Although the Islamic State is attracting international attention, IHS assesses that it is in fact Jabhat al-Nusra's strategy of sharing expertise while gradually radicalising other groups that is likely to have more long term success, making the group a potentially greater threat than the Islamic State.
IHS perspective | |
Significance | Jabhat al-Nusra has followed a quieter and less spectacular approach than the Islamic State, with which it shares a world view and ultimate objective, allowing it to gradually radicalise the opposition and build alliances within it. |
Implications | The diffuse nature of Jabhat al-Nusra, its good relations with other opposition groups, and its success in radicalising the opposition make it a more difficult foe to identify and target. |
Outlook | If Jabhat al-Nusra, known also as Al-Qaeda in Greater Syria, emulates its strategy of gradually radicalising fighting groups and the community in other regional conflicts, such as in Egypt, it will pose a far greater threat than the Islamic State. |
Over the past week, Jabhat al-Nusra, which also identifies itself as Al-Qaeda in Greater Syria, executed two women in Idlib, Syria, for prostitution and adultery by shooting them in the back of the head, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. The Islamic State, by contrast, uses stoning when executing individuals for adultery. The shared religious views and objectives between Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State, coupled with Jabhat al-Nusra's approach, make the latter the more dangerous of the two groups in our view. This piece will examine a number of reasons why we believe this is the case.
Dominating versus co-opting
The Islamic State’s approach has been to try to command and dominate rival groups in Syria. This is reflected in IHS Conflict Monitor data, which has shown that the majority of fighting action in which the Islamic State was involved in the first six months of 2014 was focused on rival insurgent groups. The Islamic State typically would attack areas that had been cleared of government troops by the opposition, or where the government forces had been confined to a small number of military bases, and impose its system of government. The focus on seizing territory and governing rather than fighting the Syrian Army has created a perception that the Islamic State was, while militarily effective, highly opportunistic, and more interested in pursuing its own agenda.
By contrast, Jabhat al-Nusra has made itself an indispensable force for the opposition. It has shared its expertise in making large improvised explosive devices (IEDs), deployed suicide bombers in opposition offensives, and provided capability that would sometimes tip the balance in major operations, such as the attack on the Wadi al-Daif base in Idlib in December 2014, the offensive on Taftanaz airbase in early 2013, and the defence of Aleppo against the government’s ongoing offensive. In contrast to the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra has spread itself across Syria, until recently avoiding taking control of territory on its own. IHS Conflict Monitor shows only 10 examples in which Jabhat al-Nusra expelled an insurgent group from territory (all in late 2014), 34 instances in which it expelled the Islamic State from territory (mostly early in 2014), and 83 instances in which it expelled the Syrian Army or allied forces. It has therefore created an image for itself as being committed to toppling Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, and as being a genuine ally of the opposition. This has paid dividends in terms of relations with other groups and in terms of public perception more broadly.
Radicalising the opposition
Jabhat al-Nusra has avoided governing on its own, typically working through establishing sharia (Islamic law) councils to govern in which a number of opposition groups are represented. However, by naming the governing structure a sharia council, Jabhat al-Nusra has effectively set a tone in which strict adherence to Islamic law is expected. This has reflected the thinking of Jabhat al-Nusra and Al-Qaeda, specifically, that the Sunni population as a whole has to be radicalised before an Islamic state can be established.
Moreover, its military successes, and the opposition’s need for its presence, have encouraged other groups to emulate Jabhat al-Nusra as the effectiveness of the latter has been established. As the conflict has become more sectarian, it has also become more important for fighting units to ensure that they have strong Islamist credentials, and none have stronger credentials than Jabhat al-Nusra. Now, the main Islamist Syrian fighting groups, aside from the Islamic State, are all Salafist jihadist. This includes Ahrar al-Sham, in whose founding Al-Qaeda played a role, and Jaish al-Islam, the Saudi-backed outfit whose leader, Zahran Alloush, has said that his group’s interpretation of Islam is identical to that of Jabhat al-Nusra.
Public perception
The Islamic State is a source of controversy in the broader Middle East and North Africa region, as it is in Syria and Iraq. However, Jabhat al-Nusra is perceived in Syria to be a genuine ally that contributes to government services and to the provision of aid. This has allowed it to expel from Idlib groups such as Harakat Hazm and the Syrian Revolutionary Front, which it accused of corruption and which had co-operated closely with the US, and take over their supplies and some of their fighters. Most significantly, its role does not spur strong disagreements in the region. The general perception appears to be that they are just "good mujahideen", making Jabhat al-Nusra more insidious and more appealing to moderate Muslims than the Islamic State.
Outlook and implications
By ensuring that the Syrian opposition’s laws of governance and combat are viewed through the lens of Islamic law, Jabhat al-Nusra is likely to have far more success in winning hearts and minds among moderate Muslims, and adherents to its world view, than the Islamic State can ever hope to achieve. The Islamic State is certainly more appealing than Jabhat al-Nusra to young "hotheads" keen to join jihad. However, Jabhat al-Nusra is far more likely to be viewed as an entity that can bring stability and good governance, making it far more attractive to Islamist moderates and businesses seeking to challenge their governments in countries such as Jordan or Saudi Arabia. Jabhat al-Nusra’s good relations with opposition groups have allowed it to swing the opposition in its direction, furthering the narrative of a conflict between the Sunni and the Shia, without repelling potential sympathisers with the spectacular violence of the Islamic State. Additionally, its relations with the Syrian opposition allow it to simply melt into the opposition if it were ever under a sustained campaign as is the Islamic State, and this makes it more difficult to launch such a campaign without appearing to be targeting the Syrian opposition as a whole. Ultimately, Jabhat al-Nusra is likely to be in a far stronger position to radicalise fighters and populations in other conflict areas in the region, such as in Egypt, rather than the Islamic State, given that it has the same level of expertise to share but does not demand total obedience, and given its strategy of gradually radicalising the population it assists rather than abruptly imposing a new set of laws. It would then be in a position to channel this support to the goal that it and Al-Qaeda have declared for themselves, which is the establishment of a new caliphate in Syria and Iraq.