FIFA World Cup screening venues in Africa and Middle East at increased risk of terrorist attack

The 2014 FIFA World Cup, hosted by Brazil, will be held in June and July. During the previous World Cup, held in South Africa in 2010, there were twin suicide bombings against crowds watching the final in the Ugandan capital Kampala, killing 74 people. The Kampala attacks were claimed by Somali militant Islamist group Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, which has since planned and executed attacks across East Africa, most notably the killing of 67 people at the Westgate mall in the Kenyan capital Nairobi, which was likely to have been carried out by local affiliate group Al-Hijra.

The pattern of such attacks on football viewing venues has been replicated by terrorist groups in other East African countries, as well as in Nigeria. On 13 April 2014, an improvised explosive device (IED) attack at the Arusha Night Park pub in Tanzania during the screening of an English Premier League match left 15 people injured. On 25 May, four people were killed in a suicide attack by suspected Boko Haram militants targeting an open-air viewing of the UEFA Champions League final in the Nigerian city of Jos in Plateau State. On 1 June, at least 14 people were killed in an IED attack by suspected Boko Haram militants targeting a bar screening a football match in the Nigerian town of Mubi, Adamawa State. Nigerian officials have also accused the group of carrying out several attacks on similar targets in 2011 and 2012. Notably, four people were killed and 10 others wounded when several IEDs were detonated in close succession near three outdoor bars, so-called "viewing centres", purportedly targeting groups of fans watching a football match in a predominantly Christian-populated area of Jos city on 10 December 2011.

In descending order of risk level, IHS assesses there will be an increased risk to World Cup viewing venues in the below countries over the next six weeks.

Nigeria

There is a severe risk to screening venues in Adamawa, Borno, and Plateau states, and in the capital Abuja. In recent attacks, Boko Haram has shown that it has taken a cue from Al-Shabaab to attack football viewing venues and perpetrate mass-casualty attacks against civilians. These have mostly targeted outdoor bars, known as "viewing centres", in predominantly Christian areas. Northeast and Middle Belt states will be at highest risk of attack, including cities such as Abuja and Jos. In an indication of this threat, security officials in Abuja announced in October 2013 that football fans would no longer be allowed to enter the Abuja National Stadium to watch the local club's training sessions amid increasing fears of a possible attack on the stadium by Boko Haram. There are moderate regional spillover risks to countries that have made military commitments to defeating Boko Haram, including Niger, Mali, Chad and Cameroon.

Somalia

The risk of attacks on hotels and other screening venues is severe in Mogadishu, where there is a severe and growing risk of Al-Shabaab attacks. The group has demonstrated its ability to stage complex attacks and circumvent security at high-profile targets, such as at the UN headquarters and the presidential compound. Further Al-Shabaab attacks on World Cup viewing venues within the capital, including hotels and restaurants frequented by foreigners and military personnel, are highly likely as the group pursues a campaign to demonstrate its capability. IHS sources claim that the insurgent group has infiltrated Mogadishu, nominally under government control, through the northern districts of Huriwa, Karaan, Wardhigley, and Yaqshid.

Kenya

Bars, restaurants and public screenings are at high risk in Mombasa and Nairobi. Increased radicalisation of youths by groups such as Al-Hijra, Al-Shabaab, and the Muslim Youth Council (MYC) operating in coastal Kenya, and Kenya's military involvement in Somalia are factors that will fuel Al-Shabaab's continued intent to stage further attacks. Increasing attacks by radical groups on "soft" targets including restaurants, bars, and transport hubs also indicate a capability to attack football viewing venues over the next six weeks. Likely attack methods include IED, vehicle-borne IED (VBIED), gun, and grenade attacks, particularly in Nairobi's mostly ethnic Somali Eastleigh neighbourhood, as well as locations frequented by Westerners in Mombasa, central Nairobi, and beach-side locations such as Diani. IHS is receiving reports of grenade attacks from local sources, and believes that many more attacks are occurring in Eastleigh than are actually being reported or confirmed by Kenyan authorities.

Iraq

There is a high risk of IEDs targeting public areas where World Cup matches are being shown in Babil, Diyala, Karbala, Nineveh, and Salaheddine provinces, as well as in Baghdad. There is an active Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) jihadist insurgency in the above locations, and a precedent exists for targeting mixed Sunni-Shia or purely Shia civilian areas using large VBIEDs. Open cafes in busy streets or squares that are showing World Cup matches are therefore a potential target. Risks will be highest during any Iran matches that are televised. Risks are lower in the Shia-majority south.

