Winter Olympics security measures highlight Russian effort to minimise militant threat

The presidential decree issued by Russian president Vladimir Putin involve major restrictions on travel in the area surrounding the sites where the 2014 Winter Olympic Games will be held in Sochi in February and March. In particular, travel restrictions will be put in place from 7 January 2014 across the entire Sochi municipality, enabling police checks on anyone travelling into, or within, the region. The only exceptions will be on rail traffic, and the transport of local residents and those with official accreditation. Within the municipality it will also be forbidden to sell weaponry, or hold public meetings, demonstrations or pickets that are not related to the Olympic Games themselves. In addition, so-called “controlled areas” will be established around the main Olympic venues. These are primarily located in a coastal cluster based around the town of Adler, approximately 20 km south of Sochi city itself, and a mountain cluster approximately 48 km northeast of Adler. The controlled areas will surround the Olympic sites themselves, as well as the main logistics and distribution centre, and certain key transport hubs, such as the stations on the new rail link between the coastal and mountain clusters.

These measures will be supported by a vast deployment of security forces; approximately 25,000 police officers, 8,000 personnel from other security forces (such as Ministry of the Interior troops) and approximately 20,000 to 30,000 members of the armed forces deployed to the area. By way of comparison, this equates to more than double the entire security deployment at the larger Olympic Games in London held in July and August 2012.

Russian security forces have also been highly active in undertaking security operations across the North Caucasus in recent months in order to disrupt militant groups operating there. These operations are likely to be stepped up over the coming months.

Militant threat

The main influence behind this huge security response is the threat posed to the Games by Islamist militants operating across Russia’s North Caucasus, an area that directly abuts Krasnodar region (where Sochi is located). The Caucasus Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz), the loose umbrella organisation for the various militant groups operating across the region, has already stated its intent to target the Games. Insurgent leader Dokka Umarov announced in early July that he was lifting a moratorium on attacks targeting civilians, and called for attacks on Sochi.

The North Caucasus militant groups are also likely to retain the capability to undertake attacks in and around Sochi. The vast majority of attacks undertaken by militants take place within the North Caucasus itself (and specifically the republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria), as demonstrated by the killing of the head of Ingushetia’s Security Council, Ahmed Kotiev, by suspected militants today (27 August). Nevertheless, the insurgents have demonstrated their ability to strike at targets outside the region, including attacks on the Moscow Metro in March 2010, and against Moscow’s Domodedovo airport in January 2011. This is in addition to a sporadic series of bomb attacks in the Stavropol region, which sits just north of the North Caucasus. Militants, especially those operating in Dagestan, have also shown the ability to produce an enduring succession of suicide bombers which, alongside car bombings, represents the most likely method of attack against the Olympics (see Russia: 12 July 2013: Thwarted suicide bomb attack in Russia's Dagestan highlights threat to Sochi Olympics).

Outlook and implications

The security measures outlined by Putin indicate both the concern on behalf of the authorities regarding the security threat to the Sochi Olympics, and also the determination to prevent such attacks. The security restrictions put in place across Sochi municipality have come under criticism from the Russian political opposition and human rights activists, who have described them as draconian. This is not likely to affect the security preparations, with the police in Sochi having already been placed on high alert.

The security measures in place will make it difficult for militants to travel into or around Sochi municipality, with any attack requiring significant planning as it would be extremely difficult to enter the region with any form of explosive device. One potential weak spot depends on the type of police used to secure the restricted zones around Sochi. Many local police personnel have recently been recruited to boost numbers, meaning training levels may be low. The low pay for average police officers could also open the possibility of individuals being able to bribe their way into the region. However, the risk of such eventualities at the special “controlled areas” is much lower, as these are likely to be policed much more intensely and by more highly trained personnel.

Therefore, the risk of successful militant attacks on the Olympic venues and key logistic and transport hubs is low. However, there is a heightened risk that suicide or car bomb attacks could occur at softer targets, including secondary transport hubs or security checkpoints themselves. Such attacks are likely to be undertaken by individuals or small groups, with the risk of sophisticated attacks being undertaken by larger groups minimised by the security measures in place and the lack of capacity within the Caucasus Emirate. An alternative risk could be the militants seeking to undertake high-profile attacks in other areas, should they believe the chances of success in Sochi are too slim. This could either be in other parts of Krasnodar territory, within Stavropol territory, or less likely, in major urban centres such as Moscow.