IHS Global Insight Perspective | |
Significance | Yesterday, the family of Latin American Leftist leaders welcomed a new member, as Mauricio Funes from the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) scored a historic victory in the Salvadoran presidential contest, relegating Rodrigo Ávila from the ruling Republican National Alliance (ARENA) into second place. |
Implications | After 20 years of ARENA rule and 17 years after the end of the civil war, the peaceful handover of power to the former guerrilla group-turned-political party, FMLN, is a major step for the consolidation of democracy in one of the region’s poorest countries. |
Outlook | Funes is likely to opt for gradual policy change and incremental reform. This reflects the need to strike bargains in the legislature, but may lead to some tension between the president-elect and his party. More broadly, effectively serving the multiple constituencies that supported Funes’ election campaign is likely to shape policy-making, as the country faces a dire economic outlook and an unprecedented rise in violent crime. |
A Country Divided
Amid widespread street celebrations yesterday, Mauricio Funes, the candidate representing the leftist opposition FMLN, declared himself president-elect of El Salvador. In the expected tight electoral race, preliminary results from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE)—based on 91.1% of the ballots—have given Funes a decisive but narrow leading edge of 51.3% over his only competitor, Rodrigo Ávila (48.3%) from the ruling ARENA party. Highlighting the widespread perception of a country highly polarised between two political forces, this is by far the closest outcome in a presidential election since the end of El Salvador’s bloody civil war in 1992. A little later, Ávila conceded defeat, offering to lead a "constructive" opposition party. After a bitter and highly emotional electoral campaign, which had seen small-scale violent clashes, no major incidents of electoral violence were reported on Election Day itself. Reflecting the high stakes of the election, seen by much of the electorate as a vote on "change", voter turnout has been high, estimated at some 60% (see El Salvador: 13 March 2009: Election 2009: Tensions Run High as Salvadorans Vote for New President).
The Salvadoran Way
For the first time since the end of the civil war and faced with the real possibility of losing a presidential election, ARENA led a defensive electoral campaign based on stoking fears of El Salvador evolving into a satellite state of far-left neighbours Cuba and Venezuela. These claims have been strenuously rejected by Funes, the first-ever FMLN candidate to not be a former rebel fighter.
Stressing his accountability to the Salvadoran left, Funes has tried to evade association with either moderate leftist leaders such as those of Chile and Brazil, or radicals in the vein of Cuba and Venezuela. More tangibly, Funes has pledged to maintain close relations with the United States, by far the country’s most important trading partner and home to some 2.3 Salvadorans. Remittances—flowing mainly from the United States—account for 17% of El Salvador’s GDP. In particular, he has promised not to seek a course of economic de-dollarisation and not to drop out of the Central American Free-Trade agreement (DR-CAFTA), instrumental in diversifying exports and attracting investment. Funes has also kept his distance from the Venezuelan-led Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA).
More broadly, it is important to remember that El Salvador is not awash with hydrocarbon reserves, the proceeds of which have sustained the rise of radical leftist rule in countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador. With a low tax-take and a moderate buy-out capacity, leftist radicalism is unlikely to thrive under Funes.
Outlook and Implications
Translating the momentum of change into concrete policies with tangible outcomes will, however, be a substantial challenge for Funes, as he falls of short of a legislative majority in the new unicameral Congress (see El Salvador: 20 January 2009: Election 2009: Latin American Left Chalks Up Another Victory with Salvadoran Parliamentary Polls). Although with 35 deputies the FMLN is the strongest legislative force, it will need to bring on board the rightist National Conciliation Party (PCN) to successfully pass legislation. Any decision requiring a qualified majority (56 votes out of 84), such as the budget, can be blocked by ARENA, while ARENA, the PCN, and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) could impose legislation requiring a simple majority against the consent of the largest parliamentary force. However, getting parties to co-operate in the legislature will not be easy after the long and bitter electoral campaign.
The need for legislative co-operation and placating the opposition may also create tension within the FMLN, whose rank-and-file continues to be more radicalised than its leadership. These problems could be exacerbated by the fact that the vote for Funes has also been a highly personal one, with voters throwing their support behind the contender, but not necessarily his party. This effectively creates another constituency to which Funes will be held accountable. Business groups have historically been on friendly terms with successive ARENA administrations, but may pragmatically react to policy proposals from the future president; thus policy-making is likely to be driven by inter-party negotiations and gradual change. A political gridlock of opposing forces would, however, impose high social and economic costs on the country, which is ailing under an unprecedented wave of crime, largely linked to youth gang activities and likely negative economic growth in 2009.