EU, Georgian and Russian Governments Pledge Commitment to Peace Plan

One Step Forward…

"Slow but steady wins the race" seems to be the motto of France, the current holder of the European Union (EU) presidency. Yesterday, the EU made more progress on bringing about peace, or at least a truce, in Georgia. The triumvirate consisting of French President Nicolas Sarkozy, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, and the President of the European Commission (EC) Jose Manuel Barroso visited Moscow and Tbilisi in an attempt to overcome the recent deterioration in Russo-Georgian relations, which threatens the French peace plan of 12 August. Their first stop was at the Kremlin to discuss the scope for a withdrawal of Russian troops to where they were stationed before the war broke out on 7 August, and the deployment of around 200 monitors from the EU to South Ossetia. Next was Tbilisi where the triumvirate tried to persuade President Mikhail Saakashvili to refrain from provoking the Kremlin—and indeed the administrations of the breakaway regions—during the withdrawal of Russian troops. On both visits, the triumvirate was successful: Russian President Dmitry Medvedev agreed to order the full withdrawal of Russian troops from "Georgia proper", the Georgian territory excluding the breakaway regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia, within 10 days of the arrival of around 200 peace monitors from the EU in South Ossetia. If all goes to plan, the Russian troops should leave all of "Georgia proper" territory by 1 October. President Saakashvili welcomed the EU's mediation as a "step forward", according to Euractiv.

…Two Steps Back?

And yet, a closer look at the deal shows just how fragile it is. All depends on the capacity of the Kremlin and the Georgian administration to keep the more hostile forces in check.

Saakashvili will have to start with himself by refraining from any more jibes at the Kremlin's stance on the two breakaway regions. Already refraining from public comments on Russia's position on South Ossetia and Abkhazia would work wonders, yet chances are very low that Saakashvili will manage to do so. First, the Georgian government is still angered by the capacity of the breakaway regions to obtain Russia's support and even recognition of their independence. Tbilisi regards the two regions as part of the Georgian territory and demands respect for its sovereignty. Any support for Abkhazia and South Ossetia could increase instability in Georgia, and thus threaten the stability of the government. Indeed, in his reaction to yesterday's deal between the EU and Russia, Saakashvili stated that the Russian military should "get the hell out" of the two regions, according to the BBC. Secondly, Saakashvili is under considerable pressure: recently, 80 members of Georgian opposition parties, journalists and human rights organisations published an open letter in the government-critical daily Rezonansi; they asked why the President entered South Ossetia in August despite warnings by the United States, called for an end to large-scale censorship and free debate on the mistakes made by the government in the conflict. One of the opposition spearheads, the former ally of Saakashvili and leader of parliament Nino Burjanadze, announced her return to politics to challenge the government's version of the war in August. These two factors may increase the petulance of the Georgian government and derail the peace process through ever-recurring diplomatic spats and continued deterioration in relations between the Kremlin and Tbilisi.

The Russian government has its own temptations to fight. The first difficulty for the Kremlin will be how to marry its support for independence of the two breakaway regions with continued allegiance to the peace process. It will indeed be difficult to improve relations between the Georgian and Russian governments as long as South Ossetia and Abkhazia continue their state-building tasks. Reference to the peace plan may be of little help here, as the latter made an important translation error which grants Russia the right to observe security "for" the two regions, rather than "in" which was in the original text. Indeed, the Kremlin can ensure the security of citizens in the two regions by far more means thanks to the word "for", be it through diplomatic, economic or judiciary means. "In" would have effectively ended Russia's heavy influence over the two regions once it had withdrawn its troops from South Ossetia at least. By encouraging the leaders of the two regions to continue with their state-building measures, the Kremlin may provoke a harsh response from Georgia, something the EU dreads. Further, the Russian envoy to NATO, Dmitri Rogozin, threatened that the Kremlin would stop all relations with NATO if Georgia was accepted for NATO's "Membership Action Plan" (MAP).

Outlook and Implications

As for the EU, the deal is an important breather but not much more. The bloc remains very divided as regards the way forward in the conflict, which was epitomised in the decision of the EU Council on 1 September to apply a step-by-step approach to sanctions against Russia (see Russia - Europe: 2 September 2008: EU Pragmatic on Russia at Emergency Summit). Sarkozy admitted that lasting peace remained a far way off by saying that "all has not been resolved" (Euractiv). Those preferring a cautious approach to sanctions against Russia—first and foremost France itself—must now hope for cooperation by Georgia and Russia to see the plan through to 1 October. Anything other than that would resurface the open divide in the bloc about the EU's stance towards Russia, and could prompt more individual actions by disgruntled member states. The EU Presidency has the task of presenting a united EU towards third parties at all times, and this may become infinitely more difficult if the peace plan breaks down.