Global Insight Perspective | |
Significance | The presidential election is a further step in Pakistan’s reversion to democracy following nine years of rule by President Pervez Musharraf after a military coup in 1999. |
Implications | The most immediate issue facing the new president is curbing the powers of the presidency and reinstating the deposed judiciary, which will quell further political gridlock and alleviate concerns over a civilian dictatorship. |
Outlook | A stable presidency will rest on Zardari gaining the support of opposition parties, Pakistan’s population, the military and international community, which will require instituting political and legal reforms, progress in clamping down on Islamic extremism and reviving Pakistan’s economy. |
Asif Ali Zardari, the co-chair of the ruling Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the widower of former premier Benazir Bhutto, secured more than two-thirds of the votes in Pakistan’s presidential election on 6 September. Zardari was elected in a secret ballot of a 702-member electoral college, comprising a joint session of the country’s 342-seat National Assembly (lower house), 100-seat Senate (upper house), and four provincial assemblies, with each accounting for 65 votes. Pakistan’s Election Commission will announce the official results later today. Zardari will be sworn in as the 14th president of Pakistan tomorrow (9 September).
The election was sparked by the resignation of President Pervez Musharraf last month amid the threat of impeachment (see Pakistan: 18 August 2008: President of Pakistan Announces Resignation). Musharraf led Pakistan for nine years following a military coup against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999. Zardari assumed the co-chairmanship of the PPP following the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 while she was campaigning for parliamentary elections.
On the same day as the vote, some 33 people, including 5 policemen were killed and more than 80 injured in a suicide car bomb attack on a police check post in Peshawar, the capital of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The attack destroyed some 60 adjacent shops and two houses. Meanwhile, at least three militants were killed by a U.S. unmanned airstrike near the town of Miranshah in the North Waziristan agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) today. It was the fourth reported U.S. airstrike in Pakistan’s northwest tribal region in almost a week. Some 3,000 Pakistani tribesmen demonstrated in Wana in the South Waziristan agency of FATA on 5 September following an alleged U.S.-led airstrike and troop incursion in the area earlier in the week (see Pakistan: 3 September 2008: Failed Assassination Attempt on Pakistani Prime Minister amid Reports of International Troop Incursion into Pakistan). There has been a surge in militant attacks following the Pakistani military’s operations in the Bajaur agency of the FATA, which began last month. More than 1,200 people have been killed since the military stormed the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) in the capital Islamabad in July 2007, which was followed by a surge in terrorist attacks across the country.
Outlook and Implications
Managing Relationships
Despite securing the mandate of the government and his party, a stable presidency will rest on Zardari gaining the support of Pakistan’s 168 million populous, the military and international community, namely, Afghanistan, India and the United States. This will require instituting political and legal reforms, progress in clamping down on Islamic extremism and reviving Pakistan’s economy. Furthermore, despite its withdrawal from the ruling coalition, the fact that the PML-N retains control of Punjab province, Pakistan's political heartland, makes it a force to be reckoned with.
Popular Support
Zardari lacks the support that his wife had, which has been fuelled by charges of corruption, extortion and murder against him during Benazir Bhutto’s tenure as prime minister. This earned him the nickname “Mr. Ten Percent” and led Zardari to serve 11 years in jail before being released in 2004 after being cleared of 17 cases. In April, Zardari was cleared of conspiracy charges linked to the murder of Murtaza Bhutto, his brother-in-law in 1996.
Zardari’s first test of legitimacy will come from the issue of repealing the 17th amendment to the constitution, which was passed by Musharraf. This will return power to the parliament while the presidency is reverted to a largely symbolic position as per the 1973 constitution. At present, the president has the powers to dissolve the parliament, dismiss the prime minister, as well as appoint provincial governors, the chairman of the election commission and the attorney general. Opposition parties have also called on Zardari to resign his position as co-chair of the PPP in order to return the presidency to an apolitical position. While the PPP has favoured rolling back the powers of the president, with Zardari as president it may be less enthusiastic about doing so. This could fuel allegations that the PPP is creating a civilian dictatorship through its control of the parliament and a strong presidency.
