Co-ordinated attacks on Islamists in Libya are likely to fail but will further damage political process

Forces loyal to retired army Colonel Khalifa Haftar attacked the bases of Islamist militias Ansar al-Sharia and the 17 February Martyrs Brigade in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi on 16 May, with the stated aim of expelling them from the city. Haftar, a long term resident in the United States, is a former colonel in Muammar Gaddafi's army; in the late 1980s and early 1990s Haftar unsuccessfully worked with the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to overthrow Gaddafi. Currently, he claims to command the self-styled 'national army', although the exact status, composition, and affiliation of this 'army' is not clear.

Federalist leader Ibrahim Jathran, whose forces have shut down eastern oil terminals, supported the actions taken by Haftar's forces but was critical of Haftar himself. This criticism reflects the fact that the two most likely see themselves as competitors for political authority. The Special Forces al-Saeqa brigade, which has been so far politically neutral and suffered a disproportionate number of attacks from Ansar al-Sharia, said on 19 May that it would join Haftar's military action.

Ansar al-Sharia is a militant Islamist group whose aim is to impose Sharia (Islamic law) in Libya, and is suspected of conducting attacks and assassinations against government security forces in eastern Libya, and of assassinating the US ambassador to Libya, Christopher Stevens, in September 2012. It is allied with 17 February militias, as well as with the Libya Shield militias, both of which nominally report to the government. IHS sources in Libya claim that Ansar al-Sharia militants receive government salaries. Elements of the air force based in eastern Libya supported Haftar's move and launched air strikes against Ansar al-Sharia camps.

In Tripoli, western Libya, militias allied with the powerful western Zintan Brigade also moved in support of Haftar's action and attacked the General National Congress (GNC) headquarters. The militia fighters claimed that they would hand over legislative and executive power to the Constituent Assembly, which was elected in February by 13% of eligible Libyan voters and has yet to formally convene (see Libya: 25 April 2014: New Libyan constitution is unlikely to be agreed in coming year and would be unworkable).

The chief of staff of the Libyan Army, Colonel Jadallah al-Obaidi, who is from Benghazi, branded the move by Haftar and his allies as a coup attempt, and said the Libyan army would support the GNC. He ordered Libya Shield's central force, primarily drawn from Misrata and allied with the Islamists, to move to Tripoli to help secure the city. Obaidi is unlikely to have access to uncommitted, reliable military forces that he could send east to relieve pressure on Islamists in Benghazi.

Militia motivation

IHS has noted an increase in the number of former members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) to have taken up senior government security positions. The LIFG has a similar ideology to Ansar al-Sharia, and the United Nations classifies it as an Al-Qaeda affiliate. IHS pro-federalism and pro-secession sources claim that the two groups are co-operating with the Muslim Brotherhood in order to gradually takeover the governance of Libya, and that they are allied with militias from Misrata who share their objectives and ideology. However, IHS notes that the Islamist camp in Libya encompasses groups that are not fully ideologically aligned, such as various Salafist groups, former LIFG members whose current ideological and religious views are not clear, the Muslim Brotherhood, and tribal and regional groups from the coastal area stretching from Misrata to Tripoli. The latter were excluded from power under Gaddafi, and have allied themselves with the Islamists in the hope of checking the power of tribes from the interior of the country, who were formerly allied with Gaddafi. While they, like almost all political actors in Libya, profess support for Sharia, they are likely to be driven by partisan regional and tribal interests far more than ideological conviction.

Additionally, members of the Muslim Brotherhood, which co-ordinates strongly with former LIFG members in the Libyan GNC, have also taken up a number of senior security positions. Moreover, the Libya Shield Militias in the east are heavily influenced by Salafist cleric Ismail Ali al-Sallabi and militia commander Wisam bin Hamid, who are also closely associated with the Brotherhood and Ansar al-Sharia. The Misrata Military Council in the west, which is allied with the Islamists in the GNC, is in control of the Nawasi Brigade, the Tripoli Military Council and the Special Deterrent Force, who are among the dominant military forces in Tripoli. Moreover, Mitigia Airport in northern Tripoli is also under the control of the Supreme Security Committee, which is headed by Hashim Bishr.

