In July the Greek security forces captured one of the country's most wanted left-wing militants. This article analyses the impact of the arrest and assesses levels of terrorism risks stemming from other groups operating in Greece.
IHS perspective | |
Significance | The capture of one of Greece's most-wanted militant fugitives, Nikos Maziotis, in July signals a major step in the country's fight against domestic left-wing terrorism. |
Implications | Maziotis' arrest will impede the operational capacity of his militant group, Revolutionary Struggle, and its ability to continue an armed struggle, unless he had managed to form a larger clandestine organisation whilst out of prison. |
Outlook | Even if Revolutionary Struggle's operational capacity is lowered, IHS does not assess that terrorism risks in Greece will fall considerably in the short- to medium-term. It is likely that the group will remain capable of staging small-scale attacks, while the presence of other left-wing militant groups maintains an elevated risk of death and injury, and property damage, mainly to Western, especially German, assets and personnel, as well as members of Greek state institutions. |
Struggle continues
On 8 August Panagiota Roupa, wife of Revolutionary Struggle (Epanastatikos Agonas: EA) leader, Nikos Maziotis, issued a statement through website Indymedia claiming she would not "surrender" but would "continue the armed struggle" in Greece. Maziotis, one of Greece's most wanted militants, was arrested by Greek police on 16 July after an armed exchange in the
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Policemen run to the scene where Nikos Maziotis |
central tourist district of the capital Athens. Maziotis was convicted in absentia in 2013 and sentenced to 25 years in prison for participating in a series of high-profile attacks, including an attack on the United States Embassy in Athens in 2007 and a 2009 vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack on the Athens Stock Exchange. Maziotis had been on the run since October 2012 after violating his conditional release with Roupa, who is also an EA member.
Since their disappearance in 2012, Maziotis and Roupa had been linked to six armed bank robberies (that were likely to be intended to finance the EA's activities), and were also behind the 10 April 2014 VBIED attack on the Bank of Greece in central Athens (see Greece: 10 April 2014: Car bomb outside Bank of Greece indicates persistent risk of attacks against foreign assets and diplomatic missions). There were no injuries but the explosion caused extensive damage to the building. The attack, the EA's first in more than four years, was a carbon copy of the 2009 Athens Stock Exchange operation. As the group explained in its subsequent communiqué, the attack was "a response" to Greece's return to the bond markets and "a protest" against the official visit of "the leading supporter of extreme neoliberal austerity measures across Europe and the main exponent of Europe's economic elite, the super-terrorist" German chancellor Angela Merkel to Athens the next day. The group said that the blast had also targeted the office – housed in the bank premises – of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) representative in Greece, Wes McGrew.
High-profile militant incidents in Athens and surrounding areas in 2010-14 | |||
Date (most recent first) | Area | Asset type | Description |
16 July 2014 | Nea Erythraia | Catering | An IED was detonated outside a restaurant, causing major property damage. |
10 July 2014 | Central District | Banking | VBIED explosion outside Central Bank building caused serious property damage, but no casualties. |
2 March 2014 | Plaka | State institution | Several small gas canister IEDs detonated outside the office of prime minister's aide, causing significant property damage. |
2 January 2014 | Glyfada | State institution | Unidentified suspects set alight the first floor of the local branch of the Social Security Organisation, causing extensive damage. |
20 January 2013 | Maroussi | Retail | An IED detonated at a news stand in the Athens shopping centre; two security staff were injured. |
27 June 2012 | Maroussi | IT/Western corporation | Three people drove a van through the entrance of the Greek Microsoft headquarters and set off an incendiary device; no injuries were reported. |
3 December 2011 | Maroussi | State institution | A tax office was seriously damaged in an arson attack; no injuries resulted. |
12 October 2011 | Glyfada | Retail | More than 30 shops were damaged in an IED explosion; no casualties were reported. |
11 September 2011 | Central District | State Institution | Suspected anarchists threw petrol bombs at an empty police bus outside the Culture Ministry building, causing considerable damage. |
3 March 2011 | Kessariani | Banking | Eurobank branch was damaged in an arson attack; no injuries resulted. |
30 December 2010 | Central District | State Institution | Courthouse substantially damaged in IED attack. |
18 August 2010 | Petropouli | Retail | IED destroyed a cafe in a local cultural centre; no one was hurt. |
19 July 2010 | Ilioupolis | Media | Unidentified attackers shot dead journalist Socrates Giolias. |
24 June 2010 | Central District | State Institution | A parcel bomb went off inside the Public Order Ministry offices, killing an official; the minister was not hurt. |
5 May 2010 | Central District | Banking | Three people died when petrol bombs were thrown at a Marfin bank branch by hooded youths during protests against austerity measures. |
2 May 2010 | Aghios Dimitrios | Banking | Unidentified attackers threw petrol bombs at a Geniki Bank branch, causing major damage. |
2 May 2010 | Aghios Dimitrios | Banking | Molotov cocktails were thrown at an Emporiki bank branch; major damage, but no injuries resulted. |
28 March 2010 | Patissia | State institution | An IED detonated outside a training institute for civil servants; a teenage passer-by died. |
16 February 2010 | Kolonaki | Banking | A bomb detonated outside a branch of US bank JPMorgan Chase, causing no injuries; a telephone warning was made. |
8 February 2010 | New Erythraia | Retail | Attackers used gas canisters to set fire to a local supermarket, causing substantial damage but no injuries. |
Source: IHS data | |||
Outlook and implications
The EA's ability to carry out future attacks depended on Maziotis' ability to set up a wider organisation whilst he was out of prison, including recruiting new members, as well as training someone to take over operational duties. According to an IHS source, Roupa is the ideological driving force behind Maziotis and his group. As stated in her communiqué, she is unlikely to give up, but is likely to seek a revenge attack. Even if Maziotis' arrest did weaken the EA, terrorism risks in Greece are unlikely to abate in the medium term. In this event, EA's operational capacity is likely to be lowered in the coming months, while its members are likely to 'lie low' as the search for Roupa and others continues. It is unlikely that the group would attempt – or be capable of – a large-scale attack in this period, although the risk of 'small-scale' attacks would remain elevated.
