Global Insight Perspective | |
Significance | Although president Hu has boosted his position by having his policy and ideological policy blueprint elevated to the status of "established Party theory" at the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCPNC), the composition of the Politburo Standing Committee appears to be a compromise solution brokered to satisfy various political factions, which does not seem entirely satisfactory to Hu in his quest to consolidate power. |
Implications | Compromise solutions are as a result likely to be continuously brokered to provide for outward Chinese Communist Party (CCP) unity, which is in its interest as it seeks to push through key reforms in the provinces, with strong central leadership being pivotal for their success. |
Outlook | The departure of the powerful head princeling, vice-president Zeng Qinghong, has solved the succession struggle, seemingly positioning his protégée, Xi Jinping, as Hu's heir. This is, however, likely to come at the expense of increasing "shadow politics", in which former president Jiang Zemin and Zeng are set to play key roles from behind the scenes. |
China’s Top Leadership Unveiled
China’s five-yearly National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCPNC) today culminated in the unveiling of a new top leadership for the Politburo Standing Committee, China's most powerful political body, with the conference having served to modestly boost the position of the government of President Hu Jintao. As expected, Hu won another term as head of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), with the reshuffle seeing four new faces enter the Politburo Standing Committee, including two apparent possible heirs to replace Hu at the time of his expected departure from the upper ranks of Chinese politics at the next CCPNC, which is to be held in 2012.
At a major ceremony in the Great Hall of the People, President Hu announced the top political leadership elected by the 204-member Central Committee, with the nine new members of the Politburo Standing Committee being paraded onto the stage in order of rank and seniority. Hu remains the top leader, followed by chairman of the Standing Committee of the CCPNC Wu Bangguo, Premier Wen Jiabao, and chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the country's top political advisory body, Jia Qinglin, after powerful vice-president Zeng Qinghong stepped down ahead of the ceremony. The new terms of the president and the premier are to be approved by parliament when it assembles in March. Meanwhile, Li Changchun, who is in charge of the Party's propaganda machinery, stayed on despite previous reports that he was expected to step down due to ill health after having been diagnosed with intestinal cancer a number of years ago.
The Newcomers
The new members appointed to the Politburo Standing Committee are an uneasy mix, representing the interests of all of China’s key political factions: the tuanpai, the princelings, and the Shanghai Clique. In order of rank, they are Shanghai Party chief Xi Jinping, Liaoning Party chief Li Keqiang, Public Security Ministry head Zhou Yongkang, and CCP organisation chief He Guoqiang. The four newcomers replace vice-president Zeng Qinghong and lawmakers Luo Gan and Wu Guanzheng, with the fourth position having been left open following the death of committee member Huang Ju last summer. Xi Jinping emerged as the head of the newly appointed members, which, according to CCP tradition, indicates that he is being groomed to fill Hu’s place. Xi is a princeling, a term that refers to a privileged group consisting of high-born officials who have risen to power mostly because of their families' strong political connections and influence. He holds close allegiance to the retiring vice-president and head princeling Zeng Qinghong, which is set to ensure the latter’s significant influence from behind the scenes, although Xi has on several occasions stated his willingness to co-operate with Hu. Meanwhile, Li Keqiang is an integral part of Hu’s tuanpai faction and is considered his protégée among the appointees, making him the sole newcomer, who represents the president’s faction. Zhou and He are on the other hand allies of former president Jiang Zemin and part of his so-called Shanghai Clique, reflecting his continued influence on Chinese politics five years after he retired.
Outlook and Implications
A Victory for Hu?
The CCPNC had been widely expected to function as a key arena for Hu to cement his position as the top leader of the Party hierarchy by having his policy and ideological policy blueprint elevated to the status of "established Party theory" and by putting his protégés in key positions. He has indeed won a victory on the first count, but the composition of the Politburo Standing Committee appears to be a compromise solution brokered to satisfy various political factions, which does not seem entirely satisfactory to Hu in his quest to consolidate power. This has created a situation whereby compromise solutions between the various factions will have to be continuously brokered to provide for outward CCP unity, which is in its interest as it seeks to push through key reforms in the provinces with strong central leadership being pivotal for their success. However, political intrigues between the factions could well become an obstacle to this, notably if Li Keqiang seeks to boost his own chances as Hu’s heir by taking and obstructing Xi’s political line to undermine his political reputation and clout with adverse implications for the implementation of policy.
Succession Dilemma Solved
With Zeng’s move to step down from the vice-presidency, a major succession dilemma has been solved. Despite being a former ally of Jiang, Zeng had come to take on an important position in the political set-up as the president's left-hand man. In his capacity as a lead princeling, Zeng is known to have strong connections in the military, having made him a useful ally for President Hu, who cannot boast of similar influence regarding this powerful institution. Zeng until yesterday held all the positions that were given to Hu in the lead-up to the fourth-generation leadership transition, with the exception of the position of vice-chairman of the Party and state Central Military Commissions. There has been speculation that the high-level positioning of Zeng provided insurance until the 2007 CCPNC in case Hu failed in his role as president, allowing for an easy transfer of power. In order for the leadership to follow the established succession routine and elevate Hu's successor, it had to consider Zeng's role. With Zeng having departed, the road has been paved for Hu's potential successor to take over the influential vice-presidency. Xi is expected to be groomed for this position while Hu’s protégé is expected to be named executive vice-premier, taking over responsibility for the country’s financial services, putting the pair in position for taking up the positions as Party secretary and premier. It seems highly possible that a deal has been brokered between Zeng and Hu to solve this dilemma, whereby Zeng will retain his influence by proxy by having his close ally Xi groomed as president and head of the Party by allowing him to fill a seat on the Standing Committee.
Shadow Politics Ahead?
The departure of Zeng Qinghong, who has remained a close ally of former president Jiang Zemin, has indeed widely been considered a victory for Hu in his efforts to consolidate power, but it is worth taking note of the fact that this may have come at the considerable concession of having Zeng remain in power from behind the scenes as is indeed already the case with former president Jiang. The appointments of two Shanghai Clique members to the Politburo Standing Committee—Zhou and He—testifies to his continuing influence on Chinese politics. This makes for a situation whereby "shadow politics", with Jiang and Zeng exercising considerable power from behind the scenes, is likely to become the order of the day. Hu as such faces continued challenges in asserting his power base, notably in the form on building co-operative relations with Xi and his relationship with Li. Much will depend on the working relationship between the two heirs apparent, with their co-operation—as opposed to political intrigue—being vital to the effective implementation of policy.