Election 2008: Opposition Candidate Withdraws from Presidential Run-Off in Zimbabwe

After a meeting with the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)’s executive committee on Sunday (22 June), the party’s leader Morgan Tsvangirai took the contentious, if understandable decision to withdraw from the scheduled second round of the presidential election on Friday (27 June). Speaking from his home in the Zimbabwean capital, Harare, Tsvangirai told reporters that over recent weeks that the MDC had been subjected to a brutal campaign of violence sanctioned and at times even led by the uniformed security services. In stark comparison with the 29 March first round in which the MDC won control of the National Assembly and Tsvangirai dominated the presidential vote, the MDC has not been able to campaign in rural areas as a result of the violence and police bans on MDC rallies. Moreover, President Robert Mugabe and other senior figures within the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) have explicitly stated that they would not accept an election result that hands the presidency to Tsvangirai. Therefore, concludes Tsvangirai, "we in the MDC have resolved that we will no longer participate in this violent, illegitimate sham of an election process...we are not legitimising Mugabe." Although Mugabe has not yet commented on the MDC withdrawal, other party officials have. According to Information Minister Sikhanyiso Ndlovu, the vote will go ahead as "the Constitution does not say that if somebody drops out or decides to chicken out the run-off will not be held."

Between a Rock and a Hard Place

Not for the first time, Zimbabwe's electoral dynamics have left the MDC with a choice between unpalatable alternatives. The party has indeed been subject to a violent campaign focused on those traditionally ZANU-PF areas that showed an uncommon degree of support for the MDC such as Mashonaland, Midlands, Masvingo, and some Harare constituencies. To make matters worse, the state controlled Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, which is dominant in the rural areas, announced last week that it would not be carrying opposition campaign adverts because of their "inappropriate language”. The likely and desired effect of pro-government violence and overwhelmingly one-sided media coverage would be to get the ZANU-PF vote out for fear of seeing the country re-colonised and to diminish the MDC voter participation for fear of launching a post-election war. Members of ZANU-PF, including the president, have warned at various points recently that Zimbabwe was won by blood and they will not allow it to be lost by the ballot. African Union (AU) observer team head Marwick Khumalo said on 18 June that Zimbabwean conditions at the time were not conducive to free and fair elections, as did Tanzanian Foreign Minister Bernard Membe speaking on behalf of three Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries—Tanzania, Angola, and Swaziland. Both South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki and UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Haile Menkerios met with Mugabe and Tsvangirai last week and reportedly called on them to jettison the election in favour of a government of national unity. Therefore, in the absence of anything resembling a free and fair electoral environment attenuated by promises of war, withdrawal is understandable. However, it puts the MDC in political limbo. Without MDC participation, Mugabe will be president by default. Looking to precedent, Mugabe and his most ardent supporters in the security services’ upper echelons will claim that Mugabe is the legitimate victor. Since Tsvangirai has withdrawn unilaterally (i.e., not in the context of some cross-party initiative), he goes into negotiations with a weakened hand.

Other than calling for stronger intervention from the international community—the UN and regional partners—the MDC has not yet clarified its position going forward; i.e., specifically what actions it will take itself, in pursuit of what objections, and finally specifically how it would like the international community to involve itself. Tsvangirai is expected to comment more fully on Wednesday (25 June). Potentially, the MDC has at least two factors in its favour—one, that the international community could bring new pressure to bear on Zimbabwe, especially if there is a backlash against MDC supporters; and two, that if the MDC is able to maintain its parliamentary majority despite the electoral court challenges still pending, it will rob ZANU-PF of the power to select a successor to Mugabe through electoral college if he steps down prematurely. The possibility of further violence is a real one; after past elections (e.g., 1985 and 2000), opposition supporters have been persecuted with impunity founded on presidential pardons and the inactivity of the police.

Outlook and Implications

Unsurprisingly, the strongest language has come from Western powers in response to Tsvangirai's withdrawal. The U.K. Foreign Minister David Miliband is in favour of a "full discussion" on Zimbabwe at the UN Security Council session today, while the Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has said that his government is looking to increase sanctions against Zimbabwe, Agence France-Presse (AFP) reports. Others such as the former U.K. cabinet Minister Peter Hain have called on South Africa and China to withdraw investment and call in debt. Even within the sub-region there has been a hardening towards Zimbabwe, at least in terms of rhetoric. Given current conditions, SADC chair and Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa has supported Tsvangirai's decision. That said, it would be surprising if before some further and extraordinary escalation in the violence comes to light, SADC and South Africa in particular implement the sanctions being recommended in some quarters. For one, sanctions often affect policy only after a matter of years. Second, with over 80% unemployment, a projected 4 million dependent on food assistance, and an inflation rate of over 1 million per cent, Zimbabweans are already struggling to survive. Sanctions would press them further, while the government has proven itself resilient to their plight. There is no appetite for military intervention regionally and the precedent of AU intervention in the Comoros this year and South African intervention in Lesotho in 1998 is not applicable here. This leaves renewed negotiations as the most likely path forward. To that end, the MDC will have to clarify whether it hopes to postpone elections and/or form a government of national unity and over what timescale.