In the east, Salafist leaders such as Ali al-Sallabi dominate the Rafallah al-Shahati Brigade, the 17 February Brigades, the Libya Shield units and the Abu Salim Martyrs' Brigade. These Islamist leaders are likely to pursue their own agenda aimed at taking control of Libya and excluding rival forces. They are unlikely to obey the orders of any civilian government led by someone ideologically opposed to them. This applies to the Constituent Assembly, led by Ali Tarhouni, to which the Zintan militias said they would hand over power

In Benghazi, IHS data shows that security services have suffered at least 251 assassination attempts, shootings, and kidnappings since January 2012 (see table). At least 32 colonels from various forces were killed in these attacks.

Over the same period, assassination attempts and improvised explosive device attacks have been carried out against media, judicial, religious and political figures, as well as beauty salons, restaurants and cafes, according to IHS data. Pro-federalist, pro-Saeqa, and anti-Muslim Brotherhood social media, and individuals spoken to by IHS, all allege that Ansar al-Sharia is behind these attacks.

Heading for stalemate

Despite the support given to Haftar by elements of the Libyan Air Force, his forces had to withdraw from some districts of Benghazi to positions on its outskirts on 19 May. He has called for support from al-Saeqa Special Forces, which have said that they will commit their forces to the fight. Even if Haftar succeeds in securing Benghazi, the Islamist militias based in the city are likely to withdraw to the Green Mountain, a mountain chain which runs along eastern Libya's coast. A campaign against an Islamist militant insurgency in the Green Mountain would likely require months, if not years, to win. Haftar would require significant financial and military support to win such a campaign. However, given the UN Security Council Resolution 2146, which bans eastern oil sales independent of the Tripoli government-controlled National Oil Company (NOC), he is unlikely to have adequate funding from his own resources and would be dependent on external backing.

Similarly, in western Libya, the Zintan are unlikely to be able to completely secure Tripoli, and to prevent militias loyal to Misrata and its allies from re-entering the city and engaging their forces. Zintan forces' heavy weapons are largely limited to 23 mm anti-aircraft cannon used in a ground role, and 14.5 mm and 12.7 mm heavy machine guns. However, despite the presence of a few tanks, they lack the heavy weapons required to expel similarly armed pro-Misratan forces already in the city. Moreover, as Misratan forces control access to the city from the east, their rivals are unlikely to prevent them from sending reinforcements. As such, the forces opposed to the Islamists are unlikely to be able to decisively win this or any future engagement. Far more likely is the continuation of the breakdown in law and order, and repeated, frequent fighting between Islamists and their rivals.

Outlook and implications

Since the attacks on the Islamists began, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have withdrawn some of their embassy staff from the country. This probably reflects their assessment that a prolonged fight between Islamists and their rivals is likely. However, as yet there is no evidence that the Islamists or their rivals are receiving external support.

Without military and intelligence support from Egypt, Algeria and the United States to Haftar and his allies, the most likely outcome is a prolonged stalemate that involves recurrent but inconclusive localised outbreaks of fighting between Islamists and their rivals in Tripoli and Benghazi. This makes a political compromise enabling political processes, such as they are, to be re-established in Libya very unlikely.

However, in the event that Haftar's forces in the east successfully expel Islamists from Benghazi and other major cities, while western forces aligned with Haftar fail, a formal declaration of secession by eastern Libya would become a lot more likely. However, actual independence would require eastern Libya to be able to sell oil independently of the National Oil Company in the west, in contravention to US Security Council Resolution 2146. It would also be constrained by the rivalry between Haftar's forces and those of Saeqa and the Petroleum Facilities Guard.