On 14 July, a statement purporting to be from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb appeared on the internet, reaffirming its allegiance to Pakistan-based Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.
IHS perspective | |
Significance | Although its authenticity is still unconfirmed, the statement highlights the divisions between jihadist groups over how to react to the Islamic State's announcement of a caliphate in Iraq and Syria. |
Implications | The Islamic State's ability to win over leaders of long-established jihadist groups is weak, but its ability to attract support from individuals and emergent groups is strong. This means jihadist infighting is likely to spread outside Syria. |
Outlook | Groups aligning themselves with the Islamic State are likely to have a broader target set than those aligned with Al-Qaeda, including attacks on the Tunisian state, for example. |
In response to the declaration of a caliphate by the Islamic State, (formerly known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) on 29 June, a statement from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) appeared on the internet on 14 July, reaffirming its allegiance to Pakistan-based Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. The Islamic State had called on all other jihadist groups to pledge allegiance to the new caliph, failing which, it would consider them invalid. AQIM's statement, if proved to be authentic, indicates that it rejects this ultimatum, and considers the declaration of the caliphate invalid, as it took place without proper consultation and against the wishes of various influential jihadist theologians.
Internal dissent within Al-Qaeda affiliates
A similar line of supporting the Al-Qaeda leadership and rejecting the Islamic State's bid for supremacy has been taken by leaders within the Yemen-based Al-Qaeda affiliate, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). For example, on 5 July, two leading AQAP religious figures, Harith bin Ghazi al-Nadhari and Ibrahim al-Rubaish, released a video in which they criticised the Islamic State and its supporters. In the video, both AQAP clerics defended the reputation of the "old jihadist scholars" and warned against "slandering them". The video followed a 3 July statement by AQAP's leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi, praising Al-Qaeda's leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, in language tantamount to a renewal of the group's allegiance to him.
Overall, it seems that the Islamic State is not succeeding in attracting the official leadership of the more established jihadist groups to its side, which was probably one of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's main goals in declaring the caliphate. However, this does not preclude the possibility of pro-Islamic State factions emerging even within the Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, and of splits between the leadership and their core constituencies. There have already been signs of dissent within both AQIM and AQAP in this regard. For instance, on 27 June, an AQIM faction claiming to represent AQIM's central and trans-Saharan region issued a video stating that it would always support the Islamic State and that it wished to build friendly ties with it, and calling for AQIM to declare its support for the group. Similarly, in Yemen, in a series of messages posted on Twitter on 3 and 4 July, an AQAP member, Mamoun Hatim, criticised the Nadhari and Rubaish videos, stating that the Islamic State's successes in Iraq should not be denied. There were also reports that Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen, an affiliate of AQAP, had pledged allegiance to the caliphate on 1 July. This suggests that disagreements within those groups over strategy, loyalties, and which line to take are likely to grow over the coming weeks.
Groups expressing opposition to the caliphate
In contrast, jihadist groups in Lebanon and Syria have voiced the strongest opposition to the Islamic State caliphate. In Lebanon, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades denounced the caliphate as "illegitimate" in a statement posted on 4 July. Meanwhile, in Syria, nine leading rebel groups rejected the Islamic State's move on 30 June, stating, "The announcement by the rejectionists [the Islamic State] of a caliphate is null and void both legally and logically." Among the groups were the biggest Islamist rebel coalition, the Islamic Front, and Majlis Shura Mujahideen al-Sharqiya, an alliance in the eastern province of Deir el-Zour that includes the Al-Qaeda official affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra. Indeed, an unconfirmed statement was issued by Jabhat al-Nusra's emir Abu Mohammed al-Jolani on 12 July, indicating that an Islamic emirate would soon be formed in Syria, but emphasising the gradual and consultative approach that it would take towards this, in contrast to the Islamic State.
The position of these factions, although expected, is likely to lead to further infighting in northern and eastern Syria, particularly in border areas with Iraq, as the Islamic State is likely to attempt to cement its territorial gains in both countries. Infighting is also likely in Lebanon between pro- and anti-Islamic State factions. Furthermore, it is very likely that those Syrian insurgents who support the Islamic State's declaration of the caliphate will simply defect from other groups to join the Islamic State instead, particularly in Deir el-Zour, where Islamic State control is already extensive. This poses risks for Jabhat al-Nusra, which will probably face defections if it is seen to be on the losing side.
Groups expressing support for the caliphate
Additionally, the Islamic State has received pledges of allegiance and support from smaller organisations or groups that were already supportive of it. Smaller groups are likely to be motivated by the desire to align with the military successes and notoriety of the Islamic State (in comparison with Al-Qaeda's lack of major attacks in recent years). Another potential motive is the desire to access the substantial financial resources that the Islamic State has acquired through taking over oil fields in Syria, raiding banks in Iraq, and ongoing activities such as extortion and kidnap. Smaller groups that have declared allegiance or support include those listed below.
Syria – Jaish al-Sahaba (29 June)
Lebanon – Liwa Ahrar Sunna Baalbeq (29 June) and Ahrar al-Sunna (2 July)
West Bank – Al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Bayt al-Maqdis (30 June)
Tunisia – figures associated with Ansar al-Sharia (1 July)
Iraq – figures associated with Ansar al-Islam (1 July)
Egypt – Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (2 July)
Syria – Katiba Ansar al-Sharia in Homs and Liwa al-Dawud (8 July)
Libya – No official announcements, but pro-Islamic State stance taken by supporters of Ansar al-Sharia in Libya on social media
Outlook and implications
Of the groups that have declared support or allegiance, the most significant are Egypt's Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, which has proven vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) capability in Cairo and Ismaïlia and is likely to target government, security force, and economic targets such as pipelines; Iraq's Ansar al-Islam, a long-standing group active in northern Iraq; and Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia and Libya, although these groups have not yet officially declared a position. Support for the Islamic State is unlikely to translate immediately into heightened capability. However, it does indicate that these groups would no longer be subject to any restrictions set by Al-Qaeda, which would broaden their target set.
This is most significant in Tunisia, where Al-Qaeda opposes attacks on the state beyond some limited operations against security forces. However, the Islamic State has declared the country a place where Muslims are oppressed and has vowed to exact revenge there. The presence of a large contingent of Tunisian jihadists within Islamic State ranks already underlines the risk of attacks by returnees. An increase in attacks against government buildings and security forces, tourist assets such as hotels and resorts, diplomats, and embassies of those Arab and western countries deemed anti-Islamist would be the most immediate indicator that Ansar al-Sharia and Tunisian jihadists are shifting towards the Islamic State.
Additionally, jihadist infighting of the type now occurring in Syria is likely to break out elsewhere in the region. Risks are highest in areas where state capacity is weakest and multiple armed groups operate, for instance in Lebanon and Yemen. Infighting would probably take the form of assassinations of rival leaders, for example using IEDs, shootings, or suicide attacks. In Lebanon, the alignment of Liwa Ahrar Sunna Baalbeq and Ahrar al-Sunna with the Islamic State indicates an increased risk of IED, VBIED, and suicide attacks targeting security forces, Hizbullah operatives, Shia targets, and places of worship.