Imminent expiry of disarmament deadline for FDLR rebels raises violent risks in eastern DRC in six-month outlook

The insurgent Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda: FDLR) has a deadline to disarm on 2 January 2015, but it is unlikely to comply with this demand. It is possible that joint military action by the Democratic Republic of Congo and the United Nations could disarm the group by force. If the group is not disarmed, security risks in the eastern DRC will severely deteriorate in the first few months of 2015.

Background

The defeat of the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebellion largely depended on Rwanda withdrawing its support to the group. This enabled the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo: FARDC) and the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) of the UN Stabilisation Mission for DRC (Mission de l'ONU pour la stabilisation de la RDC: MONUSCO) to dismantle the group. However, Rwanda's decision was made in exchange for the assurance by the DRC government and MONUSCO that Rwandan Hutu FDLR rebels would be next to be disarmed.

However, in July 2014, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) accorded the FDLR another six months to surrender and disarm completely. Initially, only about 200 FDLR fighters have surrendered, with another 80 surrendering on 28 December in Walikale territory; its estimated total strength is 3,000 fighters. The FDLR appears to be playing for time: SADC deemed the surrender "partial and late" on Radio Okapi on 28 December, and Rwanda expects decisive military action against the FDLR if the 2 January deadline expires without disarmament.

Scenario 1: Decisive offensive against FDLR

In this scenario, the FDLR's failure to comply with the deadline would trigger military offensives by the FARDC and MONUSCO to disarm its fighters by force. This would result in an intensification of fighting between rebels and security forces, including the use of heavy artillery and attack helicopters against FDLR hideouts in North Kivu, mainly in Rutshuru and Walikale territories. A successful operation would greatly improve the security outlook for eastern DRC in the six-month outlook.

However, the UN FIB has redeployed to Beni territory to combat the resurgence of the rebel Allied Democratic Forces–National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF–NALU), which has increased its killings of civilians in the area since October 2014.

Despite a clear mandate, other MONUSCO units are less likely to take offensive action against FDLR. Although the Special Representative for MONUSCO, Martin Kobler, in December 2014 reiterated that military action would be necessary if FDLR failed to disarm voluntarily, much will depend on regional dynamics. FIB contributor countries South Africa and Tanzania are unlikely to order their units into offensives, especially if the FDLR continues with its small gestures of goodwill such as the small number of troops who have so far surrendered. However, Angola, which is currently chairing the ICGLR, advocates a tougher stance against the FDLR. If Angola, which is so far not contributing troops to MONUSCO, decides to dispatch military units to eastern DRC either as part of MONUSCO or, more likely, unilaterally, military action against FDLR would become more likely, even if South Africa and Tanzania opt out.

Scenario 2: Return to protracted war

Delays to military action and the general suspicion of FDLR and other armed rebel groups towards the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programme raise the risk of a return to protracted civil war, with an interlinked risk of Rwandan military intervention inside DRC. Indeed, on 24 December Rwandan Foreign Minister Louise Mushikwabo denounced the "ill intentions and manipulations" of the FDLR, saying Rwanda could "count on itself" to disarm the rebels by force.

Rwanda is likely to support the rearmament of a new Tutsi rebel group in eastern DRC, recruited from the remnants of the defeated M23. On 16 December, more than 1,000 former M23 fighters fled from the Bihanga barracks in Uganda's western Ibanda district, where they had been cantoned awaiting repatriation to DRC following a December 2013 agreement with the DRC government that they would be granted amnesty upon return (see Democratic Republic of Congo: 18 December 2014: Departure of Congolese rebels from Ugandan camps raises risks of renewed M23 rebellion in eastern DRC).

Since August 2014, MONUSCO reported that the M23 was regrouping and rearming, and the mass escape of supposedly demobilised fighters, coupled with likely Rwandan support, makes the resurgence of an armed 'new M23' rebellion increasingly likely. This poses the risk of attacks on UN and government troops, and of looting, extortion, and collateral harm to non-governmental organisations active in North and South Kivu. Moreover, Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) are likely to provide covert support to the 'New M23' against FDLR, FARDC and MONUSCO units, raising the risk of cross-border incursions and artillery shelling. In November and December 2012 Rwandan troops shelled Goma airport in support of the M23's advance on the province capital.

Outlook and implications

Either way, IHS expects a marked increase in the intensity of fighting in eastern DRC in the first months of 2015. Unless Angola uses its military power and regional influence to initiate decisive military action as chair of the ICGLR, the rebel group is likely to play for time with token gestures of compliance, such as a small number of surrenders in isolated areas that do not significantly undermine the group's operational capability. This, in turn, significantly raises the risk of a renewed Rwandan-backed Tutsi rebellion in eastern DRC, leading to broad deterioration of the security situation in the area.