Election 2013: Chavez's anointed successor clear favourite as Venezuelans vote

Venezuela is holding a presidential election for the second time in six months this Sunday (14 April) under the shadow of late president Hugo Chávez, who died of cancer on 5 March. Acting president Nicolás Maduro will run for the ruling PSUV against Henrique Capriles, representing the MUD, a coalition of opposition political parties. Maduro is Chávez's appointed successor while Capriles is the defeated candidate who ran in the presidential race in October 2012 against the late president, securing 44% of the vote against Chavez's 55%. This was the best ever electoral result secured by an opposition leader in the Chávez era and Capriles is again leading a united, but weak, opposition to the polls.

Chávez appointed Maduro as his successor before he left Venezuela for Havana, Cuba, on 11 December 2012 to undergo surgery. The late president urged the PSUV, the armed forces, and his supporters to support Maduro in an election should he became incapacitated or die. His blessing has been enough to increase the prospects of Maduro, who remains loyal to the Chávista movement but is an uncharismatic leader. The electoral campaign finishes today (11 April), the same day that Venezuelans remember when Chávez was ousted from power for 48 hours in 2002 in still unclear circumstances, after 18 people were killed following an anti-government protest, following which the high military command withdrew their support for the government.

The electoral campaign and tensions ahead of election day

The 10-day electoral campaign, the shortest in Venezuelan history, has been highly polarised and has seen Hugo Chávez remain at the centre of political dynamics. Maduro tried to build up political support on Chávez's legacy, calling himself his "son" and pledging to give continuity to the Chávista economic and social policies. He has also tried to develop a strong Chávez-like rhetoric and generate polarisation both internally and externally. Internally, he tried to portray Capriles as the candidate of the rich and accused his opponent's electoral command of formulating plans to not recognise the electoral results and sabotage the electricity grid. Externally, he accused the United States of meddling in Venezuela's internal affairs and suspended communications with US diplomats in a further deterioration of the already tense bilateral relationship. Maduro's government expelled two US military attachés the day Chávez died, accusing them of allegedly contacting active Venezuelan military officers, and has gone as far as accusing two former US diplomats of plotting to kill him just weeks after he had formulated the same assassination claims against Capriles.

Capriles, in turn, has developed a strategy of bringing the electoral debate back to the day-to-day economic and social problems affecting Venezuelans, such an inflation, insecurity, corruption, and shortages of food, medicines, basic goods, electricity, and water. Capriles has developed a more aggressive campaign style against Maduro compared to the non-confrontational style he assumed in October against Chávez, who back then was struggling with cancer.

Most opinion polls such as Datanalisis, Hinterlaces, and IVAD, are showing that Maduro is leading in voters' preferences by a double-digit difference. Maduro's key challenge on election day will be to mobilise his support base. The PSUV has powerful machinery in place to achieve this, including a database of government supporters who the party will provide with logistics and transportation to the voting centres, especially in the late hours of the afternoon, according to IHS sources. This will be key, as the opposition presented a complaint at the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral: CNE) on 2 April – through opposition lawmaker Alfonso Marquina – alleging that members of the armed forces were part of a plan to mobilise voters in favour of the ruling party in co-ordination with political leaders. The alleged document referred to by Marquina called the opposition the "enemy" and included a plan for the Bolivarian militia to play a key role mobilising PSUV supporters. This is key, as the Bolivarian militia is mainly made up of active militants of the PSUV who could be provided with weapons. This followed another legal complaint by the MUD that technical IT staff from the PSUV had access to the codes and passwords of Venezuela's electronic voting machines.

Outlook and implications

This is the first election in Venezuela without Chávez's participation since 1998. The big question is not whether Maduro will win or not, but how large the margin of difference will be. Should the margin be very small, which may be the case according to opposition calculations, there is a possibility that the opposition could demand a recount of votes and cry foul, thus increasing tensions in the country and the likelihood of violent unrest. The likelihood of violence could increase if the CNE delays releasing the results, as it has in the past. This will include possible confrontation in the streets between pro-government and opposition supporters and isolated events of violence but should not compromise overall political stability in Venezuela. 

Having said this, our core scenario is that Maduro will win by a difference of between eight and eleven percentage points, that the opposition will recognise the results, and that a smooth transition will take place. However, Maduro faces a range of key political, economic, security, and social challenges after the election which could undermine his popularity and lead the country into political instability should he fail to keep the different factions of the Chávista movement together. This is pertinent given the influence that Chávez's personality exercised over certain factions of the armed forces, and the role they are expected to play in assessing the efficiency of the new government policies and how Maduro’s leadership is perceived at the grassroots level. After Chávez’s death a gradual process of deterioration has started that will continue, seeing a reorganisation of the political order behind the scenes in the coming years.

For now, the different Chávista factions seem to have gathered under Maduro’s leadership. However, Maduro does not have the same charismatic personality and leadership that characterised Chávez’s rule. He will have to negotiate with other powerful PSUV and armed forces actors to make key decisions and will have to maintain unity among the different Chávista factions. Maduro's capacity to lead the country will be tested as he will face tough economic and social challenges and will be forced to take unpopular decisions to correct years of economic mismanagement and update a crumpling infrastructure. If he fails to overcome these difficulties his leadership will be eroded and so will his capacity to keep the different Chávista factions united, paving the way for a fragmentation of the PSUV. The weakening of the PSUV could start to take place after Maduro’s first year in power and in the run-up to the 2015 parliamentary elections, which will be the next electoral opportunity to test the strength of the opposition at the national level, and assess the feasibility of a new leadership emerging in Venezuela.

Political stability is not guaranteed in Venezuela after Maduro's election and the battle for power will be fierce in a country which holds the biggest oil reserves in the world. A key indicator of the fragmentation of the PSUV could take place if there are riots in Venezuela like the events of 27 February 1989, when protests took place against the government of Carlos Andrés Pérez (1989–93). As for political risks immediately after the election, we expect the risk of nationalisations to remain high, particularly in the energy services and food sectors. Currency and inflation risks will remain high as long as the exchange control system is in place and the government is incapable of reducing demand for foreign currency. Shortages of food, medicines, basic goods, and electricity are also likely to continue amid a political scenario in which the Maduro administration will increase its efforts to tackle rampant crime and insecurity in Venezuela.