Global Insight Perspective | |
Significance | Thailand will be reverting back to civilian rule after 15 months of military rule. |
Implications | The new government will play a pivotal role in addressing Thailand’s stagnating economy and the deteriorating security situation in the country’s south. |
Outlook | None of the parties is expected to win an outright majority, returning Thailand to the era of weak coalition governments. |
Eager for Change
Thailand will be reverting back to democracy after 15 months of rule by the military-backed Council for National Security (CNS), once the country’s first parliamentary elections since the military coup are held on Sunday (23 December). The elections will see candidates contest 480 seats in the Lower House of Representatives, with 400 from constituencies and 80 selected on a proportional basis from party lists. There are currently 66 registered parties, with 18 intending to contest Sunday’s elections.
The military coup, Thailand’s 18th in 75 years, ousted the government of Thaksin Shinawatra on 19 September 2006, after he had won two five-year terms in 2001 and 2005 with an outright majority. Nonetheless, he was only able to complete six years of his premiership in the face of growing protest over an alleged corruption scandal, Thaksin’s sale of his Thai telecom company Shin Corporation to the Singapore-based Temasek Holdings, and the deteriorating security situation in the Muslim-majority south. Questions were also raised over Thaksin’s allegiance to King Bhumibol Adulyadej following his falling-out with Privy Council leader Prem Tinsulanonda.
After the coup, Thaksin was replaced by Surayud Chulanont as interim prime minister. The military drafted a new constitution, the country’s 18th, which was approved in a referendum in August. This constitution curtailed the powers of the lower house of parliament and prime minister while expanding the role of the upper house and judiciary in order to allegedly maintain checks and balances and prevent the dominance of a single person or party over the political sphere (see: Thailand: 27 August 2007: Government of Thailand Enacts New Constitution, Sets Election Date). Coup leader General Sonthi Boonyaratglin retired as army chief in October to be replaced by General Anupong Paojinda, although he retained a role over policymaking by assuming the role of deputy prime minister. While the military-backed government came to power with widespread support, this was soon squandered by a series of policy blunders on the economy, a lack of progress on the insurgency in the south and a number of corruption scandals in the government (see: Thailand: 14 December 2007: Thai Deputy Finance Minister Resigns from Cabinet Following Criminal Conviction). As such, Thailand’s 45 million eligible voters appear eager to return to democracy, as demonstrated by last weekend’s record turnout in the absentee and advance voting phase of the elections (see: Thailand: 18 December 2007: Record Number of Absentee Voters Cast Ballots for Upcoming Thai Parliamentary Elections).
The Ghost of Thaksin
As for Thaksin, his Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais, TRT) Party was dissolved for violating election laws in May, while Thaksin and 110 other party members were banned from politics for five years. Thaksin and his family are also facing charges of corruption and tax evasion, although he has not yet been convicted of any charges, while US$2 billion of his assets have been frozen. He has spent the days since the coup in the United Kingdom, where he owns the Manchester City football club. Nonetheless, he has continued to exercise influence over the political process given a divide between rural and urban voters. He has the continued support of rural voters in the north and north-east, fuelled by his rags-to-riches rise and his rural welfare policies, while urban voters in Bangkok and the central regions remain vehemently opposed to his return. Recently, controversies were raised over a video CD in which Thaksin urged voters to support the pro-Thaksin People Power Party (PPP), which is a violation of his ban from Thai politics (see: Thailand: 10 December 2007: Front Running Party in Thai Polls Could be Disbanded Over Alleged Electoral Offences).
The PPP, led by Samak Sundaravej and comprising supporters of the now-disbanded TRT Party, remains the most popular party, especially in the former strongholds of the TRT in the north-east (see: Thailand: 5 December 2006: Party with Links to Former PM Enjoys Lead Ahead of Thai Polls). The other dominant party is the Democrat Party, which is Thailand’s oldest political party, led by Abhisit Vejjajiva. It remains popular among the business community in the capital, Bangkok, and in the south of the country. However, neither party is expected to win an outright majority, forcing them to form alliances with mid-sized parties to make a coalition government. As such, the performance and allegiance of the middle and smaller parties will be pivotal in determining the make-up of the next government. These parties include the Chat Thai (Thai Nation) and Pua Pandin (Motherland Party), as well as smaller parties such as the Pracharaj (Royal People Party), Matchima Tippatai (Neutral Democratic Party), and Ruam Jai Thai Chat Pattana (United Development Party). Given the anti-Thaksin tilt of most of Thailand’s parties, the next government will likely be led by a Democrat-led coalition. Thailand’s political scene continues to be dominated by personality politics rather than policy platforms and concerns persist over vote buying and coercion, which remain common in Thailand.
