Militant group ISIL likely to expand territory it controls in northern Iraq in coming months

The Iraqi government yesterday (10 June) declared a state of emergency in Mosul, Nineveh province, in response to the takeover of the city by militant group the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). ISIL has reportedly captured the city, the country's second largest, including the governor's building, the central bank building, and the civilian and the military sections of Mosul International Airport, where, according to the Baghdad parliament's speaker (and brother of the governor of Mosul), Osama al-Nujaifi, the militants have seized military helicopters. ISIL has also taken over three prisons, releasing more than 3,000 prisoners. Social media showed video footage of Iraqi security forces leaving the city. Iraqi officials, including the speaker, have since confirmed the withdrawal of security forces from Mosul, while the city's governor had already fled. In a press statement, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki urged all citizens to take up arms to combat the emergent terrorist threat and help regain control over neighbourhoods in Mosul now under ISIL control.

On 5 June, prior to the attack on Mosul, Sunni insurgents temporarily overran the city of Samarra, the largest city in Salaheddine province and an important pilgrimage site for the Shia. Sunni insurgents armed with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), anti-aircraft weapons, heavy machine-guns, and armoured vehicles took over five neighbourhoods of the city, engaging in fire fights with security forces throughout the day. Insurgents retreated after ground forces, supported by attack helicopters, mounted a counter-attack to drive them out.

In Mosul, there is a severe risk of ISIL fighters ransacking banks, shops, government buildings, and raiding weapons depots. A military offensive to retake the city is very likely within the next few days, posing severe risks of collateral damage to property, particularly in the eastern part of the city overrun by insurgents.

Following the declaration of a state of emergency, Prime Minister al-Maliki is very likely to authorise within the next 48 hours a renewed military offensive, backed by the Iraqi Air Force, much as he did in Samarra last week. The eastern part of Mosul, which was the initial area overrun by ISIL insurgents, is likely to sustain the heaviest levels of damage. Property near government buildings, such as the governor's offices, the central bank building, and buildings around Mosul airport, is at highest risk of collateral damage during exchanges of fire between militants and security forces. Insurgents' likely access to anti-aircraft weapons and heavy machine-guns presents severe risk of being shot down to low-flying aircraft.

Morning flights to Mosul airport by Royal Jordanian and Turkish airlines were cancelled on 6 June. Mosul airport is unlikely to be reopened over the coming week as confrontations with security forces around the city are unlikely to subside within this time frame. Aircraft within Mosul have been redirected to Kirkuk airport. Although Osama al-Nujaifi maintained that insurgents had taken control of the Sharqat military airport and a helicopter, this has not been corroborated by other Iraqi government officials, or by credible video footage on social media.

ISIL is highly likely to believe it has a unique opportunity to attempt the declaration of an Islamic state in Iraq and eastern Syria should it succeed in taking and holding Mosul, Tikrit, and parts of Diyala province.

ISIL's ability to overrun two Iraqi cities within a week represents a substantial shift in capability, and indicates growing intent and capacity to hold territory in the predominantly Sunni northern provinces of the country. ISIL has been steadily pressuring Iraqi government forces through undertaking hit-and-run and suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks, kidnappings, and assassinations in Nineveh, Kirkuk, Diyala, Salaheddine, and Babil provinces and Baghdad. Now, the takeover of Mosul, as well as reports from IHS sources of an advance towards Tuz Khurmatu and Tikrit in neighbouring Salaheddine province, represents an unprecedented ISIL offensive. Moreover, if ISIL succeeds in holding a city as significant as Mosul, this would substantially erode government control over Sunni provinces. Even if ISIL is driven out of Mosul over the course of coming days, it will probably attempt to overrun other towns, including Tuz Khurmatu and Tikrit. The objective would be to keep Iraqi security forces off-balance, tying them down on passive security duties, as well as to erode the government's presence and its ability to sustain services. This, in turn, would allow ISIL to realise its broader objective of building an Islamic state across Syria and Iraq. It would also enable it to set itself up as a rival authority to the core al-Qaeda organisation. ISIL is also probably seeking to draw the Shia into another protracted round of sectarian killings; this would be played out along the borders of such an Islamic state, in Babil, Karbala, and Wasit provinces, as well as in Baghdad.

Outlook and implications

ISIL will probably succeed in expanding the territory it controls in Iraq's predominantly Sunni northern provinces in the six-month outlook. The inability of government security forces to counter concurrent increased Sunni insurgent attacks in northern and western Iraq will probably accelerate the taking on of a security role by Shia militias to protect Shia areas, raising the risk of a re-emergent Sunni-Shia civil war.

The security forces' retreat from Mosul yesterday, alongside with their inability to retake Fallujah, which has been held by ISIL and insurgent Sunni tribes since January 2014, signal that they lack the capacity to regain the initiative from the insurgents across multiple locations in northern and western Iraq. Special forces and some armoured/mechanised formations aside, the Iraqi Army is mostly made up of light infantry divisions, with limited mobility and firepower, and is best suited to static security duties. Its success in evicting Shia militias from control of Basra in 2008 in 'Operation Charge of the White Knights' was made possible only by heavy commitment of US advisers, combat forces, and firepower in support of the nominally Iraqi-led operation. This support is no longer available and the Iraqi Army's shortcomings in combat capability have not been fully overcome by significant procurement of US and other equipment since the US withdrawal.

Following their apparent abandonment of Mosul, the strain of countering concurrent insurgent attacks at an increasing number of 'hotspots', particularly in mixed Sunni/Shia areas, and continued insurgent targeting of security forces, presents a severe risk of further demoralising the security forces and gradually thinning their ranks over coming months. Expanded military operations in Sunni provinces will probably wear down the security forces without inflicting corresponding losses on insurgents' ranks, as they have access to foreign and local recruiting networks. This now presents a severe risk of Shia militias overtly re-emerging to take on defensive duties to secure the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, as well as protect mixed Sunni-Shia provinces such as Babil and Diyalah. Central Shia provinces such as Karbala and Najaf are also at risk.

ISIL has probably gained the space in which to organise and direct attacks across northern Iraq through its control of large swathes of the central Syrian desert region up to the Iraqi border, as well as growing sympathy from the Sunni population, who are growing increasingly disenchanted with their perceived exclusion from political influence. Meanwhile, Iraq's army and assorted paramilitary and police forces are yet to acquire the weapons and training needed to gain the upper hand over ISIL and other insurgent groups. Moreover, Prime Minister al-Maliki's sectarian policies over the past eight years have left him with little leverage to mobilise Iraqi Sunnis against ISIL - whether through the pre-existing Awakening Council structures in al-Anbar or other channels - least of all in Mosul, which has no history of siding with the government against the insurgency.

In the event ISIL overruns cities in disputed Arab-Kurd territories in northern Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) will probably deploy Peshmerga troops to defend these areas.

The federal government in Baghdad appears poised to allow Peshmerga (former Kurdish guerrilla fighters, now incorporated in the de-facto KRG army) to deploy in Kurdish towns that fall outside the Kurdistan Region (comprising Dahuk, Irbil, and Sulaimaniyah provinces) in disputed territories in Ninevah, Salaheddine, and Diyala. According to media reports, Peshmerga were deployed to Mosul on 9 June but were awaiting orders to engage. Likely deployment of Peshmerga in disputed Arab-Kurd territories in northern Iraq heightens terrorism risks to energy operations in these areas, but ultimately allows the KRG to defend its de-facto borders more effectively.