Islamic State's call to arms prioritises Iraq and Syria but includes Tunisia as legitimate target alongside US

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's speech clearly justified terrorist activities as a legitimate means of retaliation by Muslims. It also underlined the message given during Baghdadi's previous announcement of an Islamic Caliphate, namely that Muslims must choose whether they stand with or against the Islamic State, formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This message was further reinforced by a declaration that it was obligatory for all Muslims to make hijra (emigrate) from lands controlled by unbelievers, to join the new "land of Islam" in Iraq and Syria, and fight against its enemies there.

The speech clearly showed that the military priority of the group is to recruit fighters who can assist with the war effort in the Levant, which encompasses not only Iraq and Syria, but Lebanon and Jordan too. This is in line with the group's decision to appoint an emir for Lebanon and its calls for Muslims within Jordan to rise up against the monarchy there. For now, no other expansion of territory is proposed, although the group clearly aspires to this in future. Indeed, its call for other groups to pledge allegiance to it was intended to extend its reach and supplant Al-Qaeda as the main authority over jihadist groups in areas such as Algeria and Yemen.

The most likely areas where offshoots of the Islamic State could be established are in countries that already have significant contingents of fighters who have joined the group; where the state is weak; or where there are existing terrorist groups operating who may decide to pledge allegiance to the group, having been impressed by its military gains and apparent wealth of resources. Baghdadi's speech mentioned that the group has already attracted fighters from across the world in addition to the Levant, including Australia, China, the Caucasus, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Iraq, North Africa, the United States, and Yemen. Of these, highest risk areas include Egypt and Yemen, where insurgents from established terrorist groups have already expressed support for the group; also at risk are Libya and Tunisia, where the state's capacity to prevent and detect fighters returning from Syria is relatively weak.

Baghdadi's speech also singled out various locations where Muslims are oppressed and vowed to exact revenge there: Afghanistan, Algeria, the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen, as well as Saudi Arabia, Oman and the other Gulf monarchies), China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, the Levant, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, the Palestinian Territories (probably a threat primarily against Israel, but also against the Palestinian government of Hamas and Fatah, which the group deems insufficiently Islamic), the Philippines, the Russian Caucasus, Somalia, and Tunisia. References were also made to oppression of Muslims in Myanmar and the Central African Republic, emphasising the group's global agenda, although it is highly unlikely that the group has members from these countries and therefore any capacity there.

Of the countries singled out, Tunisia is a particularly notable example because so far both Al-Qaeda and the proscribed Tunisian group Ansar al-Sharia have taken the position that Tunisia is a land of dawa (preaching) and not jihad. Attacks within Tunisia by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have been concentrated on the eastern border with Algeria and have targeted security forces and, most recently, the house of the Minister of Interior in Kasserine province. The justification for these attacks was that the group was not engaged in jihad against Tunisia but reserved the right to retaliate for acts of aggression against it by the Ministry of the Interior and security forces. However, the Islamic State has already criticised this position, and now appears to be putting Tunisia on an equal footing with Algeria and the US in terms of its alleged oppression of Muslims. Given that the group comprises a number of Tunisians whom one Syria-based source told IHS have a particular reputation for being hardline jihadists, this underlines the risk to Tunisia of attacks either by returnees or by sympathisers of the Islamic State within Tunisia itself. Government buildings or security forces would be the most likely targets, but diplomats, embassies and other assets of countries perceived to be anti-Islamist, such as the UK, France or Egypt, would also be potential targets.

Outlook and implications

The responses of other jihadist groups will be key in determining the Islamic State's future reach into areas dominated by Al-Qaeda affiliated groups, such as Algeria and Yemen. The fact that the group has large financial resources and a proven ability to move people across national borders, suggesting that money and expertise can potentially be transferred to allied groups, is likely to be a major incentive for groups to pledge allegiance. This is especially the case given that Al-Qaeda's central leadership has for some time played simply an ideological role rather than an operational or financier role for its affiliates, which has weakened its brand. This all means that groups currently affiliated to Al-Qaeda are likely to be divided over which line to take, as they do not want to back the "losing side". For example, an official statement from AQIM published on 1 July praised the Islamic State's military gains but refrained from pledging allegiance, and called for it to reconcile with other groups such as Al-Qaeda. However, another video issued by an Islamic judge within AQIM and posted online on 27 June, more clearly stated support for the Islamic State and called for Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to clarify his position. IHS will be examining and collating responses from various jihadist groups in more depth during the coming week and their implications for security across the region.