In Beirut's southern Bir Hassan suburb, two suicide bombers targeted the Iranian embassy and killed Ebrahim al-Ansari, Iran's cultural attaché to Lebanon.
IHS Global Insight perspective | |
Significance | The attack reflects growing capability on the part of jihadist groups. |
Implications | State security services appear to have the capability to identify suspects in terrorist attacks, but insufficient political backing to stop them. |
Outlook | Militants are likely to continue to improve their attack capability in the one year outlook. Further radicalisation of the Sunni community in Lebanon is likely given the inability of moderate Sunni groups like the Future Movement to confront Hizbullah effectively. |
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A Lebanese Army investigator examines the scene of the Iranian embassy VBIED |
A suicide bomber, wearing a 5 kg explosive vest, on a motorbike detonated the device at the entrance of the Iranian embassy in Beer Hassan in Beirut on 19 November. A vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), packed with at least 60 kg of explosives, also detonated 50 metres away from the entrance of the embassy, which was most likely to be premature as the intended objective would probably have been to detonate within the embassy compound. A Twitter account, in the name of Sheikh Siraj-u-Deen Zreikat, a Sunni cleric from the Tariq Jdeedeh neighbourhood in Beirut, was used to claim responsibility for the attack on behalf of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated militant Islamist group.
Given previous VBIED attacks targeting Shia areas in July and August 2013, in response to Lebanese Shia group Hizbullah in fighting alongside President Bashar al-Assad's forces in Syria, it is very likely that the area around the Iranian embassy was well protected in anticipation of such an attack. That the attackers got through reflects their capability to penetrate Hizbullah's security measures . Moreover, the attack was probably intended to first penetrate the perimeter around the embassy and then have the second VBIED reach the structure itself in order to maximise the damage. This is a more sophisticated attack than the July and August attacks, which involved leaving a parked VBIED in a crowded area.
Security forces
Sheikh Zreikat was arrested by Lebanese Army Intelligence for a few hours in 2012 for his association with Sunni militant groups. Lebanese newspaper al-Akhbar claimed that he was released following the intervention of Lebanese Republic Mufti Sheikh Mohammad Qabbani. Zreikat, who had been a Friday prayer leader appointed by the state-sponsored Dar al-Fatwa, the official organisation of Sunni clergy in Lebanon, then allegedly issued a video threatening the Lebanese Shia community on behalf of Abdullah Azzam Brigades in August 2012.
The Lebanese security services are likely to have the capability to identify members of militant groups, but not the political backing to stop them. For example, IHS notes that Lebanese security services had issued warrants for the arrest of a number of individuals allegedly involved in the July and August attacks in Dahiyah, and also in Tripoli, North Lebanon, and managed to detain some suspects. However, this was not enough to prevent further attacks by allegedly new groups.
Outlook and implications
The attack on the Iranian embassy reflects higher capability on the part of the attackers despite state efforts to identify and detain members of jihadist groups. This indicates an ongoing severe risk of attacks targeting Shia areas including Dahiyah, Baalbek, and Nabatiyah. Moreover, jihadist groups are increasingly likely to shift their focus to Christian targets in the coming one to two years, particularly if Christian leaders currently supporting the Syrian opposition shift their position out of fear of Sunni radicalism. Further radicalisation of the Sunni community in Lebanon is likely given the inability of moderate Sunni groups like the Future Movement to confront Hizbullah effectively. Sunni Shia communal violence in Tariq Jdeedeh, Corniche al-Mazraa, and near to the Sports City in Beirut, as well as in Tripoli, ‘Arsal, and the Western Bekaa, is a high risk in coming days.
In the likely absence of a government with the will and capability to enforce its authority, and assuming – as IHS assesses to be likely – that the civil war in Syria does not end in the next two years, there will be a severe risk of war spilling over into Lebanon in the next three years, in the form of increased low-level and localised fighting using heavy machine guns, mortars, and Grad-type rockets, rather than all-out civil war involving tanks, heavy artillery, and aircraft.
In the coming year, it is likely that Sunni-majority parts of the Bekaa, Akkar, and Tripoli provinces will fall outside the state's control. This will lead to new sectarian fighting in these locations, as well as in the existing Beirut hotspots of Tariq Jdeedeh, Sports City, Corniche al-Mazraa, and Sa'eb Salam highway. Sectarian fighting is unlikely to affect downtown Beirut in the coming year.