New US-Japanese security guidelines likely to expand geographic and operational scope, particularly in situations short of war

Negotiations for the 2015 update to the guidelines for US-Japan defence co-operation began in October 2013, based on a need for the United States and Japan's partnership to reflect the changing regional security environment. The original guidelines, which were drawn up in 1987, focused only on potential armed attacks on Japan (at the time presumed from the Soviet Union). They are the framework for bilateral defence exercises, planning, and training during peacetime and reaction to emergencies.

The 1997 revision instead focused on Japan providing "rear-area support" to the US military and on "situations in areas surrounding Japan" – most likely a missile or nuclear threat from North Korea. The 2015 guidelines focus on expanding the area of operations of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (SDF) and China's growing assertiveness in the region, particularly with regards to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea.

Limits to previous guidelines

The 1997 guidelines limited the SDF's geographical area of co-ordination and co-operation with the US to "around Japan". For example, provision of the SDF's logistics support through providing fuel and water to ships in the Indian Ocean to support US-led operations in Afghanistan required a new law to be passed by the Diet. In addition, the guidelines did not provide for scenarios involving military deployments other than in response to an armed attack. The Bilateral Co-ordination Mechanism that allows for formal co-ordination between government agencies was predicated on a hostile attack against Japan. Therefore, it could not be invoked, even when the US military and the Japanese SDF were mobilised separately to respond to the "triple disaster" in March 2011 (Operation Tomodachi).

Likely updates

In contrast, the 2015 guidelines assert, "In this increasingly complex security environment, the two governments will take measures to ensure Japan's peace and security in all phases, seamlessly, from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved." The 2015 review of the guidelines introduces the following key elements:

• Rather than the former Bilateral Co-ordination Mechanism, an Alliance Co-ordination Mechanism to "strengthen policy and operational co-ordination" and "establish necessary procedures and infrastructure".
• A commitment to collective self-defence through jointly intercepting ballistic missiles targeting the US and conducting minesweeping operations in the event of the mining of sea-lanes essential to Japan's economy.
• Guidelines on enhancing trilateral and multilateral co-operation with regional allies, including peacekeeping, non-combatant evacuation operations, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
• An acknowledgement that "emerging threats to Japan's peace and security… cannot be defined geographically". These guidelines expand the geographical area of co-operation, removing the current limit to situations "around Japan", in addition to extending co-operation to include capacity building of neighbouring countries in the South China Sea, counterterrorism activities, cyber-space domains, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, maritime surveillance, and peacekeeping operations authorised by the UN.

The guidelines also commit the US and Japan to "co-operate in joint research, development, production, and testing and evaluation of equipment and in mutual provision of components of common equipment and services". In order to increase technology exports to provide for this technical collaboration, in April 2014 the Japanese government approved a relatively relaxed version of Japan's "three principles" of not exporting arms to states that are communist, subject to UN embargoes, or involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts. The 2014 change to allowances for arms' exports is the latest step in a gradual relaxation since the 1980s.

Japanese officials have stated that Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) patrols in the South China Sea may be authorised in the future. However, rather than deploy the SDF in the South China Sea, which China could perceive as a threat to the status quo, Japan is likely to engage in capacity building of neighbours' maritime forces mainly through the Japan Coast Guard.

After agreement

These guidelines are not a legally binding treaty and in Japan their implementation will require the Japanese Diet to pass legislation. It is probable that several items of supporting legislation will be passed before the end of the current Diet session in the second quarter of 2015. However, further legislation is likely to be delayed if it is not drafted and passed before campaigning begins in July 2016 for the upper house election.

Outlook and implications

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komei Party coalition met on 24 April to discuss 11 proposed bills on national security, some of which are related to the guidelines. The government announced that it would submit the full text of the proposed legislation to the parties on 11 May, with the aim of receiving Cabinet approval by 15 May, before submitting the proposals to the Diet. These proposals will allow Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defence – a key to the updated US-Japanese security guidelines – if an attack on a third country poses an existential threat to Japan or infringes Japanese people's rights at home or abroad.

A major concern for Japan is whether, in the event of a threat to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, the US will honour its commitment, which was made by Obama in a speech during his visit to Japan in April 2014, to defend Japanese territory, including the islands. The revised guidelines reaffirm the US's ongoing commitment to "extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including US nuclear forces".