Iraq's Awakening Councils' support of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has damaged their standing among the Sunni tribes, reducing their effectiveness in combating militant groups.
IHS Global Insight perspective | |
Significance | Awakening Council militias in al-Anbar province have announced that security operations in the desert have forced militants to move into urban areas. More than 2,500 people have been killed in attacks across the country during the past three months. |
Implications | The Awakening Councils lack broad Sunni tribal backing as their co-operation with Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has alienated them from the tribes participating in the Popular Sunni Movement of Iraq (Hirak) and the affiliated Tribal Defence militias. |
Outlook | Unless porous borders and the flow of insurgents to and from Syria are contained, or the Awakening Councils secure the backing of Hirak leaders, militant attacks are likely to gradually spread southwards into Karbala, Najaf, and Hilla provinces, with attacks in Basra increasing in frequency over the coming year. |
The Sunni Awakening Council in Iraq (Sahwa) announced the formation of a joint force between Karbala and Anbar on 1 July under the name of 'Desert Eagles' to secure international pilgrimage routes, the Nakhib desert, and Ain Tamar district. Sahwa tribal leaders in the Sunni al-Anbar province and the Shia Karbala province appointed Sheikh Alaa al-Tamimi, a tribal leader from Karbala, as the head of the Desert Eagles joint force.
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Sunni protesters wave Islamist flags at an anti-government rally in Fallujah, Iraq. |
On 21 June, Sahwa Chieftain, Sheikh Wissam al-Hardan, announced the formation of the joint Karbala-Anbar Awakening coalition that was to be equipped with light and heavy weaponry, and armour provided by the Ministry of Interior. In 2007, the US-backed Awakening Councils – local tribal defence militias to fight Al-Qaeda and Islamist State of Iraq (ISI) operatives – achieved tangible security gains and worked to significantly limit the ongoing Sunni insurgency. However, while in 2007 the lines of the conflict were more clearly defined within the Sunni community, the Awakening Councils now lack broad Sunni tribal backing due to their co-operation with Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the persistence of the Syrian conflict, and growing sectarian rhetoric.
The Sunni divide
Mass anti-government protests by Sunnis, now under the broad banner of the Popular Sunni Movement of Iraq (Hirak), have been ongoing since 23 December 2012. Protests started in Ramadi, al-Anbar province, and spread to the Sunni provinces of Salaheddine, Nineveh, and Diyalah. They are rooted in broader grievances against Maliki expanding his personal power and perceived Shia dominance at the expense of Sunnis. Maliki's failure to honour promises of employment made to Sunni militias and integration of Baathist soldiers, who were turned from supporting the jihadist insurgency by the US Army's 'reconciliation' programme, exacerbates sectarian rifts with the government.
Hardan has openly criticised Hirak protests and also accused protesters of co-operating with armed insurgents. Co-operation between Sahwa leaders and Maliki also greatly restricts popular support for Awakening Council initiatives in Sunni provinces. Hirak leaders, especially in al-Anbar province, have accused Sahwa leaders, politicians, and tribesmen who co-operate with Maliki of buckling under the threat of blackmail, and even rampant opportunism and treason.
Sunni tribal leaders in al-Anbar province who are affiliated with the still peaceful Hirak are unlikely to sustain support for peaceful protests in the six month outlook. As protesters continue to be ignored by Maliki's government, an increasing number of tribesmen are likely to join the existing tribal defence militias. In Nineveh and Diyala, the Tribal Army for the Defence of Sunnis in Iraq has repeatedly attacked security forces since its formation on 27 April.
The backing and arming of Sahwa militias in al-Anbar province by Maliki serves primarily to preserve his core Shia security forces for deployment elsewhere in the country. However, increased incidents of fighting between Sunni tribal defence militias and Iraqi security forces in northern and central provinces will probably improve the opportunities for Sunni jihadists to plan and co-ordinate attacks in southern Shia province such as Karbala, Najaf, and Hilla, and into southern Iraq over the coming year.
Violent trajectory
Although by 2009, the level of violence and corresponding fatalities had dropped noticeably, it did not stop altogether, with an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 civilians killed per year. According to figures released by the United Nations Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), total civilian fatalities increased from 230 in December 2012 to 963 in May 2013, while civilian casualties increased from 655 in December 2012 to 2,191 in May 2013. The increase in violence is concentrated in the western, northern, and central Iraqi provinces, as well as the capital Baghdad. This growing Sunni insurgency has focused on military targets, government officials, Awakening Council members, Shia religious sites, pilgrimage routes, and soft targets such as markets and restaurants in urban centres. The attacks have been carried out using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), vehicle-borne IEDs, firearms, and less frequently heavy weaponry. During the first six months of 2013, there were an average of 25 successful IED attacks per month in Baghdad, with a total of 19 in June.
In addition to a growing insurgency within Iraq, border crossings with Syria are increasingly contested, with fighting breaking out between armed individuals, Syrian insurgents, and the Iraqi Army or border guards. On 4 July, Iraqi security sources announced that they discovered an insurgent training camp adjacent to the Syrian border in Nineveh province. The Syrian jihadist group Jabhat al-Nusra has had success in gaining Sunni support inside and outside Syria, and allying with other insurgent groups. On 15 June, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the emir of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Al-Qaeda in Iraq's front organisation, publicly rejected Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri's order of 23 May to abandon his group's April merger with Jabhat al-Nusra. For Iraq, this co-operation and flow of arms and fighters between the two countries is likely to sustain growth in militant attacks in northern and western Iraq and gradually improve the operational capability of jihadists in Iraq.
Outlook and implications
There is a high risk that jihadists will increase their operational capability in the Shia provinces of Karbala, Hilla, and Najaf in the next year. Successful attacks have already been recorded in all three provinces: on 16 June, a co-ordinated campaign led to a total of 10 VBIEDs detonating across Najaf, Nasiriyah, Kut, Dhi Qhar, and Hilla. It is unlikely that jihadists will be able to establish permanent base camps in those predominantly Shia provinces, which would be necessary to support a sustained attack campaign, as is the case in Baghdad. However, the probable increase in skirmishes between Sunni tribal defence militias and security forces in northern and central provinces is likely to free up Sunni jihadists currently engaged in attacks on security forces in those areas, to pool their resource and establish base camps, stockpile weapons, and subsequently plan more frequent ranged attacks in southern Shia provinces and Basra city.