Global Insight Perspective | |
Significance | A new parliament will be elected on 22 July, but the volatility of recent months is set to continue, with elections only partially resolving the protracted political crisis. |
Implications | Polls have been widely divergent, meaning that parliamentary distribution is almost impossible to predict. The most likely scenario shows an AK victory, with a reduced majority, and the probable entrance of an additional party to parliament, plus some independents. The extent of the new entry will determine whether AK has a majority or will need to call in a coalition partner. |
Outlook | The continuation of the broad reformist base of AK is expected, but little planning can be managed until the outcome of the voting is known; the vagaries of the electoral system could see one or several opposition parties. All are broadly supportive of progress on reform and improving living standards and the business environment, reducing concerns somewhat, but still leaving a mulititude of other issues—such as the presidency, the military and the security situation—left to be tackled. |
Risk Ratings | Global Insight raised its political risk rating for Turkey to 2.75 in recent weeks, in the belief that uncertainty in the political arena will continue until a definitive solution to the presidential issue is found. The economy has held up well, with no sign of desertion from long-term investment, nor is any expected with a continuation of an AK-led government. However, the uncertainty may continue to detract from the resumption of normal business, with implications for European Union (EU) progress and the implementation of reforms. |
On 22 July, Turkey will vote for a new parliament in one of the most controversial election campaigns seen in its democratic history, juxtaposed against a near-certain victory for the ruling Justice and Development (AK) party. Polls put support at between 29% to as much now as 49% for AK, despite months of criticism over its perceived attack on the secular government order amid the failed May presidential elections. The furore forced the elections to be held before their November due date, but this has failed to diminish AK's supporters, with the party trading on its reformist record and increased living standards. Polls indicate public concerns still revolve around unemployment and social issues that affect the electorate's day-to-day existence, closely followed by national security—this being hard to miss in the recent climate engendered by, amongst other incidents, a suicide bomb attack on the capital, Ankara, in May, which prompted fears of a sustained terrorist campaign and a security clampdown in the south-east. The secularism debate, which drew million-strong rallies against the government, lies incongruous with the actual support of the ruling party, with the Turkish public apparently able to separate the issues—much to the displeasure of the military and incumbent President Ahmet Necdet Sezer.
Unfortunately for AK, the elections solve only one part of a larger problem and the constitutional issues will remain to await the return of the new parliament. This includes the election of a new president, and a decision on the future of presidential election processes. President Sezer remains in his post, which expired in May, but a quick election of a successor sought as an interim measure has been compounded by the attendant difficulties of previous attempts (see Turkey: 6 July 2007: Court Backs PM on Constitutional Change, Amid Pre-Election Uncertainty in Turkey). It means revisiting relations with the military, reviewing progress with the European Union (EU) and ensuring investor confidence is retained if AK has to share power in a coalition government.
Reformist AK
The moderate Islamic AK has revised the boundaries of the game by calling on the opposition parties to support a modernising and reformist agenda. In the midst of the secularism debate, in which staunch secularists harked back to the 1923 foundation of the modern Turkish state by Ataturk as being inviolable, a body of convincingly calm opinion has emerged to indicate that the rabid democratisation of 1923 was no longer appropriate and, in fact, that these foundations were erring on the side of suppression. In its term since 2002, and greeted with some dread by the military, AK has brought in business-friendly reforms, put Turkey on the path to the EU—albeit a rocky one, strewn with pitfalls and damaged signposts—and brought the economy back from the brink of crisis to make the country an attractive investor destination. Despite being born from a now-banned Islamic party, AK has only shown glimpses of its religious roots—enough, say critics, to suggest it will go further once it has consolidated power, an argument that was used to justify the blocked presidential election of AK Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul. Such nay-sayers postulate that it was the fear of military intervention in its early term that prevented AK, with a constitutional majority at the time, from pushing further with an Islamist agenda.
In fact, AK has focused on the economy, wherein lies the true nature of its success and it is to be remembered that re-election is something of a rarity in Turkish politics. AK plans for Turkey to be in the top ten largest global economies by 2023, although whether this will occur within the corral of the EU is by no means guaranteed. What is certain is that unemployment will have to be tackled. Economy Minister Ali Babacan indicated in an interview with the Zaman daily that whilst employment needs to be addressed, the income gap in Turkey remains low, with only 1.6% of workers earning below US$1 per day. These facts are hard to overcome, despite opposition claims that AK has ruined the economy. As such, AK can expect anything between 240-340 seats in the 550-seat parliament by most accounts. In 2002, vote redistribution and the failure of all parties bar the current main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) to garner the 10% national threshold to enter parliament allowed AK to gain two thirds of seats with one third of the votes. This time round, the parliamentary distribution is hard to predict as it will depend on who makes that threshold. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said, though, that anything over the 2002 34.4% result will be a success; 40% is his prediction, and that should the party fail to win sole-party government status, he will retire from politics.
