Six-Party Talks Yield Success as North Korea Agrees to First Steps Towards Nuclear Disarmament

An Initial Step towards Nuclear Disarmament

Yesterday (13 February), the North Korean government agreed to implement the initial first steps towards disabling its nuclear programme as the latest round of the six-party talks—which involve North and South Korea, China, the United States, Japan and Russia—were drawing to a close. The deal was announced by China’s chief envoy to the six-party talks, Wu Dawei, who said it marked “a first and important step” in the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula as well as ”a favourable development for the peace process in north-east Asia.” Meanwhile, top U.S. nuclear negotiator Christopher Hill warned that the agreement was merely the first phase of the denuclearisation process, although it was positive. The disarmament deal was reached after five days of negotiations follows the resumption of the six-party talks in December last year. This came after a hiatus of more than one year, with North Korea leaving negotiations in November 2005 in response to Washington’s decision to impose financial sanctions over the Stalinist regime’s counterfeiting (see North Korea: 1 November 2006: North Korea Agrees to Resume Six-Party Talks, in Face of Economic Stranglehold). The deal constitutes a significant diplomatic development in the long-running negotiations, with the issue gaining renewed urgency after North Korea conducted its first nuclear bomb test in October last year.

Weapons for Money and Oil

The agreement calls for North Korea’s main Yongbyon nuclear reactor to be shut down within 60 days in return for 50,000 metric tonnes of fuel aid, as well as economic aid equal to the same value. The closure of Yongbyon is subsequently to be verified by international weapons inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Kim Jong-Il regime has further agreed to provide the international community with a complete overview of its current nuclear programmes and to dismantle existing nuclear facilities. After this, it is expected to receive an additional one million tonnes of fuel oil. In return, within 30 days the United States is to heed North Korean calls for it “to resolve financial restrictions” against the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia (BDA), where it froze US$24 million in 2005, according to Hill, cited by Associated Press. As mentioned, the move prompted North Korea to leave the six-party talks in November of that year, and the lifting of the financial sanctions is a precondition for it returning to the negotiations, as the country has found itself in an economic stranglehold due to both U.S. financial sanctions and the UN-sponsored sanctions imposed over its nuclear bomb test. Moreover, the United States has agreed to bilateral talks with the North Korean government to normalise relations and to begin the process of taking North Korea off its list of designated terror-sponsoring states. The lifting of U.S. trade sanctions is also to be considered, but no deadline has been put in place for this. Japan, Washington’s key ally in the Asia-Pacific, is similarly to consider establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea, with the Korean peninsula having technically remained at war since the 1953 ceasefire that ended direct hostilities between the North and the South, due to the absence of any formal peace treaty. Meanwhile, the six parties are to establish five working groups that will focus on the issues of denuclearisation, U.S.-North Korea relations, Japan-North Korea relations, economic cooperation and developing a peace and security mechanism in north-east Asia.

A Face-Saving Act for Some…

The agreement is a significant face-saving act for several of the parties to the negotiations, but in their efforts to find an agreement they have left a number of crucial questions to be addressed at a later stage. As such, North Korea drastically reduced its initial demands for 2,000 megawatts of electricity and two million tonnes of heavy fuel oil annually, in the face of an ultimatum that the talks would be brought to an end regardless of whether an agreement had been reached. As the key ally of North Korea, China has played a significant role in bringing its “communist younger brother” back to the negotiating table. This is after the Kim Jong-Il regime conducted the October nuclear bomb test without conferring with China, thereby making the latter country lose face, and North Korea returned to the six-party talks only after China allegedly cut off oil supplies to its communist neighbour. However, the U.S. move to accept the agreement has been met with disquiet from hawks in the American political establishment, such as former UN Ambassador John Bolton. According to reports cited in the New York Times, they have lambasted it for rewarding would-be proliferators with major shipments of heavy fuel oil, thereby sending the wrong signal to the world at a time when the U.S. government needs to appear strong in Iran and Iraq. The acceptance of the agreement constitutes a turning-point in U.S. foreign policy, with the administration of George W. Bush having hitherto insisted on not accommodating North Korean demands for concessions in return for the disablement of its nuclear programme. It has also previously maintained a policy of separating the nuclear issue entirely from the financial sanctions imposed by the Treasury. The move thus signals that North Korea is no longer considered part of the so-called “Axis of Evil” coined by Bush in 2002. The U.S. government is keen to disengage itself from North Korea at a time when it is seeking to focus its energies on its involvement in Iraq and addressing the Iranian nuclear crisis. Moreover, it signals a return to the 1994 Geneva Framework, which former president Clinton operated within, and which the Bush administration has until recently sought to disassociate itself from (see below).

Outlook and Implications

The nuclear disarmament deal constitutes a return to the agreement reached in September 2005, which saw North Korea halting its nuclear weapons programme in return for energy aid and security pledges. It provides a significant first step towards North Korea’s nuclear disarmament and could—if successful—serve to additionally improve the isolated country’s relations with long-term enemies such as the United States and Japan. Foreign ministers from the six countries are now to convene in 60 days for further talks, with another meeting of the top nuclear negotiators being scheduled for 19 March. While the agreement is a positive development in terms of the non-proliferation regime in general and the reduction of tensions in north-east Asia in particular, a number of complicated issues have not been addressed and may come to hamper later progress. This includes the question of how to address North Korea’s existing nuclear weapons. It will be a difficult task to effectively monitor what the Pyongyang government declares as its nuclear facilities and the subsequent moves to shut them down, with the country being known for having numerous mountain-side tunnels where such projects can be hidden. North Korea has a long record of back-tracking on commitments, and sceptics fear that this may be an attempt to obtain international aid without taking serious steps to dismantle the nuclear programme. North Korea reached a similar agreement with the United States in 1994, which then fell apart in 2002 when then U.S. top nuclear envoy James Baker alleged that Pyongyang was attempting to produce weapons-grade uranium. Meanwhile, the question of who should provide the pledged energy aid may become a problem down the line. According to South Korean nuclear envoy Chun Yung-woo, none of the parties to the talks have objected in principle to evenly sharing the cost. However, the Japanese government has refused to provide any aid until the issue of North Korean abductions of Japanese nationals in the 1970s and 1980s has been addressed, and this has remained an impediment to rapprochement between Japan and North Korea. As such, it remains to be seen if North Korea will deliver on its pledges and whether the United States will come through on addressing its current financial sanctions against North Korea. These sanctions are considered key by a Kim Jong-Il leadership bent on ending its financial isolation.