Global Insight Perspective | |
Significance | Georgian troops and fighter jets have occupied the capital of South Ossetia breakaway region overnight on 8 August. |
Implications | The action was justified by apparent attacks by the separatists on the Georgian mainland, but was certainly well-timed to coincide with the opening of the Olympic Games in China and thus avoid international attention. |
Outlook | South Ossetia is defenceless without the support of its main ally, Russia, which now has to find a way to protect its interests without entangling itself in an image-damaging war. |
Risk Ratings | With another trouble spot in Abkhazia, the escalation of separatist conflicts in Georgia could have potentially major security concerns for the whole Caucasus region, as separatists can only defend themselves with the help of Russia, implying an international character to the hostilities. Georgia's security risk rating is already high, at 3.75. We may raise the risk if the conflict escalates internationally, but deem it unlikely. |
If any separatist conflict had looked likely to escalate in Georgia this summer, one would have bet on Abkhazia, where tensions have waxed and waned over the recent months, with the Georgian government publicly announcing the possibility of an outright war. Yet, it is another region, South Ossetia, that eventually proved the trouble spot, with a rapid escalation of military actions leading to a full attack last night.
The capital of the breakaway republic of South Ossetia, Tskhinvali, was occupied by Georgian troops on the night of 8 August; the Georgian army also took control of eight villages in the region as a result of a military assault supported by fighter jets that bombed the capital and the North-South Ossetia highway. The Georgian authorities explained the intervention as a response to the proven shelling by South Ossetia's military contingent on Georgia's troops and the alleged (and denied by Russia) bombings of Georgian territory by Russian military jets in the course of last week.
The primary—if only—prominence of South Ossetia is political and ethnic, as a potential bone of contention between Russia and Georgia. A product of Stalin's ethnicity-blind nationalism policy, South Ossetia is a 4,000 sq km region with a population of 70,000 who are not ethnically Georgian, but close to the Ossetians in Russia's province of North Ossetia. South Ossetia's demands for autonomy and independence had already brought open military conflict with Tbilisi in the early 1990s, eventually putting the region under the control of Russian peace-keeping forces. The unrecognised republic struggled economically, with Russia providing about two-thirds of its US$30 million budget. Most of its population also hold Russian passports, and Gazprom is building a pipeline to the region as well as infrastructure to help it economically. Thus, with Russia's support, South Ossetia represents an ethnically, economically, and politically alien body on Georgian territory, certainly to the annoyance of Tbilisi. The Georgian authorities treat South Ossetia as a hotbed of smuggling and banditry, openly accusing its self-professed government of laundering Russian budget money extracted through corrupt practices and hence justify their military operation as a cleansing exercise.
Outlook and Implications
The self-professed South Ossetian government is helpless to retaliate in any way, except with Russia's support, and this international dimension is most important in the current escalation. For Russia, South Ossetia is a useful means to undermine and cause inconvenience to the unfriendly Georgian government which sees itself as the U.S. outpost in the post-Soviet space, and seeks to join NATO, which is very annoying to Russia. Furthermore, the Russian government is not likely to take the killing of its peace-keeping troops in the province overnight lightly. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has already condemned the attack as an "aggressive action", while President Dmitry Medvedev is reportedly considering "emergency measures" to respond to the situation, taking time to choose their tactics.
Despite the obvious impetus to deal with the persistent problem, both the Russian and Georgian governments are well aware that they need to tread carefully and save face internationally. The European Union (EU), United States, NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have all called for a halt to the fighting in South Ossetia, and none would want to appear overly aggressive. Georgia has already announced a brief ceasefire to let civilians out of the province, and has kept reiterating its readiness for dialogue throughout the military action. Russia, seeking to renew its international authority, would also not want to take the obvious image risks any military support to South Ossetia will carry. Russia's most likely response will thus be not military but diplomatic, including the possible reintroduction of blockade measures against the Georgian government, rather than an outright military action in South Ossetia's support.
After Georgia's intervention, we are most likely to see lengthy and protracted negotiations at various levels up to the UN Security Council that could stop the military activities but would most likely prove unsatisfactory to all sides, exposing once again the lack of widely acceptable international instruments for settling inter-state and separatist conflicts. This may give additional ground to Russia's calls for a new security pact in Europe, which, however, is likely to be blocked by Euro-Atlantic structures as upsetting the already existing balances. The military action in South Ossetia will be dwarfed in international attention by the opening of the Olympic Games in Beijing today (a trademark of the Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili is to mask important policy assaults under global sporting events). Yet, this small conflict is one of a number of cases pointing to substantial lacunae in international security mechanisms.