Global Insight Perspective | |
Significance | The premises of the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) were stormed yesterday, and troops have gradually made their way through the complex, killing the mosque’s administrative head, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, during the operation. |
Implications | A contingent of hard-core militants continues to hold out against the pressure, and fears remain for the whereabouts and safety of women and children, whom the military argues have been being used by the militants as human shields. |
Outlook | The outlook following the operation is mixed and suggests a deterioration in the security situation over the short term, but may also point to a significant change in government policy towards the issue of extremism. |
Operations Draw to a Close
The military has today said that it is moving onto the second phase of its operations at the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in the Pakistani capital, Islamabad. It reportedly has control of more than 80% of the sizeable compound and is working to flush out the remaining militants as well as defuse various booby traps that have been left by fleeing extremists. There are no verifiable figures of the numbers killed and injured during the operation, although the news wires are currently posting the figure of 62 killed, including nine soldiers, and more than 150 individuals injured. The sound of gunfire and explosions continues to resonate from inside the complex, and the sector in which the mosque and adjoining Jamia Hafsa madrassah (religious school) are located remains sealed off. Elsewhere Islamabad is quiet, with many people seemingly electing to remain at home today. There have been security warnings posted that stray bullets are landing up to 5 km from the mosque, underlining the incidental risk.
The Impact
Political
In general, the government’s handling of the siege and storming of the religious complex has been well received. The country’s English-language press has been positive in its comments, although it has used the incident as a warning to the government over its policy handling on the issue of extremism. This mirrors the comments made by key parties, notably the opposition Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Its leader, Benazir Bhutto, has spoken at length to a number of outlets in the United Kingdom in recent days. She has argued that the government took the right decision, but should not have allowed the situation to deteriorate to this degree in the first place, and suggested that unless Pakistan is returned to civilian multi-party democracy, extremist attitudes will continue to enjoy the room to breed.
From these comments, it can be concluded that ahead of planned elections later this year, the Lal Masjid issue may well have given President Pervez Musharraf and his administration a boost. After the policy mishandling of the chief justice’s suspension, Musharraf has been given the opportunity to redeem himself to some degree. He has shown patience and made clear that his priority has been the safety of the students—mainly female—involved in this stand-off. At the same time, the storming of the mosque has sent an unequivocal message that his government will not tolerate extremist behaviour, and that the writ of the state remains strong. The negotiating team did not acquiesce to the demands of the mosque’s leaders, which reportedly included safe passage back to their homes in other parts of the country.
Aside from this, the Lal Masjid issue has forced some political party co-operation. Relations with the government’s coalition partner, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), which have been strained in recent months, look to have enjoyed a boost. MQM leader, Altaf Hussain, praised operations against the Lal Masjid, arguing that the government had shown unprecedented patience. Similarly, although Bhutto’s comments are far from a ringing endorsement of Musharraf and the government’s policy handling, they are not overly critical. They also come after Bhutto effectively scuttled attempts by the opposition parties to form a united front against Musharraf, suggesting that a pre-poll possible tie-up between the PPP leader and president, which has been touted for months, may yet be in the offing. Noticeably absent from all this has been the six-party Muslim alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). The alliance has made no notable comment in the English-language press, but previously attempted to help negotiate with the mosque’s administrators.
Security
One of the key issues emanating from the Lal Masjid affair has been the impact on security, and this is all the more pertinent now given that the mosque’s administrative head, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, died during the operations, elevating him to the position of martyr among some religious conservatives and the extremist element. Once the siege unfolded, the authorities started deploying extra troops to sensitive areas, particularly in the restive north-west of the country, while also tightening security in cities nationwide. Currently, the situation is as follows:
- Cities: Security provisions have been increased at all the main cities, with particular attention paid to possible targets, including public places. In addition, foreigners, particularly Chinese, have been called on to maintain a low profile.
- North West Frontier Province (NWFP): In North Waziristan (Federally-Administered Tribal Area, FATA), which borders Afghanistan, the army has been redeployed in its thousands and has re-manned a number of posts that had been vacated as part of the controversial September 2006 peace deal with the tribesmen in the area. The BBC reports that the military has been deployed to the north-western district of Swat, which is home to a noted hard-line cleric who reportedly has militant links.
- Silk Route: Apparently a number of attempts have already been made to close the main highway that links Pakistan with China via the Silk Route as locals protest against events at the Lal Masjid.
Policymaking
Musharraf is due to address the nation tomorrow. This will mark his first official comments on the Lal Masjid situation and, his aides have said, will see the president announce a new policy towards Islamic extremism. This is being greeted with considerable interest. Although Musharraf formally unveiled his policy of Enlightened Moderation in 2003 and has called for Pakistanis to pursue a more moderate line on religion, foreign policy has not necessarily reflected this. The government’s historic support of Jihadi groups, which have then gone on to foment instability in neighbouring countries, particularly Afghanistan, has been at odds with the stated domestic policy line. The Lal Masjid issue provides Musharraf and the government with an opportunity to change this, although there will clearly be major costs involved—particularly in terms of domestic security challenges over the coming years—if the authorities change tack so significantly. That said, there are some areas—such as the political and social development of FATA—where the government’s policy line overlaps with that of the international community. The traditional means of governing FATA has morphed into something that is unsustainable and as such, a new political structure is required. Given that Pakistan currently enjoys the support of the international community in such endeavours, now would seem a good time to tackle these sorts of issues. As Bhutto recently asserted: “There will be a backlash, but at some time we have to stop appeasing the militants.”
Outlook and Implications
The Lal Masjid stand-off has raised serious questions as well as provided new opportunities for the authorities. Primary among the questions is why the government allowed militants to mass at a madrassah in the heart of Islamabad from where they stockpiled seemingly large amounts of weaponry. This says little about intelligence or security provisions in the capital, and has prompted some conspiracy theorists to argue that it can only have been allowed to happen, with elements among the intelligence community sanctioning this sort of activity. Whatever has gone previously, the authorities' decision to take a hard line on the mosque and its practices has sent a strong message to the extremist element in the country. This is regarded as necessary, but with the realisation that it will exacerbate the domestic security problem. For how long this will be an issue depends largely on the government’s policy attitude. Attempts to really tackle the extremist element could prompt years of unrest with the ultimate goal of a far more stable Pakistan. Given Musharraf’s position and that of the government, as well as the president and administration’s past line on this issue, a dramatic policy reversal here looks unlikely.