President Abdelaziz Bouteflika on 3 September named water resources minister Abdelmalek Sellal as Algeria's new prime minister, almost four months after May's national elections.
IHS Global Insight Perspective | |
Significance | The fact that Algeria has taken almost four months to appoint a new government is a reflection of continued political in-fighting among the country's elite, raising important questions over the presidential succession. |
Implications | The appointment of Sellal—a highly capable technocrat and political operator—may be a compromise decision by ailing President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. |
Outlook | The prospect for reform under the new government is uncertain, given the continued influence of Algeria's opaque elite and the strong likelihood of a new president taking office in 2014. |
|
Algeria's new prime minister, Abdelmalek Sellal, |
After months of political limbo, characterised by solipsistic in-fighting among Algeria's political elite, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika yesterday (3 September) named the independent Abdelmalek Sellal as the country's new prime minister. Sellal is a technocrat with extensive political experience and knowledge of Algeria's labyrinthine system of government. Until now he had occupied the relatively low profile cabinet position of water resources minister. An official statement released by the president's office was brusque in its dismissal of Sellal's predecessor, Ahmed Ouyahia, who had served in the position since 2008 saying that "[President Bouteflika] has today terminated the functions of prime minister Ahmed Ouyahia, who has presented the resignation of the government," adding that "the president of the republic has named Mr Abdelmalek Sellal prime minister."
Better Late Than Never
The appointment of a new government comes almost four months after the country's 10 May legislative elections returned the ruling National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale, FLN) to power with an overwhelming majority (see Algeria: 14 May 2012: Election 2012: Algeria's Ruling Party Enjoys Comfortable Victory). The lengthy delay contributed to a state of political paralysis in the country, as MPs and ministries languished in a state of torpor while the country's elite engaged in a protracted power struggle behind closed doors. Public anger over the elections, widely believed to have been marred by electoral fraud, has been largely subsumed by the challenges of day-to-day life, as protests over electricity cuts and water shortages have accelerated in line with the rising summer temperatures. Although the People's National Assembly convened after the election (before going into recess for the summer on 2 July), lawmakers were largely preoccupied with parochial political party in-fighting, boycott threats and squabbling over committee seats. With the machinery of government paralysed, policy was left to drift under the supervision of deputy ministers, relegating Algeria's political and constitutional reforms, promised by Bouteflika at the height of widespread social unrest in early 2011, to a state of limbo.
The root of the problem lay in the rampant internal divisions currently afflicting the two establishment parties, the FLN and the National Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement National Démocratique, RND), rather than any external political considerations. FLN Secretary General Abdelaziz Belkhadem has been distracted by a sizable section of his party calling for his removal, as a rebellion over his alleged autocratic style and opaque ties to business that was—ostensibly at least—put on hold during the elections has fully reignited. At the same time Ouyahia is facing a similar challenge from within the RND, as members accuse him of authoritarianism and steering the party away from its core political beliefs. Prior to the election it had been mooted that Amar El Ghoul, the Islamist former minister of public works was in the running for the prime minister’s office, however the poor performance of his Green Algeria Alliance party (which he subsequently split from) and its vocal allegations of electoral fraud nixed his chances. The political uncertainty prompted by this in-fighting prevented Bouteflika from appointing a new prime minister, leaving the formation of a new government in limbo. The problem was further exacerbated by the president’s continued poor health that has diverted his attention away from day-to-day decision-making, contributing to a sense of paralysis at the top of government that Sellal’s appointment is not guaranteed to resolve.
Safe Pair of Hands
Uncharacteristically, no information on the composition of the new government was given alongside the announcement of Sellal's appointment, hinting at ongoing negotiations behind the scenes. The appointment of Sellal, a key loyalist of Bouteflika who was intricately involved in his re-election campaigns in 2004 and 2009, may suggest that the ailing president's patience with his subordinates has run-out. Widely viewed in Algeria as a technocrat, the 64 year-old Sellal has held a number of senior regional positions and has occupied several ministerial posts, most notably as minister of transport before taking over responsibility for water resources. Although a safe pair of hands, Sellal has hardly featured in discussions of Algeria's sucession, his role largely obscured by the well-publicised trials and tribulations of political heavyweights, Abdelaziz Belkhadem and Ouyahia. It may be that Sellal has been appointed as a compromise candidate to oversee the resumption of normal government business, and organise the upcoming presidential elections in 2014.
The direction of the new government is currently unclear; however, given Sellal's involvement in crafting the president's policy agenda it seems unlikely that he will spearhead any radical change. Reuters reported unnamed observers as speculating that the new prime minister will ease laws put in place by Ouyahia that discouraged foreign investment however this is far from certain. Ouyahia was himself lauded during his first years as prime minister for leading a wide-ranging campaign of economic liberalisation, undertaken in co-operation with the IMF. There are powerful vested interests within the Algerian elite that remain tied to resource nationalism and are inherently suspicious of foreign investment. While there has been evidence of a growing acceptance among the elite that Algeria needs to diversify from its economic reliance on hydrocarbons in order to reduce its vulnerability to external price shocks, there is still no sign of any consensus on how to open the economy to private investment without eroding their hold on power. The likelihood that Bouteflika will decline to run for re-election in the 2014 presidential election will also influence Sellal's commitment to reform. The inevitable internal power struggle over the selection of a new president is likely to shake up the policy agenda still further.
Outlook and Implications
The fact that it took four months to appoint a prime minister following legislative elections merely serves to confirm the status quo is a reflection of the dysfunction currently afflicting the FLN and, to a lesser extent, the RND. The RND's lacklustre electoral performance and Ouyahia's personal unpopularity had made it highly likely that he would be replaced, and the choice of Sellal appears in the first analysis to be a compromise appointment by Bouteflika. The importance of the 10 May legislative election is likely to prove to be be a bellwether for the 2014 presidential election, and while the FLN reconfirmed its dominance of Algeria's political landscape, the in-fighting afflicting the party has done little to resolve the all important question of the presidential succession.