Two other parties are seen as entering parliament; CHP and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). These alone should dilute AK's majority to perhaps half the seats. In addition, for perhaps the first time ever, there are high hopes in the Kurdish community that a raft of independent candidates will be elected and form a parliamentary group. Under the Democratic Society Party (DTP) banner, the Kurdish deputies would not gain 10% nationally and even in parliament there is a question as to how much co-operation will be allowed with other parties due to the at-least-perceived connection of its members with the separatist rebel Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Still, their presence will help AK win over the EU, which has criticised Turkey over its lack of minority political representation, possibly one reason why a plan to prevent independents from switching allegiance once in parliament was ditched earlier this year. In recent days, there has been some recovery in the performance of the Democratic Party, a merger of two centre-right operations, the True Path Party (DYP) and Motherland (Anatavan), and they may well claw back some votes after their debacle of a merger, which prevented Anatavan deputies from standing. This would actually benefit AK if it diluted the votes of other parties, as the fewer parties in parliament, the better it is for the ruling party. The likely majority AK will gain allows the opposition much more leverage in its campaign, as it is able to pledge lofty social promises in the knowledge it will never be called to account (see Turkey: 16 July 2007: Election 2007: PM Steps Up Campaign with Record Rally in Turkish Financial Capital).
Outlook and Implications
Hardest Challenges Yet to Come
This leaves AK with plenty of work to do on its return to the parliament after the summer recess. Military issues are likely to dominate the coming weeks, as a key meeting with top brass will convene to decide the military succession in the near future. The generals at the apex of the army are aged and this ensures that the incumbent chief of staff, hawkish General Yasar Buyukanit, will be replaced next year. His successor will be similarly short-lived, but is likely to be equally hawkish and suspicious of AK. Collusion between the president and the military has been indicated, in the failed presidential elections and beyond.
Yesterday, the government slammed President Sezer for his refusal to endorse a replacement for the helm of the civilian-controlled National Security Council (MGK). The mandate for the term expired some months ago and two candidates have been rejected by Sezer with no explanation. Zaman reports that Sezer also vetoed five ambassadorial appointments in March this year, and he seems to be apparently flexing his muscles as much as possible before the handover of the reins of his presidency to another candidate.
Still, the government has moderated its tone against the military—bar blaming it for a spot on its economy record from the 12.5% drop in the stock markets following its 27 April statement, when it promised to defend the secularist order. This is partly due to public support for increased military action against rebels, and partly due to the current strong feeling over the presidential issue; this expediency is clear from the government's changing attitude in recent weeks (see Turkey: 13 May 2007: Turkish PM Vows to Resist Military Pressure for Iraq Incursions).
The government has apparently also decided that relations with the United States are worth expending at this stage, considering diminished public opinion over current bilateral ties. Supporting in essence the military position on pursuing rebels into northern Iraq is expedient, but it lacks substance. It was revealed this week that Turkey has been acting as a go-between in attempts at a Syrian-Israeli rapprochement. This is indicative of the growing role Turkey is playing in the Middle East, and also that suggests that any cross-border incursions into northern Iraq to pursue rebels would be a last resort, undertaken in the knowledge that such a destabilising measure would sacrifice regional ties. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul indicated yesterday that the United States is investigating how arms it supplied to the Iraqi government ended up in PKK hands, as was revealed by defecting rebels earlier in July. The implication hints at corruption amongst U.S. ranks, but the revelation is also useful for the government.
First and foremost though, it will have to tackle the immediate issue of whether it will gain the 40% it aims for, and whether it will have to face the task of a coalition—without Erdogan at the helm. This scenario cannot be ruled out, although polls suggest otherwise. Beyond that, the task of constitutional reform awaits, together with the resolution of the presidential issue. The election marks only the beginning of a new struggle in the political arena, rather than the prize.
Related Articles
- 30 April 2007: Businesses Issue Elections Warning After New Demonstrations in Turkey
- 2 May 2007: Ruling Party Calls for Early Elections in Positive Development for Turkey
- 11 May 2007: President Under Spotlight as Major Turkish Electoral Reform Package Approved
- 24 May 2007: Kurdish Suicide Bomber Named in Ankara Attack as New Suspect Detained in Turkey