Government of Sudan Agrees “In Principle" to Joint African, UN Force in Darfur

From Abuja to Addis

In the dying days of his tenure as UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan has injected added urgency into international efforts at resolving Sudan’s protracted Darfur saga. Despite the signing of the May 2005 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), between the Sudanese government and a faction within the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) rebel faction—led by Mani Arko Minawi—peace and security has remained in extremely short supply. In fact, the DPA, which was hailed as a breakthrough in efforts at resolving the Darfur crisis, created new fractures between the Zaghawa supporters of Minawi and the Fur constituents of chairman Abdul Wahid Nur (see Sudan: 2 November 2006: Darfur At a Crossroads). Indeed, Nur accused Minawi—who now holds the portfolio of special presidential adviser to Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir—of advocating a Zaghawa agenda for Darfur, adding yet another complaint to Darfur’s cauldron of existing and perceived ethnic and tribal grievances. The inter-factional fighting further eroded humanitarian access to the worst-affected regions of Darfur, prompting heated concerns that the Sudanese regime and its allies were preparing to launch an offensive against Darfur rebel groups opposed to the peace deal.

The Sudanese government, meanwhile, emboldened by inconsistencies in the international community’s approach to the crisis, was unyielding in its opposition to the possible deployment of a beefy UN contingent to Darfur. Senior ruling party officials, led by Bashir, cast the proposed deployment as an attempt to recolonise Sudan and plunder the country’s natural resources. Faced with an intransigent Sudanese leadership, divisions between China and Russia on the one hand, and the United States and the United Kingdom on the other, together with a general lack of appetite for a potentially messy entanglement in Darfur, prompted the UN to change track in its handling of the Darfur crisis.

Talk of a muscular UN contingent equipped with a robust mandate gave way to a compromise that involved an expanded and effective African contingent with UN logistical support and funding. The statement by U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack last week that the United States is seeking “alternatives” in resolving the Darfur conflict suggested that a deal was in the pipeline (see Sudan: 10 November 2006: United States Seeking “Compromises” on Darfur Crisis). Echoing McCormack’s sentiments, powerful Sudanese Vice President Ali Osman Taha said that “people are looking for a new alternative,” which suggests a slight softening in the tone of Sudanese official dialogue.

Much to be Done

Much work needs to be done, both at the regional and international level, if Sudan’s ‘agreement in principle’ to this hybrid African Union (AU) and UN contingent—dubbed the the AU Plus option—is to achieve the desired effects on the ground. The exact number of the force and its command structure are still unclear. The UN has said that up to 20,000 peacekeepers are needed to police a region whose geographical landmass is typically compared to that of France. The AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) meeting, which is scheduled to be held in Congo later this month, is expected to shed greater light on the specifics of the deal. An added conundrum that casts shadow over this latest development is the refusal of Abdul Wahid Nur and the smaller Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) to ink the May peace deal. Although Minawi, who has endorsed the deal, is considered stronger militarily, Nur commands a far greater base of support among his constituents. Unless all of Darfur’s rebel factions come on board, the violence and insecurity in Darfur will persist.

Outlook and Implications

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that Sudan’s ‘agreement in principle’ for a joint UN and African Union (AU) force marked a “real opportunity to resolve what has been an extremely difficult problem,” saying that it also gave the Sudanese government “a chance to make it right with the international system”, reports the news agency Agence France-Presse (AFP). Adding a carrot to previous remarks concerning the country, the top U.S. diplomat has dangled the prospect of international rehabilitation to Sudan’s leaders. Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir may join the ranks of Libya’s Muammar al-Qadhafi and make the leap from a former supporter of terrorism to a reformed international player. However, for this to happen, much needs to be done. Sudan’s ‘agreement in principle’ must give way to concrete action, paving the way for the disarmament of armed militias with close ties to Sudanese officials. This should, in turn, provoke plans for the return of over a million Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) from vast refugee camps in neighbouring countries. The international community must also impress on all of Darfur’s rebel groups the need to ink the fledgling peace deal and end the factional infighting which has further compromised the security of Darfur. Only then will peace in Darfur become a more achievable prospect.