Tanzania

Screening venues in Zanzibar's Arusha and Stone Town are at high risk of attack, although at slightly lower risk than Iraq and Kenya. Although Tanzanian groups such as Ansar Muslim Youth and Jumuiya ya Taasisi za Kiislam still lack the capability to stage sophisticated attacks like Al-Hijra's siege of Kenya's Westgate mall, they are capable of targeting "soft" targets with rudimentary IEDs and grenades. The security situation in Zanzibar has deteriorated since 2013, especially in Zanzibar City's Stone Town, due to the increase in radical Islam and the quest for independence from mainland Tanzania. This has led to sporadic outbreaks of religious violence, such as the killing of a Catholic priest and the burning down of a church in February 2013, as well as occasional attacks on bars and clubs frequented by Westerners. On 7 August 2013, two British nationals working as volunteer teachers in Zanzibar were injured when corrosive liquid was thrown at them in Stone Town. Groups based in Arusha have a more sophisticated capability to manufacture IEDs and have targeted football viewings before, although their primary target set is religious gatherings, with their aim being sectarian unrest. There is a further elevated risk of attack in Dar es Salaam, Mbeya, Mtwara, Mwanza, and Tanga.

Uganda

There is an elevated risk of IED and grenade attacks on screening venues in Kampala. Uganda is still identified as a priority target by Al-Shabaab due to its involvement in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The Kampala attacks in 2010 targeted a rugby club and an Ethiopian restaurant screening the World Cup final. However, Al-Shabaab does not have the same strong affiliate networks in Uganda as it does in Kenya. Security measures have been increased in Kampala and along the Kenyan border. Although Al-Shabaab's capability to stage sophisticated attacks has diminished, it is still capable of successfully targeting "soft" targets, particularly in Kampala.

Djibouti

The risk of suicide attacks on viewing venues frequented by foreign military personnel is elevated. Djibouti has traditionally enjoyed a relatively benign security landscape, largely due to the presence of Western troops in the country. However, an attack on 24 May 2014 on a restaurant frequented by foreign military personnel became the first suicide attack recorded in the country, and was later claimed by Al-Shabaab. Although this attack suggests an extension of Al-Shabaab's operational activity, the presence of Western troops and Djibouti's relatively small size mean it is likely that similar attacks will be rare in the six-month outlook, as in Uganda, and not a recurrent problem as in Kenya. However, there is still elevated risk of similar attacks on "soft" targets, especially in Djibouti City.

Burundi

There is a moderate risk of attacks on screening venues in Bujumbura. Al-Shabaab has stated its intention to attack Burundian interests due to Burundi's participation in the AMISOM mission. However, AMISOM victories in Somalia, along with Al-Shabaab's inability to replace key figures killed in drone strikes following the Kampala 2010 bombings, have significantly reduced the group's capability to stage IED attacks outside Somalia. Burundi's relative distance from places of major Islamist militant activity, such as Arusha or Nairobi, further mitigates the risk of attack during the World Cup.

Ethiopia

The Ethiopian security agencies' improved capability mitigates the risk, which will be moderate at viewing venues. Ethiopia is an attractive and highly symbolic target for Al-Shabaab, for historical reasons (it is seen as a Christian country that Somalis consider as their traditional enemy due to the disputed claim over Ethiopia's Ogaden region) and because of Ethiopia's military involvement inside Somalia. However, the group has not been able to mount any successful attacks within Ethiopia due to the greater capabilities and vigilance of the country's security agencies.

Tunisia

There is a low to moderate risk of attacks in Tunisia. Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia has in the past protested and caused destruction of property and injuries at venues serving alcohol to locals. The group's capability in Tunisia appears to be limited to crude IEDs, shootings, Molotov cocktails, and violent protests. IHS assesses that an attack by the group against Tunisians watching the games is unlikely. If an attack does occur, the most likely targets will be bars and hotels serving alcohol to locals, rather than stadiums or public squares showing the games. Violent protests that result in fighting with security forces are more likely than terrorist attacks.

Outlook and implications

There will almost certainly be attacks on screening venues in Nigeria's northeast and Middle Belt states during the World Cup. However, these are unlikely to pose a significant risk to expatriates. The most likely locations where foreigners will be targeted are Kenya and Tanzania. Across the sub-Saharan region, bars, restaurants, hotels and mass viewings (in fields or halls) are the most likely targets of IED, VBIED, gun, grenade, or arson attacks. Attacks targeting screening venues have already started ahead of the World Cup, most notably in Nigeria and Tanzania, and are likely to continue even after the final on 13 July.