IHS Global Insight Perspective | |
Significance | The last of the group's training camps fell, leaving its cadres confined to a rapidly-shrinking slice of coastal land. |
Implications | The government ruled out a ceasefire deal with the group, instead offering amnesty, rehabilitation and assimilation to lower-level fighters prepared to lay down their arms. Although the LTTE's conventional military capability has been significantly circumscribed, the group is expected to shift to more unpredictable, asymmetric attacks. |
Outlook | The authorities have said that the conflict is now in its final stages, and may even be completed within days rather than weeks. Although this is probably an optimistic outlook, the situation has prompted observers to question "what next for Sri Lanka?" |
Last Week's Events
Journalists have not been given access to the conflict areas for some time and as such, there is no independent verification of events. The LTTE has long stopped commenting on many of the government and military's assertions so observers are largely reliant on the authorities' reports for an indication of events in the war-torn areas. With this in mind, last week's key events included the fall of the rebels' suicide training HQ and their sea base at Chalai. The loss of these bases is not only psychologically important but also undercut the group strategically. Chalai for example was reportedly used as a supply point for arms and fuel from other countries. Attention is now focused on taking the remaining smaller coastal bases, and tracking down the last of the group's fighters, many of whom are believed to have taken to the jungles. Last week saw the international community strongly press both sides over rising civilian casualties, with the UN and large aid agencies, like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), reporting on the humanitarian atrocities being committed in the region.
Outlook and Implications
The LTTE
The international community is keen to bring the conflict to a swift end to contain the risk of further mass civilian casualties. As such, they have called separately on the government to consider a ceasefire, and the LTTE to lay down their arms. Both options have been rejected. The government has said that a ceasefire will simply provide the rebels with an opportunity to rearm, regroup and launch suicide missions against the military. The LTTE meanwhile has reportedly said that it will not give up its fight without a number of vague guarantees, such as the right to live with dignity. As a result, fighting is likely to continue to the bitter end. Some observers have argued that the conflict has now reached the stage where it will require heavy close-quarters combat to finish the group. That said, in many cases the rebels have slipped away ahead of bases falling, leaving the military to discovery deserted facilities and ghost towns. As such, it is possible that remaining fighters will try to escape by simply mingling with the civilians in the area.
The government is keen to target the LTTE's leadership and has already ruled out amnesty for the senior leaders. Clearly the main prize is rebel commander, Velupillai Prabhakaran, and his capture or death would constitute a huge boon for the government. There is considerable speculation as to Prabhakaran's whereabouts: some argue he remains in the country, others posit that he fled a few weeks ago and may be in Malaysia or Thailand.
The rebel group itself is defeated though given its guerrilla tactics, it has been suggested that a core group will continue to operate against the government and military. The Black Tigers are a tight-knit band of highly trained LTTE operatives skilled in terror and suicide attacks. This band is expected to go underground and use targeted attacks against high-profile individuals, military targets, and civilian targets in key cities like the capital, Colombo. It is impossible to determine whether this will come to pass, but given the group's tenacity and training it is likely that some members will want to continue their fight. Notice was served today when a female suicide bomber killed 28 people and injured dozens of others in the northeast of the country. Twenty of those killed in the Vishwamadu area of Mullaitivu district were soldiers.
The Government
The government is riding high on the LTTE's demise. It is the first administration to do what none of its predecessors have managed and against the perceived wisdom that it was impossible to defeat the LTTE militarily. The fact that it had a huge boost in terms of the LTTE's disintegration in 2004 when its rebel commander in the east defected and provided the military with vital operational and strategic information is now neither here nor there. The basic fact is, it has won, and the LTTE has lost. The government has been quick to capitalise on the nationalistic sentiment and general interest surrounding the military's conquest. An exhibition of finds from the LTTE's various bases has gone on show in Colombo, and photographs of the group's training headquarters are being circulated to news agencies.
It has brushed off repeat accusations of human rights violations, blaming—rightly in some, but not all cases—the LTTE for either committing atrocities or positioning their lines next to civilian settlements in a bid to use them as shields. There is very much the sense that the government is prepared to accept the criticism targeted towards it in the short term to ensure its longer-term aim of finishing the conflict. It can do this because it has support from the majority of the population, and is confident that despite the criticisms of international partners and donors, they will ultimately remain on-side.
Politically, the government can be expected to go into election mode over the course of this year. The electoral budget has already been increased in anticipation, and both local elections in the once rebel-held territory and a national election, are likely. The former is particularly important for the government. It was quick to pursue local elections in the east of the country once the LTTE was routed from the region. The move legitimises its actions showing an acceptance by the local population of the federal government (and with this, Sri Lanka's laws and systems), and it undermines the LTTE's long-asserted claim to a distinct Tamil homeland. Nationally, the government can be expected to make substantive gains in a general election. The majority Sinhalese population, and parts of the Tamil population, will be relieved that the conflict has ended and reward the government for it, seeing this as an opportunity for peace and allowing Sri Lanka the opportunity to rebuild and develop.
The International Community
The international community can be expected to swiftly offer Sri Lanka a considerable amount of aid money to pursue reconstruction and development work in the war-torn areas. Observers who have visited formerly Tamil-held regions have remarked on their need for development, an overhaul of the infrastructure, and general improvements in facilities. Coupled with this, large parts of these areas will have been destroyed or affected by the fighting. What the international community also needs to do is build in two key elements: improvements in the humanitarian situation and support for the healing of the country's ethnic divisions. A notably nationalistic Sinhalese government is expected to pay less interest to Tamil rights, and the international community needs to ensure that these stay on the agenda and that the administration pays more than lip service to the rights issue. Pushing this issue will create tensions between the donor community and the harder-line Sinhalese politicians, who have come to accuse the international community of being too sympathetic to the LTTE. That said, without healing these divides and making considerable improvements to the lives of Tamils in the north and north-east, Sri Lanka will end up sowing the seeds for future ethnic-based conflict.