Shadow of the Military
Despite the return to democracy, the military has attempted to ensure a place for itself in post-coup Thailand. For one, the military has allegedly attempted to ensure that the pro-Thaksin PPP does not win the election by maintaining martial law over 28 of the country’s 76 provinces, notably areas where Thaksin remains popular, and curtailing the party's campaign activities. Furthermore, the military is likely to retain significant influence over the government given the emerging weakness of the two other centres of power in Thailand: the government and the monarchy, with the likely emergence of a weak coalition government and declining health of revered King Bhumibol Adulyadej (see: Thailand: 15 October 2007: Fresh Fears Voiced Over Accession After Thai Monarch Hospitalised). Finally, the military-appointed parliament approved the controversial internal security bill yesterday, a day before the parliament was dissolved. The bill, although slightly watered down from its original text, nonetheless gives the military powers to dictate policy and suspend constitutional rights, while granting it immunity from prosecution, bringing significant opposition both internally and from the international community (see: Thailand: 12 December 2007: Protestors Storm Thai Parliament Over Opposition to Internal Security Bill).
Twin Concerns – Reviving Economy and Resolving Insurgency
The economy has been battered by political instabilities and policy blunders under the military-ruled interim government. Notably, on 19 December 2006, Thailand’s stock market fell by 14.8%, its biggest one-day drop, after the Bank of Thailand announced stringent capital controls. Despite revoking the controls and implementing five interest-rate cuts, Thailand’s export-driven economy has continued to see growth stagnate in the presence of a rising baht and oil prices. A proposal to amend Thailand’s Foreign Business Act to make foreign investment more restrictive has further undermined investor sentiment.
As such, all the parties have returned to some variation of Thaksin's populist economic policies or “Thaksinomics”, which place emphasis on rural development, infrastructure projects, and privatisation. Interestingly, the Democrats have vowed to hold “99 days” of action if elected, including the implementation of free education for all, low cooking gas prices, energy conservation, and addressing the insurgency in the south. Nonetheless, the incoming coalition government is likely to have a weak mandate to make the necessary reforms.
The security situation has also seen no significant improvement under the CNS government. The most striking example of this was on New Year’s Eve last year, when a series of bomb explosions across Bangkok killed three people and injured more than 30. The culprits have still not been identified, although the government has blamed supporters of Thaksin’s government rather than the Muslim insurgents from the country’s restive south. The insurgency in predominantly Buddhist Thailand’s four Muslim-majority southern provinces, which has claimed the lives of over 2700 people since 2004, has also escalated. While the insurgency accelerated under the heavy-handed tactics of Thaksin’s rule, the more conciliatory approach taken by the military government has not been any better as attacks have escalated and grown more gruesome (see: Thailand: 5 December 2007: Bomb Explodes in Pattani Province in Thailand’s Insurgency-Infested South). The Thai military maintains a presence of 30,000 troops in the region. A combination of economic incentives, effective law enforcement, and protection of the local language and culture will be necessary to quell the conflict. Notably, a second bridge was opened today linking Narathiwat province in Thailand’s south with Kalatan state in Malaysia’s north in order to boost the local economies on both sides of the border.
Outlook and Implications
With the TRT disbanded, Thailand’s politics will likely revert to the unstable coalition politics of the 1990s when precarious alliances frequently formed and collapsed. The Democrat Party looks likely to win, albeit by the thinnest of electoral margins, although this may be the best-case scenario to ensure the military’s withdrawal from the political sphere. A PPP-led government could potentially overturn the ban imposed on 111 former TRT politicians and amend the new constitution that includes a controversial amnesty clause for those involved in staging the coup. This may well prompt the military to stage another coup. Nonetheless, whether in the opposition or the ruling government, the PPP is likely to retain significant influence over policymaking given the thin margin of support for the incoming government. Controversy will also continue over whether the new constitution gives enough checks and balances to institute a more robust democratic framework given indications that it may increase the power of bureaucrats at the expense of the legislature. Thailand’s transition to a democratically elected parliamentary government will undoubtedly improve the country's international image, along with restoring the confidence of investors. Nonetheless, political stability appears elusive for the next government and, as such, reforms will remain a slow process.