The EA blames the government, financial institutions (mainly banks), and Greece's international lenders for the state of the country's economy, ongoing austerity regime, falling living standards, and high unemployment. If the group is able to carry on with its
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Map showing areas of attacks in Greece. |
armed struggle without Maziotis, the most likely targets would include Greek senior politicians, their relatives and premises; members of any troika delegation; members of German diplomatic missions and their premises; as well as high-ranking officials at German companies or banks – such individuals are seen as more accessible, but still symbolic. Any attacks would be likely to take the form of arson, IEDs, VBIEDs, parcel/letter bombs or targeted shootings, most likely restricted to central Athens and Thessaloniki. They will not aim to cause widespread civilian casualties, but the risk of unintended property damage is high due to collateral damage, mostly in built-up urban areas.
Meanwhile, in February 2014 a new militant group called the Popular Fighters Group (Omáda Laïkón Agonistón: OLA) claimed responsibility for an attack on the residence of the German ambassador to Athens, Wolfgang Doldt, on 30 December 2013. The OLA also claimed it had fired a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) at a Mercedes-Benz dealership in northern Athens on 12 January, as part of a "campaign against the German capitalist machine". The OLA's choice of targets together with the tone of its subsequent communiqué, match those of the EA. This led Greek authorities to conclude that the OLA and EA are "one and the same thing", according to an official at the Ministry of Public Order, who spoke to IHS on condition of anonymity. Nonetheless, neither group have confirmed this, and Greek security forces have been unable to officially connect Maziotis to the OLA.
The domestic terrorism threat also stems from other groups. Fire Conspiracy Cells (Synomosia Pyrinon tis Fotias: SPF) was responsible for the 2010 parcel bombs sent to foreign embassies and an IED attack outside an Athens courthouse which caused superficial damage and no casualties. The IED was in a rubbish bin close to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Syntagma Square, one of Athens' busiest areas, while parliament was in session. The SPF's subsequent claim of responsibility blamed current parliamentary forms of democratic representation and dysfunctional socio-political and economic structures. At the same time, repeated references and criticism of neo-liberal capitalism, the IMF, and political corruption revealed its hostility towards international interdependence and transnational policies. The arrests of some key members in 2009 have failed to destroy the group and the SPF seems to have an effective support and sympathiser network. According to Greek security forces, the group has carried out over 200 attacks to date – including low-level IED attacks against police stations and a VBIED attack against the director of Korydallos maximum security prison (where most SPF militants are being held). With SPF's loose structure of individual cells, it is difficult for Greek security services to develop an effective response or even estimate the group's current level of membership and capabilities.
Last, the escape of Christodoulos Xeros, who was serving six life sentences for a string of assassinations and bombings carried out on behalf of left-wing militant group 17 November (Epanastatiki Organosi 17 Noemvri: EO17N) has further raised terrorism risks in Greece. Xeros failed to return to Korydallos Prison in Athens after a temporary leave of absence in January, and later that month posted an online video threatening to return to armed action. In his statement, Xeros warned that "the price of [the government's] treason is death", urging other anarchists to join him. EO17N militants had in the past targeted US and UK officials, Greek politicians, magistrates, journalists, industrialists, and ship-owners through a variety of methods ranging from small-arms attacks to firing rockets at foreign embassies and businesses. In June 2002, 15 members of the group were captured and imprisoned and the Greek security forces believed that any remaining splinter groups posed no real security threat. Xeros' escape and threats have put Greek security forces at high alert. However, it is unlikely that the EO17N would make a comeback under his leadership. Xeros has never been a significant EO17N member and the police believe he lacks the gravitas and the discipline required for relaunching an EO17N comeback. There is a small risk that Xeros would become more closely involved with Roupa and rest of the EA; however, substantial ideological differences between them are likely to hinder any intense co-operation.
This article was written in co-operation with IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre and an IHS external contributor.



