The current political crisis in Libya has its roots in interference by rival militias over the shape of the country's future governance, primarily over the extent to which elements of the former regime should be barred from power.
IHS perspective | |
Significance | Tribal elements from the east and the interior of western Libya, allied with Ghaddafi loyalists and remnants of the former army, are fighting against a coalition of Islamist forces primarily from the coastal areas between Misrata and Tripoli. Both of these coalitions are deeply fractured along tribal, regional, and ideological lines. |
Implications | Limited military intervention in the conflict is likely by Algeria, Egypt, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. However, without arming the fighters on the ground, this will be insufficient to turn the tide of the battle. |
Outlook | The Libyan state is unlikely to recover its authority in the coming year, and, in a best-case scenario, will remain dependent on quasi-independent militias and remnants of the former army for several years to come. |
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A fighter from an Islamist militia sits outside the gate of Tripoli International Airport, |
Libya's political divisions have fuelled the formation of two broad military coalitions: one led by commanders from the Zintan region based on the tribes of the interior, which had generally benefited from former leader Muammar Ghaddafi's rule; and the other led by commanders from Misrata and drawing on Islamist militias primarily from the coastal areas. The ensuing power struggle has escalated into all-out fighting in the capital, Tripoli. Islamist militias, which control the Mitiga Airbase and key security posts, launched an offensive in July 2014 to expel the Zintan from Tripoli International Airport after the latter sided with Benghazi-based renegade General Khalifa Haftar's attempt to dissolve the now-defunct General National Congress (GNC) and break the Islamist militias militarily. On 23 August, Islamist forces overran the Zintan positions and captured the airport. Several buildings, including the main terminal, were set on fire and destroyed in an apparent attempt to prevent airport operations resuming.
Government stability
In response to persistent heavy fighting in Tripoli and Benghazi, the government is attempting to move administrative functions to the eastern city of Tobruq, which is not currently contested by rival militias. However, this is likely to be challenged militarily by Islamist militias and jihadist groups based in the area, leading to a severe risk of fighting in the city and along roads leading to it.
The new parliament, the House of Representatives (HoR), now based in Tobruq, has requested foreign intervention under the auspices of the United Nations to resolve the fighting. However, the focus of the UN Security Council on Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine lowers the probability of such intervention. Without significant external support for the pro-government Zintani forces, the Islamists are likely to be largely successful in cementing their control over Tripoli and Benghazi. The main constraint to the power of the Islamist coalition comes from its inherent internal divisions, with a high risk that more outwardly pro-democracy groups such as the Misratans and Muslim Brotherhood militias will be challenged by more radical groups such as Ansar al-Sharia.
Risks of external intervention
The Islamists currently hold a military advantage in both the east and the west of Libya. The military weakness and political divisions affecting the Islamists' rivals suggest that they would be unable to hold out unless they were to receive far more military aid from Algeria and Egypt and other countries, including the UAE. Significant military gains by Islamist forces would increase the likelihood of an Egyptian military intervention in eastern Libya to support the Libyan state, probably involving air strikes and special forces (see Libya: 6 August 2014: Another attack near western border heightens likelihood of Egyptian airstrikes inside Libya). Egypt is primarily concerned that the Muslim Brotherhood or jihadist groups will gain control of Libyan energy revenues, which they would be likely to use in support of the insurgency in Egypt.
As in Syria, limited air strikes in isolation would be unlikely to provide a decisive advantage. Moreover, there is a high risk that aid to the Islamists' rivals would result in a protracted state of inconclusive fighting, rather than the Islamists' defeat. Only a strategy that combines undermining the Islamists politically by building state institutions capable of delivering public services, along with militarily defeating the most radical Islamist elements, will have any prospect of succeeding. There is no evidence yet that such a strategy is being considered, but it is likely to evolve as a result of foreign intervention and support to the Libyan state. Control of the energy export infrastructure between Ajdabiya and Sirte will also be critical.
Outlook and implications
IHS has identified the three most likely scenarios in the one-year outlook in Libya, ordered from most likely to least likely. They all assume that any foreign military intervention will be limited in scale and carried out by regional powers only. All the scenarios carry a high to severe risk of fighting in central Tripoli in the six-month outlook, severing access to the airports and leading to fighting along roads connecting Tripoli to the Tunisian border.
Scenario 1: Failure of the government in Tobruq, leading to a stalemate
The government in Tobruq fails to take control of state administrative functions located in Tripoli, including the relocation of key personnel. It also fails to consolidate its power around Tobruq and to contain the Islamists in the east. Control of energy revenues, the central bank, and the National Oil Corporation (NOC) remain in Tripoli under the control of the Islamist coalition, which establishes the rump of the GNC as a parallel government. This allows Islamist forces to gradually expand their control over the country, leading to a high probability of Algerian and Egyptian intervention. The failure of the Tobruq government and success of the Islamists may trigger sufficient support for state forces from the UN Security Council, including funding, training, and sanctions on the Islamists, to lead into Scenario 2.
In downtown Tripoli, there would be a high risk to government buildings and adjacent structures, similar to Scenario 2. Roads to Tunisia would be even more unsafe due to frequently shifting battle lines. Air strikes targeting Islamist militias would not occur frequently, but radical Islamist elements would continue to target foreigners.
Scenario 2: Tobruq government consolidates control over oil revenues, slowly restores state capacity
Through major external support, the government consolidates in Tobruq, and moves control of state revenues there. Haftar's forces, using large amounts of Egyptian arms and ammunition, contain the Islamists in Benghazi and Derna, and ally with the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) to ensure that energy export terminals are under Tobruq's control. The government uses revenues to build its support base among the Amazigh, Gaddafa, Oulad Suleiman, Tebu, Zuwayia, and other Arab tribes between Ajdabiya, Jalu, Kufra, and Sirte. These tactics allow the Arabian Gulf Oil Company and other state oil companies to restore enough energy exports to finance supporting and buying off militias in the west.
Recurrent fighting around key government buildings in Tripoli would be highly likely. Mitiga Airbase and Tripoli International Airport would be military objectives, with the success of the government leading to an attempt to capture Souq al-Jouma district in Tripoli and Mitiga Airbase.
Scenario 3: Islamists succeed, leading to a high risk of their fracturing and turning against each other, or of sanctions and foreign intervention
The external support given to the Islamists' rivals is insufficient to prevent their defeat due to the Islamists' greater numbers, cohesion, and skill, better resources, and ability to sideline or ally with smaller tribes. The Islamists succeed in isolating the Tobruq government and secure control of energy revenues through expelling the PFG from oil export terminals or making a deal with them. This allows them to buy off still hostile tribes and militias, and to establish control over the state temporarily. The Islamist coalition is likely to fracture between the more hardline factions and the Muslim Brotherhood, leading to a severe risk of fighting in Tripoli. It also increases the likelihood of enough external support to trigger sanctions and greater direct foreign military intervention from Algeria and Egypt to secure their respective borders.