Global Insight Perspective | |
Significance | The double suicide bombing on Pakistan's main arms factory demonstrates a coordinated approach by the Taliban to target Pakistani, Afghan and international security forces, and disrupt supply lines to international coalition operations in Afghanistan |
Implications | The surge in violence demonstrates that former president Pervez Musharraf's resignation is unlikely to quell the Islamic insurgency in Pakistan's north-west tribal region, which threatens the internal stability of both Pakistan and Afghanistan |
Outlook | Attempts to clamp down on the Taliban resurgence are likely to take a backseat in Pakistan, amid the ongoing political friction within the ruling coalition over the process of reinstating the deposed Supreme Court judges and picking a presidential candidate. |
Pakistan’s Election Commission announced today that the presidential election following the resignation of President Pervez Musharraf earlier this week will be held on 6 September (see Pakistan: 18 August 2008: President of Pakistan Announces Resignation). Nomination papers will be filed from 26 August and the president will be elected by a joint session of the upper and lower houses of parliament and the four provincial assemblies. The leading party in the government, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), has reportedly nominated Asif Ali Zardari, PPP co-chairman and husband of the late Benazir Bhutto to stand for president, although this has been opposed by the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), the second-largest party in the ruling coalition (see Pakistan: 21 August 2008: Ruling Party to Nominate Zardari for Pakistani President). Both parties met today to reach a consensus on selecting a candidate for president and the process of reinstating some 60 deposed Supreme Court judges who were ousted by Musharraf during his six-week state of emergency in November 2007. Nawaz Sharif, head of the PML-N, has set a deadline for 27 August for the restoration of the judges, with a draft resolution to be prepared over the weekend ahead of a parliamentary vote next week.
Meanwhile, casualties from yesterday’s double suicide bombing at Pakistan's main defence-industry factory in Wah, which is 30km west of the capital, Islamabad, rose to 64 dead and 70 injured (see Pakistan: 21 August 2008: Arms Factory Bombed in Pakistan as Cross-Border Missiles Strike Near Afghan-Pakistan Border). A third would-be suicide bomber has been arrested in connection with the bombings, for which the Taliban claimed responsibility.
A U.S. airstrike also killed some 30 insurgents in the Shindand district of Herat province in western Afghanistan today, according to the U.S. military, although the Afghan army reported that there had been some civilian casualties. Three Canadian combat engineers were also killed by an improvised explosive device (IED), which hit their vehicle in the Zhari district in Afghanistan’s southern Kandahar province on 20 August. Another U.S. solider was killed by an IED explosion in eastern Afghanistan today. This brings the number of foreign troops killed in Afghanistan this week to 19, including 10 French soldiers and 3 Polish soldiers (see Afghanistan: 19 August 2008: Violence Escalates in Eastern Afghanistan). A total of 41 foreign troops have been killed in Afghanistan in August and 185 since the start of the year.
Outlook and Implications
Political Infighting Diverts Attention from Deteriorating Security
The Pakistani government has called for the powers of the president to be curtailed to a ceremonial position as per the 1973 constitution, following the abuse of power under former president Musharraf. However, political infighting over the presidential post has widened fissures within the ruling coalition, with relations already under strain over the process of reinstating the deposed Supreme Court judges. Although Zardari and Sharif have agreed to reinstate the judges, Zardari has reportedly opposed the reinstatement of former Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. This is over concerns that Chaudhry could rescind a National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), which was implemented by Musharraf to facilitate Zardari’s return to Pakistan last year and his acquittal on corruption charges. The PML-N withdrew its ministers from the cabinet in May following the failure to meet a deadline to reinstate the judges, although four ministers subsequently returned following an agreement to impeach Musharraf (see Pakistan: 13 May 2008: Pakistan's Ruling Coalition Fractures amid Disagreement over Reinstatement of Judges). Irrespective of the outcome of today’s meeting of the ruling coalition, the brief honeymoon period between the PPP and PML-N following their victory over pro-Musharraf and Islamist parties in a parliamentary election in February appears to be over. Both parties have reverted to their traditionally confrontational relationship fuelled by their competing political ambitions and long-standing legacy of mistrust and competition.
Need for Coordinated Approach in Afghan-Pakistan Taliban Resurgence
The double suicide bombing in Islamabad is the second major terrorist attack in Pakistan following the resignation of former president Musharraf earlier this week (see Pakistan: 20 August 2008: Pakistani Coalition Meets to Discuss President’s Successor as Bomb Blast Toll Rises to 30). Militants have stepped up attacks following the Pakistani military’s operations in the Bajaur tribal agency near the Afghan border, which has left some 500 militants and 30 soldiers dead in the last two weeks, according to the government.
After coming to power in March 2008, the government of Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani sought to distinguish itself from the previous pro-Musharraf government by adopting a more conciliatory approach toward militants in the north-west tribal region. This included a string of prisoner exchanges, a reduction of the Pakistani military presence, a commitment to replace the colonial-era Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) with Islamic (Sharia) Law in the tribal region, a ceasefire in the South Waziristan agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in April, and a peace agreement in the Swat Valley of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in May (see Pakistan: 22 May 2008: Peace Agreement Concluded between Militants and Government in Pakistan). Yet this has allowed militant groups to consolidate their position ahead of renewed attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have been accompanied by growing bilateral tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a string of cross-border airstrikes by the United States and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) into Pakistani territory.
The gloves appear to have finally come off between the Pakistani Taliban and the Pakistani military following the Pakistani military operations in the Bajaur tribal agency. These operations have put to rest any belief in an accommodation between militants and the government, as well as the view that militancy was driven purely by opposition to the undemocratic, pro-Western government of Pervez Musharraf. So far there has remained a distinction between the forces of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban-Pakistan) led by Baitullah Meshud, which is based in the north-west tribal region and has mounted attacks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Afghan Taliban leadership headquartered in Quetta, the capital of Pakistan’s southern Baluchistan province, which has only focussed its attacks on Afghanistan. This distinction may begin to erode, though, as the Taliban insurgency rages in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
In addition to attempts to make territorial gains in Afghanistan, the Taliban are also making symbolic victories by attacking international aid workers and infrastructure, and mounting bold attacks on the capital and its outskirts to undermine the legitimacy of the Hamid Karzai government and international coalition operations (see Afghanistan: 14 August 2008: Aid Group Suspends Operations in Afghanistan After Killings). This has been complemented by militant attacks in Pakistan, which have targeted security forces and their infrastructure in order to disrupt supply lines to international coalition operations in Afghanistan. The international community has responded to the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan and the Talibanisation of FATA in Pakistan with pledges to enhance the 70,000-strong international troop presence in Afghanistan, of which 53,000 are part of ISAF, with the rest operating under the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom. Nonetheless, a sustainable solution to the conflict will only be found through targeting the catalyst of the Taliban resurgence, including militant sanctuaries in Pakistan’s border regions, the flourishing opium trade in Afghanistan and the inability or unwillingness of Afghan president Hamid Karzai’s government to clamp down on corruption and warlordism within his government, as well as claims of U.S.-inflicted civilian casualties.