Venezuelan political outlook and civil unrest scenarios assessed as protests escalate

The waves of anti-government protests affecting Venezuela have intensified significantly in terms of scale and violence over the past few days, particularly yesterday (19 February), when confrontations between security forces, pro-government armed groups, and anti-government protesters spread to at least 13 of the country's 23 states (see Report Elements for a map of the protest hotspots). There is a high risk of the protests escalating in the coming days, and of these threatening the stability of President Nicolás Maduro's government. The ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela: PSUV) currently appears united in its support for Maduro. However, the risk of fractures within the ruling party and military emerging and unsettling the government will increase significantly if Maduro and Diosdado Cabello, the president of the National Assembly, maintain their strategy of containing protesters through force. This risk will increase significantly if protests start to emerge across shanty towns in Venezuela and if the number of people killed (currently six since the protests started in early February) and wounded continues to rise. According to information released through social media, there have been protests in areas considered to be government strongholds around Caracas's El Valle and Caricuao areas.

The protests started with the student movement showing increased discontent towards rising insecurity, high inflation, and the scarcity of food and basic products. However, the 18 February arrest of opposition leader Leopoldo López of the Popular Will Party (Voluntad Popular: VP) and the use of aggressive crowd-control tactics by the security forces and pro-government armed groups (Colectivos) have exacerbated the protests.

Hotspots

There is a high likelihood that the protests will continue over the coming days. These will include protests organised through social media by students, spontaneous protests triggered by the use of force against protesters, and marches organised by the political opposition, like the 22 February march in Caracas, organised by the opposition coalition Democratic Unity Table (Mesa de Unidad Democrática: MUD). The key hotspots in the capital include the Francisco Fajardo Highway – Caracas' main arterial route – as well as areas such as Altamira, Chacaíto, Chacao, Las Mercedes, Los Dos Caminos, Los Samanes, Macaracuay, Plaza Venezuela, Santa Fe, and Sebucán. Those attending the protests face increased arbitrary detention risks, as well as death and injury risks. This is because firearms have been discharged during previous demonstrations – a student was killed on 12 February after being shot at a demonstration, and a beauty queen died yesterday after being hit by a stray bullet during an anti-government protest. Bystanders and those working or living near protests hotspots are also at risk of exposure to tear gas.

Táchira state, where the protests originated, is also a major hotspot where in addition to the risk of confrontations, there is also a risk of vandalism. In Ciudad Guayana, Bolívar, protesters reportedly set fire to two local government vehicles on 19 February, while others also damaged vehicles belonging to state-run telecommunications firm CANTV and state-run electricity firm CORPOELEC in the cities of Barquisimeto and Valencia, respectively. The states of Anzoátegui, Barinas, Carabobo, Mérida, Nueva Esparta, and Zulia also saw violent protests escalate yesterday.

Scenarios

There are several scenarios for how the current unrest in Venezuela will now develop, detailed below.

• In the first scenario, the protests escalate to the point where they initiate a fracture within the military and/or PSUV. Under this scenario, the protests would escalate due to the arrest of opposition leaders such as VP leader Carlos Vecchio or lawmaker Maria Corina Machado (for which her parliamentary immunity would need to be removed first). The government would continue its strategy to contain the protesters by force, increasing the number of deaths and people wounded. Under this scenario, President Maduro would continue to struggle with controlling the violent actions of the Colectivo groups – who mobilise on mortorcycles, often armed – while also struggling to control the actions of the security forces. The use of force against the protesters would spark unrest nationwide, and especially in areas around western Caracas such as Antimano, Caricuao, Catia, La Vega, and 23 de Enero. This scenario would lead to fractures within the PSUV party and the military, with Maduro not being able to contain the associated violence. Should this scenario take place, the risk of Maduro being ousted due to a military intervention would increase significantly.
• In the second scenario, the government survives the crisis. For this scenario to take place, the PSUV would need to stay united, with the military upholding its support for Maduro and constitutional order. This scenario would imply the continuation of the status quo over the coming weeks. There would be nationwide protests, but these would remain confined to areas inhabited by the middle class, with no large-scale unrest emerging in the shanty towns. If the shanty towns did not join the protests, the government would play the waiting game, benefiting from divisions within the opposition, in the expectation that the demonstrations would eventually fade away. However, even if Maduro overcomes the crisis, his government would still be fragile as the worsening macroeconomic and security environment can potentially spark new waves of unrest.
• There is also the prospect of a negotiated solution. The arrest of opposition leader López confirms that there is no intention to negotiate a solution within the government at the moment. For a negotiated solution to take place, Maduro would need to tone down the use of force against the protesters, set López free, and initiate talks with the MUD opposition coalition. A rupture within the PSUV leadership – especially with Cabello, who has taken an aggressive view against the protesters – would be needed for this scenario to take place.

Outlook and implications

Of these three possible scenarios, IHS assesses that the first scenario – for the protests to escalate – currently carries the highest probability, with the second and third scenarios less likely at a roughly equal level of low probability. For the second and third scenarios to take place, the government would need to reduce the use of force against protestors and heed calls for dialogue.