The repression of opposition protests and recent armed unrest within the armed forces indicate rising risks to political stability and security in the run-up to the Democratic Republic of Congo 2016 election.
IHS perspective | |
Significance | The question of Kabila's succession is unresolved but becomes an increasingly pressing issue, leading to great nervousness within the ruling elite, and providing a rallying cause for the opposition. |
Implications | As building up a 'natural successor' is likely to strain the ruling coalition, and running for a third mandate will trigger great domestic and international opposition, Kabila is playing for time; increasing crackdown on opposition protests to be expected |
Outlook | Delays to implementing agreements for the pacification of the East, as well as attempts to sideline Katangan elites, raise violent and political instability risks. |
Although Congolese president Joseph Kabila is constitutionally barred from running for a third mandate, some within the ruling regime and the Alliance for a Presidential Majority (Alliance pour la Majorité Présidentielle: AMP) coalition been increasingly vocal in voicing their desire to revise the constitution "for the sake of continuity" to allow Kabila to stand for a third mandate in the 2016 election.
IHS assesses that President Joseph Kabila himself may not be determined to win a third mandate at all costs. He faces considerable obstacles: the international community and DRC civil society actors such as the Catholic Church have clearly expressed their opposition to a third mandate. The leader of the Independent National Electoral Commission (Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante: CENI), Abbé Malu Malu, is condemned by the opposition as being subservient to Kabila's wishes, but although he might be willing to help Kabila play for time by delaying the electoral timetable, he is unlikely to condone a third mandate.
Kabila will find it increasingly difficult to balance the competing factions within his entourage and the army. High-profile, if poorly organised, armed attacks by still unidentified armed men on army barracks and public media in Kinshasa in December 2013 and July 2014, as well as the assassination in January of the popular Colonel Mamadou Ndala, are but the most visible signs of tensions within the army and the influential Balubakat regional elite of the mineral-rich Katanga province. The recent reintegration of General Gabriel Amisi 'Tango Four' into the army and the recalling of minor parties within the AMP to Kinshasa for consultations are both indicative of an attempt to placate these tensions and to rein in the various factions within the AMP The sacking of Gecamines Administrator Ahmed Nkandj on 26 July was most likely a move by Kabila to secure support from Katanga governor Moïse Katumbi Chapwe. Although there are several AMP luminaries who harbour presidential ambitions, including Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo, Speaker of the National Assembly Aubin Minaku, PPRD Secretary-General Evariste Boshab, and Communications Minister Lambert Mende, none of them is likely to earn the approval of the AMP across competing factions.
Kabila might be persuaded to leave office if there are guarantees for his immunity from prosecution and a potential role for his sister Jaynet and brother Zoe on the national political stage. However, people from his close entourage who have benefited from Kabila's largesse would stand to lose in political and economic influence from his exit from the presidency. The recent arrest of Jean-Bertrand Ewanga, Secretary-General of the opposition Union for the Congolese Nation (Union pour la Nation Congolaise: UNC) in Kinshasa on 5 August following an opposition rally signals the nervousness of the regime. Regime exponents such as Mende and Minaku are increasingly likely to engage in 'kite flying', venturing publicly the possibility of a constitutional change and third mandate for Kabila. This in turn will provide a strong rallying cause for the usually fragmented DRC civil society and political opposition forces. IHS expects to see increasing crackdown on opposition figures, including the arbitrary arrest of opposition leaders, police violence against demonstrators, and the closure of independent newspapers.
Violent risks
Beyond a likely rise in civil unrest and related police violence, the security situation in the east of the country remains volatile. After the military defeat of the Mouvement 23 Mars (M23) rebellion in October 2013 the Addis Ababa peace and security agreement stipulated the surrender and disarmament of M23 and other rebel groups, particularly the predominantly ethnic-Hutu Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) that originally hailed from Rwanda. However, the window of opportunity to implement the Addis Ababa Agreement is closing, raising the risk of new armed insurgencies in eastern DRC. Indeed, local sources report serious delays in the planned "voluntary disarmament" of FDLR rebels. Since the February 2014 announcement of the FDLR's surrender and inclusion in the disarmament process, around 200 of its estimated 2,000 fighters have surrendered to the DRC government. According to a June 2014 United Nations Experts' Group report, the remaining FDLR units are regrouping in eastern DRC.
Although Rwanda agreed to give the FDLR another six months to voluntarily surrender, an uptick in FDLR attacks in eastern DRC increases the risk of a resurgence of a Rwandan-backed Tutsi rebellion against its rivals in the FDLR. Violent risk hotspots, currently concentrated in the north-eastern part of Katanga and the North-Kivu–Orientale border, would shift back into the Kivus. A resumption in ethnic-Tutsi rebel activity would pose wider security and instability threats to DRC's eastern region, including the risk of attacks on UN and government troops, and of looting, extortion, and collateral harm to non-governmental organisations active in the area, mining personnel at the Kibali gold mines, and potentially Heritage Oil's future exploration sites.
Contract and taxation risks
A decentralisation law, drafted by the national government in 2008, would divide Katanga, from where the majority of the DRC's mining revenues originate, into four smaller provinces. However, local political and business elites, who benefit from the extraction of minerals such as aluminium, cobalt, copper, and zinc oppose the plan, as they fear their influence and revenues will diminish. Kabila has increasingly marginalised Katangan elites over the past year by dismissing some from key functions, although Katangan Balubakat elites from the north of the province were his primary support base when he came to power in 2001. The planned division of Katanga is likely to exacerbate regulatory and double taxation risks between national and provincial level to mining companies.
The key risk factor to watch for is the announcement of a new "government of national cohesion" promised by Kabila at the closing of the December 2013 "national consultation" for early 2014, but has currently still not been implemented. If the new government headed by Kabila comes to pass, it will become clearer whether he will draw in new Katangan elites to support his government, or rather try to cut them out and proceed with the territorial reorganisation. The balancing of competing factions within the AMP ahead of the elections is also likely to put new gatekeepers in place, raising contract and corruption risks to mining operators, as well as in the nascent oil and gas sector.
Outlook and implications
Political risks are likely to increase until Kabila comes down firmly on one side or the other of the succession debate. Announcing his intention to stand again in 2016 would raise further protest risks but reduce nervousness within the regime. Conversely, choosing and building up a successor from within the AMP would mitigate the risks of popular and opposition protests but is likely to exacerbate rifts within the AMP, and balancing the competing regional influence centres is likely to see a resurgence of armed group activity in Katanga. The question of succession and the balancing of regional interests while the administrative reform of the territory is proceeding will also raise contract risks, especially to mining operations in Katanga.