Argentina's provincial primaries boost pro-business candidate nationwide ahead of presidential election, with two-way race most likely

In the mayoral primaries in Buenos Aires city on 26 April, Horacio Rodríguez Larreta from the Republican Proposal (Propuesta Republicana: PRO) party, defeated Senator Gabriela Michetti, who led a dissenting faction of the party. This was the most recent in a series of election primaries in Argentina's electoral districts ahead of the 5 July mayoral elections in Buenos Aires city and the October presidential election. Together, both PRO candidates obtained 47% of the votes, boosting PRO presidential candidate Mauricio Macri, the current mayor of Buenos Aires.

Although Buenos Aires city is a PRO stronghold (with 8% of the national electorate), the party also made headway in other contests, including in Argentina's third and fourth largest provinces, Santa Fe and Mendoza, on 19 April. This signals that Macri is gaining traction at a national level. In Santa Fe, PRO candidate Miguel del Sel narrowly outpolled the national government's Victory Front (Frente para la Victoria: FpV) candidate. In Mendoza, Alfredo Cornejo of the Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical: UCR), which is allied with the PRO at the national level, also beat the FpV.

According to most polls, Macri is running second behind the most likely government candidate for the presidency, the Buenos Aires provincial governor Daniel Scioli. Scioli, who appears increasingly likely to be backed by President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, is striking the tone of a moderate Kirchnerist, seeking support from both hard-core Kirchnerists and more traditional, non-Kirchnerist Peronists. The latest poll, published on 19 April, suggested that his strategy is working. It put Scioli on 33.4%, Macri on 27.3%, with Massa lagging on 20.1%. All three still face presidential primaries on 9 August, with both Macri and Scioli likely to face stiff challenges. Despite its recent successes, the PRO's national strength remains uncertain. In the 19 April gubernatorial primaries in the southern oil and gas-rich province of Neuquén, Macri's candidate for governor, Horacio "Pechi" Quiroga, came third with 20%, behind provincial party Neuquén Popular Movement (Movimiento Popular Neuquino: MPN) candidate Omar Gutiérrez with 37.7 %, and the FpV’s Ramón Rioseco, with 28.8 %.

Dissident Peronist candidate losing momentum

The biggest loser from these early tests of national presidential credibility is Sergio Massa, mayor of the municipality of Tigre near Buenos Aires, and leader of the dissident Peronist centrist Renewal Front (Frente Renovador: FR). Through 2014 he repeatedly polled as one of the three favourites for the presidential election, building on his strong performance in the October 2013 mid-term elections. However, Massa's mayoral candidate in the Buenos Aires city primaries – former president Néstor Kirchner’s finance secretary Guillermo Nielsen – did not even achieve the 1.5% voting threshold to qualify for the 5 July mayoral election. In addition, Massa has not yet built strong electoral alliances nationwide, outside of some agreements with a few non-Kirchnerist Peronist leaders. Massa lacks clearly defined rhetoric compared to Macri, does not enjoy Scioli's big public advertising budget, and cannot harness a national party structure beyond Buenos Aires province, unlike the UCR's Ernesto Sanz, who will face Macri in the August primaries.

Two days after the Buenos Aires city primaries, an emboldened Macri announced he would not seek an electoral arrangement with Massa. That indicated both Macri's belief that recent PRO results were a strong positive indicator for his presidential chances, and that he no longer views Massa as his key rival.

In turn, Massa has announced an alliance with a major-level national political player. On 2 May, he and Córdoba governor José Manuel de la Sota stated they would face primaries together under the United for a New Argentina (Unidos por una Nueva Argentina: UNA) banner. De la Sota is unlikely to add many votes for the UNA beyond his province, but manages a public advertising budget that could boost Massa's profile. The agreement shows that Massa believes a focus on Buenos Aires province, with 38% of the national electorate, and Córdoba, with 9%, is a viable electoral strategy. With 47% of the national vote involved, the UNA ticket could attract 30% support in those provinces, capping Macri's ambitions. However, Massa's quick reaction to his poor performance in the primaries is evidence that key figures in his campaign view this as a consolidating trend. If it were to deepen, defections from the Massa camp are likely, further weakening his position.

Outlook and implications

With the most likely scenario being a second-round run-off between Scioli and Macri, it will be key how the first-round votes for Massa, Sanz, and other candidates will be redistributed in the run-off. Macri's profile as a pro-business candidate could prove an electoral liability: in the past this has been strongly disliked by many Argentine political constituencies. Both candidates – and Massa – have made clear that should they win, they will seek to loosen currency controls, although at a different pace, with Scioli doing it more gradually than Macri. However, on the "hold-outs" debt issue, Scioli is less likely to seek consensual resolution, while Macri is more willing to negotiate. Scioli is more likely to sanction nationalisations, while Macri is the least likely to do so. Overall differences in policy appear more a matter of degree than any deep ideological split. The key question is therefore how effectively each candidate could implement their campaign promises if elected. Scioli has a major advantage – as a mainstream Peronist, he is far more likely to be able to discipline and reward political and labour union factions than either Macri or Massa. Scioli is less obviously business friendly than Macri, but is less likely to face entrenched Kirchnerist opposition in Congress, increasing his scope to implement policy changes that could boost the operational environment in Argentina post-December 2015, when the new government takes office.