Secondly, the reinstatement of the judges who were ousted by Musharraf during his six-week state of emergency in November 2007 will also be a pressing issue for Zardari. Musharraf ousted 13 of the 17 Supreme Court judges, including Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, as well as 60 of the 97 judges in the four provincial high courts for failing to pledge allegiance to his Provincial Constitutional Order (PCO). The PCO validated Musharraf’s re-election as president in October 2007, which came under scrutiny as it was conducted by the outgoing parliament while Musharraf held the dual post of president and army chief. The delay in reinstating the judges culminated in the PML-N withdrawing from the ruling four-party coalition last month (see Pakistan: 26 August 2008: Sharif’s Party Quits Ruling Alliance as Government Bans Pakistani Taliban). The government subsequently reappointed 6 of 60 high court judges although this has failed to quell opposition from the PML-N and the country’s legal community, which has demanded that all of the judges be reinstated (see Pakistan: 28 August 2008: Government Partially Reappoints Deposed Judges). Zardari fears that the reinstated judges could rescind the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), which facilitated his return to Pakistan in October 2007 and his acquittal on corruption charges. As such, Zardari has called for the reinstatement of the judges (except Chaudhry) by a constitutional package while the PML-N wants all of the judges reinstated by an executive order. Additional judges are likely to be reinstated in the coming days as part of this piecemeal approach in an attempt to marginalise Chaudhry.
Finally, the government is under pressure to revive Pakistan’s economy. The general populous will be looking for the PPP to fulfil its manifesto pledge to ensure "bread, clothing and shelter" for the population amid the country’s chronic power shortages, and food and fuel price hikes. Double-digit inflationary pressures fuelled by the declining value of the Pakistani rupee, which has fallen by approximately 26% against the U.S. dollar, coupled with strong domestic consumer spending, supported by record workers’ remittances, and a surge in international oil and commodity prices, has also fuelled the country’s current-account deficit, which reached a record US$20.7 billion in July. The country’s foreign-exchange reserves fell to just US$6.2 billion in August, which is enough to cover only 2.2 months of imports. Declining investor confidence has also resulted in the country’s stock market falling by 40% since the start of the year, which has imposed further pressure on liquidity (see Pakistan: 3 September 2008: Global Insight Downgrades Pakistan's Sovereign Risk Rating as Macro-Economic Imbalances Worsen).
International Community
The election outcome has been welcomed by the international community. Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s close relationship with Benazir Bhutto may alleviate recent tensions in the Afghan-Pakistan relationship amid allegations that the Pakistani government’s conciliatory policy towards militants in its northwest tribal region has fuelled the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. The United States has also welcomed the election outcome given that the U.S. had reportedly played a pivotal role in attempting to forge a power-sharing arrangement between Musharraf and Bhutto prior to Bhutto’s assassination. The PPP is generally regarded as more pro-Western and more responsive to the concerns over Islamic extremism than the PML-N, as demonstrated by the recent ban against the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan). Pakistan’s traditional regional rival, India, has also welcomed Pakistan’s reversion to democracy and the resignation of Musharraf, whom the Indian government regarded as the architect of a conflict between both states in the Kargil region of the disputed territory of Kashmir in 1999.
Nonetheless, Zardari’s pledge to improve relations with India and Afghanistan runs counter to the ground realities, which have seen a surge in militant infiltration across the Line of Control (LOC) separating Indian and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, as well as a Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan (see India: 21 July 2008: String of Terrorist Attacks in Indian-Administered Kashmir amid Composite Dialogue and Afghanistan: 15 July 2008: Taliban Resurgence Sparks War of Words Between Pakistan, Afghanistan). As demonstrated by the surge in U.S. airstrikes on Pakistani territory, the international community will continue to apply pressure on the Pakistani government to clampdown on militant sanctuaries on Pakistani soil amid a surge in Taliban attacks on U.S. and NATO-led forces in Afghanistan (see Afghanistan: 4 September 2008: Growing International Military Coalition and Civilian Casualties Fuel Tensions in Afghanistan).
Military
Finally, the Pakistani military, which has ruled the country for approximately half of its 61-year existence, is likely to refrain from overt interference in the political process following the popular backlash against Musharraf’s rule in the last years of his presidency. Nonetheless, any attempt by Zardari to encroach upon the military’s "sphere of influence" could lead to a resurgence of hostilities between the civilian government and military. The last time this occurred was in 1999 when frictions between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and army chief Pervez Musharraf over the Kargil conflict with India culminated in a military coup.
The Pakistani military, led by Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, will continue to rule from the shadows and have a pivotal role in dictating the country’s foreign and security policies. For instance, as president, Zardari is the supreme commander of the armed forces and will lead Pakistan’s National Command Authority, which safeguard’s the country’s nuclear arsenal, as well as having the power to appoint the chiefs of the three armed services. However, the military remains the real power "behind the throne", as seen under the governments of both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto in the 1990s when the civilian government had reportedly attempted to improve relations with India while the military continued its belligerent approach through supporting insurgent attacks on India.