Election 2014: Victory declaration by both Indonesian presidential candidates increases civil unrest risk but widespread violence unlikely

Indonesian presidential candidate Joko Widodo declared victory less than two hours after voting closed in the election on 9 July. An hour later, his rival candidate Prabowo Subianto also claimed to have won. Joko's declaration was based on quick counts carried out by reputable polling organisations, four of whom are shown in the chart below, which in the past have correctly called election results. The results suggested that Joko, popularly known as Jokowi, won between 52% and 53% of the vote, with the remainder going to Prabowo.

Seven out of 11 polling and media organisations that carried out quick counts showed a Joko victory. In his declaration, Prabowo referred to his internal polling figures as well as unnamed outside polling organisations as the basis for his victory claim. He was likely to have been referring to previously little-known polling outfits such as the Indonesian Research Center, the Indonesia Votes Network (Jaringan Suara Indonesia: JSI), National Votes Institute (Lembaga Suara Nasional: LSN), and the Centre for the Analysis of Policy and Strategic Development (Pusat Kajian Kebijakan dan Pembangunan Strategis: Puskaptis). The first three organisations indicated a Prabowo victory with a below 2%, margin, while Puskaptis gave a 4% victory to Prabowo.

The quick count results given by the four organisations were published only in pro-Prabowo news outlets including vivanews.com and tvOne, both of whom are owned by Golkar Party leader and Prabowo supporter Aburizal Bakrie (see Indonesia: 7 July 2014: Jokowi presidency likely to improve governance in Indonesia, but regardless of election outcome, return to Suharto-era cronyism unlikely). The association of Indonesian Public Opinion Surveys (Persepi) on 9 July questioned the results published by the four polling organisations cited by Prabowo; it said it would ask Persepi members JSI and Puskaptis to explain their results.

Unlike exit polls that rely on answers provided by voters after casting their votes, quick counts are based on actual results from early declarations from a sample of polling stations, and therefore reflect actual results. The method, when used by established and independent organisations including those cited in the chart, has predicted the result of previous Indonesian elections accurately, although they have not had to forecast an election as close as this one.

Increased risk of local unrest

With both sides declaring victory and unofficial results not due until 22 July, there is an increased risk of small-scale violence throughout Indonesia, particularly in the most populated island of Java where campaigning has been the most intense. The election has been the closest and most acrimonious in Indonesian history, with accusations of smear campaigns and vote-buying thrown by both sides. The most likely form of violence would be fighting among supporters of the rival camps, and attacks against assets of the opposing side. Polling day passed off peacefully, and the month-long campaign period was largely free of violence. However, on 24 June, fighting between supporters of Joko and Prabowo in Yogyakarta, Java Island, caused damage to several houses, cars, and motorcycles. There were no serious injuries or fatalities.

The Election Commission is independent and there are no reports to suggest that there has been any systematic or widespread cheating. There is currently little indication that Prabowo would mobilise his supporters should official results confirm a Joko victory. The head of the Prabowo campaign team, Mohammad Mahfud, said on 9 July that his side would use the Constitutional Court to resolve any dispute once official results are announced. Another mitigating factor is the presence of the Army, an impartial institution, whose chief of staff General Budiman said on 5 July that it would be in a state of alert should there be a close election outcome. The Army would act as a back-up for the police, which has deployed 250,000 officers across the country to secure the election.

The timing of the election during the fasting month of Ramadan is also likely to inadvertently reduce the risk of violence. The majority of Indonesians are Muslim and are currently preoccupied with preparation for the end of Ramadan festivities, which will fall on 28 July. Under Indonesia's presidential election law, any complaints regarding the outcome of the election must be lodged at the Constitutional Court within three days of the official results being announced. The court, in turn, must rule within 14 days after the complaint is lodged. This means that the announcement of official results and any subsequent appeals would take place at the end of Ramadan and the national holiday period immediately following it. In the case of a legal dispute, the Constitutional Court must rule by the first week of August, which would still be within the term of the current president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and as such would not lead to a power vacuum. Yudhoyono's term of office ends on 20 October.

The above scenario assumes that Prabowo would pursue only legal means to fight his corner. A much less likely scenario could lead to large scale protests if Prabowo refused to accept the Constitutional Court's ruling. The court's verdict is final and binding but its recent history of corruption could provide a pretext for Prabowo to reject its ruling and mobilise his supporters. The court's former head, Akil Mochtar, was given a life prison sentence on 30 June for accepting bribes in exchange for favourable rulings in connection with a number of local election disputes. However, even in this scenario, security forces are likely to be well-equipped to prevent any protests from turning into widespread violence.

Outlook and implications

Barring some improbable event, the election commission is highly likely to name Joko as the winner of the presidential elections on 22 July or soon after. Prabowo told his supporters to wait until official results are announced and it is unlikely that he would concede the elections based on quick count results by private polling organisations. However, any uncertainty regarding the outcome of the election should be resolved by the first week of August, by which time the Constitutional Court must announce its verdict on any appeals. The brief appeals process, allied with the timing of the elections and the peaceful campaign period, all suggest that widespread violence is unlikely.