict. This absence of sectarian/ethnic conflict - together with effective, albeit small, security services - restricts the opportunity for Salafist-jihadist groups to gain a foothold.

Given its still limited capabilities in the Gulf region, Islamic State attacks are most likely to take the form of shooting attacks and low-capability suicide bombings against publicly accessible targets. In accordance with Baghdadi's November 2014 announcement, the Islamic State is likely to focus on attacking Shia targets, security forces, government and diplomatic assets/officials, and Western targets.

As the Islamic State appears to still be in the early phase of its campaign, which prioritises recruitment and establishing local support infrastructure, Islamic State attacks in the GCC region would be likely to avoid mass casualties among Sunni GCC nationals. Public spaces frequented by Sunni nationals, such as malls, restaurants, and coffee shops in Riyadh and Jeddah or other major Gulf cities, are therefore an unlikely target, even for demonstrative attacks. However, attacks on banks and assets in the financial services sector, even if they do result in local casualties, would probably be considered justifiable targets on the grounds of failure to comply with sharia.

This is an excerpt from a longer report available at connect.ihs.com.