IHS Global Insight Perspective | |
Significance | The Summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation in Moscow yesterday produced a joint rapid deployment force similar to that of NATO, dominated by Russian army forces. |
Implications | The same heads of CIS states apart from Uzbekistan established a US$10-billion joint stabilisation fund, with Russia footing US$7.5-billion of the bill. |
Outlook | The Kremlin has spared no resources to finally buy Russia's influence over the CIS states to the largest extent since the fall of the Soviet Union. The military bloc will help preserve current political regimes in the CIS, while possibly adding to the fight against terrorism and drug-trafficking in Central Asia. |
Military Stick...
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) states have taken a step forward—and backward in history towards Soviet times—as the presidents of the seven members of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (ODKB),\ Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, signed the document establishing the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR) yesterday. Russia will contribute an air-borne division and an assault brigade, totalling 8,000 personnel, Kazakhstan will bring a 4,000-strong assault brigade, and the remaining members will be represented by battalions. Uzbekistan has joined on "special conditions" allowing the government to partake in KSOR operations at its own discretion.
The founding treaty defined the triple purpose of the rapid deployment force as "rebuttal of military aggression; conduct of anti-terrorist operations and operations against international organised crime; and to help alleviate emergency situations". Russian President Dmitry Medvedev hailed the future bloc as fully competitive with NATO's air deployment force. Nothing has been explicitly stated as to any perceived enemy in terms of states or blocs, although the reference to NATO is certainly not accidental. It is not yet known where the new force will be based; the army forces will not be taken out of sovereign command of its original members and its headquarters will only be entrusted with "coordination activities".
...with Financial Carrot
The same figures bar Uzbek President Islam Karimov met yesterday afternoon in a different framework, that of the Eurasian Economic Community summit, to produce another landmark decision, creating a joint economic stabilisation fund of US$10 billion. Of that sum, Russia will contribute at least US$7.5 billion, and Kazakhstan US$1 billion, while other members will define their commitment within the coming month, likely to be eventually financed by Russia as well. The Fund will allocate sovereign loans for overcoming the consequences of world financial crisis, credit foreign trade operations between members and finance their joint investment projects. The Fund will be managed by the Eurasian development bank. The members have also established an international centre for advanced technologies to implement research, innovation and venture projects.
Outlook and Implications
On the surface, the leaders of the CIS states are leaving Moscow pleased on both professional and personal accounts. Autocrats as they predominantly are, they can now rely on military support from their neighbours should any popular protests arise in their countries, a fairly realistic prospect in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia and even potentially Belarus. Armenia has also assured itself formidable backing against Azerbaijan should it resort to force in dealing with the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Access to additional stabilisation funds will also come in very handy, and for Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia this will be on top of the respective US$1 billion, US$500 million and up to US$1 billion in individual aid packages from Russia.
The Kremlin is splashing out, using the predicaments that the economic crisis has created for its over-the-border allies to lure them into its domain, hoping for payback at a later date. After all, substantial efforts on the part of the Russian leadership and diplomats to return the CIS states to Russia's undisputed sphere of influence since 1991 have been at best partially successful, with the potential allies exploiting the Kremlin's ambitions to the largest possible extent while aiming to retain their economic and military sovereignty. In the face of falling budget revenues and growing popular discontent, CIS leaders have become more agreeable, and Moscow moved swiftly into the gap.
The Russian government is prepared to foot substantial bills for its foreign economic policy successes, and without demanding clear obligations from the allies. The question remains how well they will administer it. Will the Kremlin succeed in eliminating trade and business barriers for Russian businesses in the ally states and effectively spreading its economic space to the CIS common economic space, or will it be deceived as has happened many times before? How will the stronger military and economic integration within the seven member states affect relations with the other CIS participants: Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Turkmenistan, and Moldova? Given the neutral status of the latter two and pro-NATO inclinations in the first two, they are not likely to join the military alliance any time soon. The documents signed yesterday are only a step towards Russia's ideal vision of its position in the post-Soviet space, but it is nevertheless rather remarkable, and brave.