Security Rating Downgraded as Armed Mutiny Spreads in Bangladesh

Mutiny Escalates

A mutiny at the headquarters of the Bangladesh Rifles in the capital Dhaka has spread across the country after government attempts to secure a negotiated settlement broke down. Unrest has been reported at border guard posts in Cox's Bazar, Tekhnaf, Chittagong and Naikhongchari in the south, Sylhet in the northeast, and Rajshahi and Naogaon in the northwest. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina issued an uncompromising call for the mutineers to lay down their arms in a televised national address warning of tough reprisals if the government's demands were ignored.

The violence flared yesterday coinciding with a meeting of senior BDR officers at the Dhaka compound. Some 3,000-4,000 regular BDR troops are stationed at the barrack headquarters in the capital. Rank and file guards opened fire and also seized control of a local shopping mall. Thousands of heavily armed troops from the regular Bangladeshi army were called in to secure the area. Around 10 people were immediately reported dead following the initial eruption of firing although officials stated that that number could climb much higher when access to the site is obtained. More than 50 women and children were evacuated unharmed from the military compound with most believed to be relatives of the senior officers.

Representatives of the mutineers were given safe passage to the prime minister's office where negotiations proceeded. Twenty hours after the mutiny erupted, government officials were confident to declare it over with the ceasefire anchored on a general amnesty agreement. However, sporadic gunfire continued through the night before violence spread to other outposts early this morning.

Who are the BDR and What are Their Grievances?

The Bangladesh Rifles division is the country's second largest military force charged with securing national borders with Myanmar and India that stretch some 3,000 kilometres through often inhospitable terrain. The unit's history stretches back to the eighteenth century following its formation by the colonial East India Company to provide border security. Currently, there are around 65,000 men under arms, the majority of which are stationed in the border regions at 42 main outposts. Its main remit as a border unit is in anti-smuggling operations, although it provides reinforcement to the national police force in periods of unrest. The unit is well-armed and composed of highly trained paramilitaries.

Tensions are believed to have been simmering in the rank and file of the BDR for some time. Institutional stress has been caused by the composition of the unit's officer class, which is drawn from the national army. Officers are seconded to the BDR in rotational tenures that last between two and four years. The influence of the national army is also accentuated through its role in training the unit. Regular troops have complained of the limited opportunities for advancement, the lack of receptivity of officers to their grievances and more insidiously of widespread corruption.

The current dispute appears to have been triggered by pay. The typical pay of a border rifleman is just US$70 per month, equivalent to that of low-ranking bureaucratic officials. The force has therefore been acutely exposed to the spiral in staple food prices that also fuelled double-digit general inflation. The government has provided the guards with three months of rations of rice, flour and sugar to supplement their incomes. However, this has stoked further resentment with rations in the national army provided throughout the year. Accusations that officers are engaged in widespread graft of both pay and supplies designated for rank and file troops are also rife. The gunfight erupted at the Dhaka compound after senior officers refused demands for pay increases, improved working conditions and more subsidised food rations.

Government Challenge

The mutiny and its spread present a significant challenge to Sheikh Hasina's government that took office following an election in December. The election reinstituted multi-party democracy in Bangladesh following two years of government by a military-backed caretaker government. The military seized power in January 2007 to halt the country's descent into anarchy as warring between the country's two main parties, the Awami League and the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), paralysed the legislative process. Currently, the prospect of another coup d'état remains remote. The national army remains under the control of Hasina's government, which received an overwhelming popular mandate in the December election. However, the mutiny is a test of Hasina's authority and her capacity to restore order and stability quickly. The military still remains a powerful institution in the Bangladeshi polity reflecting the severe constraints on civilian institutional capacity engendered by endemic corruption, bureaucratic red tape and political polarisation.

As such, the mutiny is significant in the microcosm that its grievances provide of wider Bangladeshi society. Socio-economic distress is expected to intensify as economic growth slows and inflation retains traction exposing that lack of sufficient social welfare nets to provide support. In addition, the onus remains on the Hasina government to continue the reform programme instigated by the interim government aimed at eradicating corruption, reducing stultifying regulation and reinvigorating the political environment through a clean-up of the electoral process and an expansion of the voter register. Such reforms are also required to boost levels of investment in the economy, both foreign and domestic, to lift Bangladesh out of its current poverty trap.

Outlook and Implications

However, the omens from the outset have been less than good. Hasina and her Awami League party have fuelled the damaging polarisation of Bangladeshi politics and the pre-electoral consensus with the BNP has already begun to break down. Clashes between members of the rival parties have already killed dozens since the start of the year while the BNP has already hamstrung the parliamentary process through a demand for additional front-row seats in the legislature. More broadly, the strength of vested interest within AL makes implementation of reforms on the scale required even less likely.